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ABSTRACT
This study examined the racial rhetoric of Wade 
Hampton with particular attention to claims that he was a 
moderate and sought to solve the racial problems of the 
period through rhetorical means. The study investigated:
(1) the extent to which his speeches addressed the racial 
issue, (2) the consistency of his position, and (3) the 
nature and appropriateness of his appeals. State newspapers 
were examined to locate his speeches, which were categorized 
by period and subject. Examination of the data revealed 
four specific racial exigencies to which Hampton responded: 
(1) the loss of black labor(1865-66), (2) black suffrage 
(1867-68), (3) black political domination (1876), and (4) 
proscription of black political participation (1877-78).
His gubernatorial campaign of 1876 and representative 
responses to each exigence were critiqued using the 
methodology of the rhetorical situation. The speeches were 
analyzed in terms of exigence, audience, constraints, and 
appropriateness.
The following conclusions were drawn: (1) over ninety
percent of Hampton's reported speeches 1865-1878 addressed 
the racial exigence. (2) His speeches were remarkably 
consistent with one another and with his private
iv
correspondence. (3) Hampton envisioned a white controlled 
society with blacks performing most of the labor while 
enjoying legal equality, educational opportunity, and 
possibilities for political office. To achieve that end he 
asked whites to recognize the new political realities, treat 
the blacks with kindness and fairness, and grant them legal 
and political rights and privileges. To the blacks, he 
appealed to their sense of identification as southern men 
and contended that economically they were inextricably 
linked to the fate of the native whites. To audiences black 
and white his ethos was his most dominant appeal.
Throughout the period he sought rhetorical rather than 
violent means for modifying the exigencies. His speeches 





Statement of Problem and Justification 
C. Vann Woodward in Origins of the New South: 1877- 
1913 labels Wade Hampton as "one of the foremost spokesmen 
of the South during the post Civil War period."1 Huber 
Ellingsworth in his study of "Southern Reconciliation 
Orators in the North, 1868-1899," identifies Wade Hampton 
as one of the four most prominent southerners to speak in 
the North on the reconciliation theme.2 These observations 
logically raised the question of the actual nature and 
extent of Hampton's speaking in the South, and most 
especially in his native state, South Carolina. Preliminary 
investigations indicated that while historians of the 
Reconstruction era in South Carolina concurred in the 
significance of his role, referred to his persuasive cam­
paigns, and quoted from his speeches, no one had done a 
study of Hampton's speaking in South Carolina. In fact, the
1Wendell Holmes Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter, eds., 
A History of the South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1951), vol 9, Origins of the New South. by
C. Vann Woodward, 321.
2Huber Ellingsworth, "Southern Reconciliation Orators 




only study of any of Hampton's speaking was Ellingsworth's 
which was limited to three speeches delivered in the North.
While the whole of Wade Hampton's speaking career 
could profitably be studied, the racial issue was of such 
critical importance in the period and so dominant in his 
rhetoric that it deserved to be isolated and studied apart 
from his other speeches. Hampton's involvement with the 
racial-political conflict in South Carolina is noted by all 
who study Reconstruction in South Carolina, but Hampton 
Jarrell is the only historian to concentrate exclusively on 
that involvement. In Wade Hampton and the Nearo he identi­
fies Hampton with the policies of Lincoln, Johnson, and L.
Q. c. Lamar, and argues that Hampton sought a middle road in 
race relations between black dominance on the one hand and 
proscription on the other.3 This claim toward moderation in 
his racial position gains significance in light of Ellings­
worth 's claim that Hampton was attempting through his 
rhetoric to bring reconciliation between North and South. 
Jarrell further observes that he chose to focus his study of 
race relations "around the personality of Wade Hampton 
because throughout the period he was at the center of the 
conflict."4 Thus, it seems profitable to focus this study 
of Wade Hampton's speaking on the issue on which he was at
3Hampton M. Jarrell, Wade Hampton and the Negro: The 
Road Not Taken (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1949), ix.
4Ibid., xi.
"the center of the conflict," and which he claimed to be 
attempting to solve through persuasion rather than coercion.
As early as 1865-67 Wade Hampton spoke to both white 
and black audiences in an attempt to influence race rela­
tions. In the 1876 gubernatorial campaign he publicly 
disavowed violence and advocated free speech. Judge T. J. 
Mackey, a converted radical, said there were
three methods of dealing with the Negro voters-— three 
methods: one is to kill him. . . . The next method is
to defraud the Negro of his vote. . . . The last is the 
persuasive method. . . . This is the Hampton method, and 
by it thousands of Negroes have been induced to . . .  
vote the Democratic ticket.5
Ben Tillman, Hampton's opponent in the 1890's, derided
Hampton for his naive belief in the power of persuasion:
He [Hampton] blundered egregiously in urging the policy 
of persuasion; and of convincing the Negroes by argument 
to vote with us. He always maintained that sixteen 
thousand Negroes voted for him in 1876; but every active 
worker in the cause knew that in this he was woefully 
mistaken. . . . Gary preached the only effective 
doctrine for the times: that "one ounce of fear was
worth a pound of persuasion," and was prepared and did 
ride roughshod over the Negroes.6
Thus, the study of Wade Hampton's racial rhetoric clearly
offers the rhetorical critic the opportunity to study the
attempt of a man who by his own testimony as well as that of
his contemporaries sought a rhetorical solution to one of
the most volatile continuing problems in American history.
5Greenville Enterprise and Mountaineer. 21 April 1880.
6Ben jamin R. Tillman, The Struggles of '76: Address 
Delivered at the Red Shirt Reunion. Anderson. S.C.. August 
25th. 1909 (n.p., n.d.), 27.
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This study will examine the racial rhetoric of Wade 
Hampton in South Carolina from 1865 through 1878. The lower 
date was chosen since it represented the beginning of a new 
relationship between the races in the South, and the upper 
date since it marked Hampton's accession to the United 
States Senate and the end of his significant involvement in 
the race issue. The study will attempt to answer the 
following questions: (1) to what extent were Hampton's
speeches in South Carolina from 1865 through 1878 concerned 
with the race issue; (2) what arguments and strategies did 
he employ to deal with the racial situation; (3) did his 
position and strategies remain consistent throughout the 
period; (4) to what extent did Hampton practice and 
encourage rhetorical means for solving the race problem as 
opposed to more coercive methods; (5) to what extent did 
Hampton's speeches offer a constructive solution to the 
problem of race relations in South Carolina; and (6) what 
was the apparent impact of Hampton's racial rhetoric.
Material and Methods
The concept of the "rhetorical situation" as devel­
oped by Lloyd Bitzer seemed to offer the best methodology 
for analyzing Wade Hampton's racial rhetoric. Bitzer 
defines rhetorical situation as a "complex of persons, 
events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or 
potential exigence which can be completely or partially 
removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so
constrain human decision or action as to bring about the 
significant modification of the exigence."7 In his detailed 
explication and extension of the theory, John Patton notes 
the importance of the role of perception in the situational 
theory and concludes that "the situational theory offers a 
way to explain and evaluate perceptions in terms of the 
accuracy and clarity with which they reflect observable, 
historical features of situations and the constructive 
potential of the responses to which they may lead for the 
solution of genuine problems."8
Prior to the Civil War Wade Hampton had been only 
modestly involved in politics and had acquired no reputation 
as a speaker. After the war, however, Hampton spoke before 
audiences black and white in an effort to influence racial 
relations in South Carolina. The application of the 
methodology of the rhetorical situation allows the critic to 
see Hampton's speeches after the war as a response to an 
exigence, and to evaluate his perception of the exigence as 
well as the nature and quality of his response.
The first step in executing the study was to acquire 
an understanding of the historiographical problems 
surrounding the Reconstruction era. Second was the reading
7Lloyd Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy 
and Rhetoric 1 (Winter 1968): 6.
8John H. Patton, "Causation and Creativity in Rhetori­
cal Situations: Distinctions and Implications," Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 65 (February 1979): 54-55.
of general sources on the South, from after the Civil War 
until the turn of the century, and on Reconstruction in 
South Carolina. In addition to the comprehensive South 
Carolina Purina Reconstruction by Francis Simkins and Robert 
Woody, the following works were of value to the study: 
Hampton Jarrell's Wade Hampton and the Negro; William 
Cooper, Jr.'s The Conservative Regime: South Carolina 1877- 
1890; George Tindall's South Carolina Negroes. 1877-1900; 
Thomas Holt's Black over White: Negro Political Leadership
in South Carolina During Reconstruction; and Joel William­
son' s After Slavery: The Nearo in South Carolina Purina 
Reconstruction. 1861-1877. Most of the Hampton biographies 
were eulogistic in nature and of little value. All 
references in the secondary sources to speeches by Hampton 
were noted for further research in the newspapers.
From the Charleston News and Courier (1865-1878), the 
Columbia Daily Phoenix (1866-1875) and the Columbia Daily 
Register (1875-1878) references to speeches and speech 
texts were obtained. Hampton's papers were consulted for 
any additional references to speeches, comments about his 
speeches, and expressions of his attitude and strategies 
toward the racial problem. The speeches were then classi­
fied according to date, location, occasion, racial mix of 
the audience, and subj ect. To develop the nature of the 
exigence and the attitudes of the audience, manuscript 
collections of key individuals, convention proceedings,
diaries, government investigations into the Ku Klux outrages 
and the 1876 election, newspapers, and published accounts of 
events by participants were consulted.
Once the nature of the exigence and the attitude of 
the audience were established, a decision had to be made 
whether to analyze a single representative response to the 
exigence or a synthesis of all of his responses to the 
situation. A combination of the two procedures was 
employed. On the economic exigence in 1865 and the suffrage 
issue in 1867, single speeches existed that clearly and 
fully represented his response to the problem. In the 
defense of his policies in 1878, two speeches were so 
frequently cited by the press and historians as key 
responses by Hampton that both were deemed necessary to 
adequately represent his views, especially since they were 
delivered to different audiences in divergent sections of 
the state. For the campaign of 1876 there was no one speech 
that stood above the others as the embodiment of all his 
appeals; thus, the campaign was analyzed as a whole with an 
emphasis on those speeches for which reasonably verbatim 
texts were available, and which were given in different 
parts of the state. Once the selection process was com­
pleted, the various appeals were analyzed and evaluated in 
terms of the appropriateness of Hampton's response to the 
exigence. Responses across the period were then compared 
for consistency.
Organization
The reporting of the investigation is organized 
around the four exigencies of the racial problem to which 
Wade Hampton responded.
Chapter II places the racial speaking of Hampton into 
perspective and reveals the extent to which his addresses 
were devoted to the racial issue. It attempts to trace the 
movement and speaking of Hampton in general terms throughout 
the period 1865-1878.
Chapter III identifies the first racial exigence as 
economic and analyzes his response in the Richland Fork 
address.
Chapter IV focuses on the issue of unrestricted suf­
frage for the blacks and examines his freedmen's address to
an audience of blacks in Columbia, South Carolina in 1867.
Chapter V examines the campaign of 1876 as a response
to black domination of the state. Hampton's canvass is 
evaluated with particular concern for the claims made by 
some members of his party that the election had been won, 
not through persuasion, but by violence and intimidation.
Chapter VI isolates Hampton's response to the attack 
upon his racial policies by some elements of the Democratic 
party. His Blackville and Greenville addresses are analyzed 
as two of his most direct and forceful replies.
Chapter VII provides a summary of the chapters and a 
general conclusion for the study.
CHAPTER II
THE RHETOR
The purpose of this chapter is not to develop a short 
biography of Wade Hampton nor to consider his education in 
rhetoric nor the development of his rhetorical skills. The 
chapter seeks rather to answer the question of the extent to 
which Hampton incorporated the race issue into his rhetoric 
from immediately after the Civil War until his election to 
the United States Senate in December of 1878. Since each of 
the analytical chapters focuses rather narrowly on specific 
speeches in response to the immediate exigence, this chapter 
will attempt to provide a broader perspective on his move­
ment and speaking during the period.
1865-1875
Wade Hampton's speaking from after the war until his 
nomination for governor in August of 1876 divides nicely 
into two distinct phases: The politically active period
from 1865 to 1869, and the more personal period from 1869 to 
1876.
From 1865 until 1869, Hampton took an active, visible 
role in South Carolina politics. He was elected to the 
constitutional convention called by Governor Perry in
9
10
September of 1865, though he was notified of his election 
too late to attend.1 In the October gubernatorial election, 
despite repeated statements that he did not want to be 
governor, Hampton came within 743 votes of defeating James 
L. Orr.2 Hampton's desire to stay out of office and attend 
to personal affairs is indicated by the voting of his home 
district of Richland County; not only did they vote Orr for 
governor by more than a ten to one margin,3 they also did 
not elect Hampton to represent them in the new legislature.4
Though he held no office, he was active in expressing 
his views in speeches and published letters. In July 1866 
he was elected as one of four vice presidents at the state 
convention of the National Union Convention, but he was not 
selected to go to Philadelphia as a delegate to the national 
gathering.5
With his address in March of 1867 to the freedmen in 
Columbia, Hampton began a period of active influence that 
continued through 1868 and was not to be matched until his 
campaign for governor in 1876. From March until August he
■̂Columbia Daily Phoenix. 15, 27 September 1865.
2Charleston Daily Courier. 18 October 1865; Columbia 
Daily Phoenix. 24 November 1865.
3Columbia Daily Phoenix. 29 November 1865.
4John Reynolds, Reconstruction in South Carolina. 1865- 
1877 (Columbia; The State, 1905), 21-22.
5Columbia Daily Phoenix. 1 August 1866.
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actively worked to gain control of the black vote.6 His 
efforts were a total failure, and in November he was elected 
vice president of a convention of conservatives which met in 
Columbia to protest the political power put into the hands 
of the blacks by the Reconstruction Acts.7
Unable to control the black vote he turned his efforts 
to ousting the radicals and putting a friendly Democratic 
administration into power in Washington. In April of 1868 
he was elected to the Central Executive Committee of the 
state Democratic party, and in June made a delegate to the 
national convention.8 He was a prominent figure at the 
convention9 and his role on the platform committee became a 
source of continuing controversy when he claimed shortly 
after the convention: "I then added the clause which you
will find embodied in the platform: 'and we declare that
the Reconstruction Acts are unconstitutional, revolutionary, 
and void.' That is my plank in the platform."10
Judging from newspaper reports, Hampton's most active 
period of speaking during the ten years between the end of 
the war and his campaign for governor took place from July
6Jarrell, 17; Francis Butler Simkins and Robert 
Hilliard Woody, South Carolina During Reconstruction (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1932), 83-84.
7Columbia Daily Phoenix. 7, 8 November 1868.
8Charleston Daily Courier. 10 June 1868.
9Ibid, 7, 11 July 1868.
10Columbia Daily Phoenix. 26 July 1868.
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through October of 1868. During these months Hampton spoke 
at Democratic rallies throughout the state. The Columbia 
Phoenix mentioned speeches by Wade Hampton in Charleston, 
Columbia, Greenville, Anderson, Marion, Sumter, and 
Walhalla.11 The fall election and the rout of the Demo­
cratic party by the radicals ended the early period of 
Hampton's active political involvement.
Hampton Jarrell notes:
After 1868, Wade Hampton retired from active involvement 
in South Carolina politics, except some activity in 1870 
in a fusion campaign headed by M. C. Butler. Though he 
was in and out of the state during the eight years 1868- 
1876, most of his time was spent with his plantation in 
Mississippi.12
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that, because he was 
out of the state much of the time and not openly involved in 
political affairs, he was not involved at all. His letters 
to Armistead Burt, John Mullaly and James Conner were filled 
with political advice and strategy.13
From 1869 until 1876 his energies were spent in an 
effort to restore the health of his wife and his fortune. 
Prior to the war he was the head of one of the wealthiest 
families in the South and perhaps the nation. At the "time
13-Ibid, 26 July; 15, 21 August; 9 September; 10, 11 
October 1868.
12Jarrell, 34-35.
13Wade Hampton to A.L. Burt, 22 October 1871, A. L.
Burt Papers, Duke University Library, Durham; Wade Hampton 
to James Conner, 11 April 1869, Wade Hampton Papers, South 
Caroliniana Library, Columbia; Wade Hampton to John Mullaly, 
19 May 1872, Wade Hampton Papers.
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of his death in 1835 Wade Hampton I was reported to be the 
wealthiest man in the 22 United States.”14 Under Wade 
Hampton II, Millwood, the family home outside of Columbia, 
and one of three Hampton plantations, was the "mecca for 
South Carolina's aristocracy, as well as for politicians.
. . . The mansion's guest wings always were filled when the 
legislature was in session, and it was at Millwood's dinner 
table that most of the governors were chosen."15 At the 
outbreak of the war Wade Hampton had approximately nine 
hundred slaves at his personal plantation in Mississippi and 
together the family had at least three thousand.16 After 
Sherman's passage through Columbia two lonely corinthian 
columns were all that remained of the once magnificent 
Millwood. In May of 1866, Hampton wrote, "My reputation is 
the only thing that I have left and I am jealous of its 
preservation."17 On December 4, 1868, he filed voluntary 
bankruptcy proceedings in Jackson, Mississippi, listing 
liabilities of one million dollars and assets of entirely 
mortgaged properties. Ten months later two remaining 
Hampton residences in Columbia, Diamond Hill and Southern
14Virginia G. Meynard, The Venturers. The Hampton. 
Harrison, and Earle Families of Virginia. South Carolina. 




17Wade Hampton to Chancellor Carver, 25 May 1866, Wade 
Hampton Papers.
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Cross, were sold at public auction. Hampton was the sole 
bidder for Southern Cross, purchasing it for one hundred 
dollars.18 In a letter to James Conner in April of 1869, he 
clearly indicated his concern about his financial matters. 
"You will be glad to hear," he wrote, "that I have been able 
to put matters in such shape as to give me reasonable ground 
to hope that I may in time pay off my debts. The hope of my 
life is to do this and I shall devote all my energies to its 
accomplishment."19
To increase his chances for paying off his debts, in 
the fall of 1871, he accepted a position as vice president 
in the insurance company of J. W. Davis.20 Because of his 
new position, Hampton indicated in the same letter that he 
intended to move his family to Baltimore for the winter. It 
is difficult to pinpoint Hampton's exact location and 
activities over the next few years. Various pieces of 
correspondence show him dwelling at different times in 
Baltimore, Wildwoods, and Columbia, with most of his time 
apparently divided between Wildwoods and Baltimore. From 
the spring of 1873, until her death in March of 1874, much 
of his time was spent caring for his sick wife in 
Charlottesville, Virginia.
18Meynard, 255-56.
19Wade Hampton to James Conner, 11 April 1869, Wade 
Hampton Papers.
20Wade Hampton to A. L. Burt, 22 October 1871, A. L. 
Burt Papers.
During this period there is no record of Hampton 
delivering a single political address, though he did deliver 
a number of ceremonial speeches. In 1871, he addressed the 
Society of Confederate Soldiers and Sailors on the "Life and 
Character of General Robert E. Lee.'*21 Notices in 1873 in 
the Wilmington (North Carolina) Star and the Augusta 
Constitutionalist advertised that General Hampton would be 
speaking in each city on General Lee and that proceeds from 
the speeches would go into the Lee Memorial Fund.22 Though 
the evidence is not conclusive, it seems highly probable 
that Hampton delivered this address numerous times through­
out the South on behalf of the fund. The only speech during 
this period that has relevance for this study is his 1869 
address at the Macon (Georgia) Fair in which he dealt at 
length with the new role of black labor.
During the politically active years from 1865 through 
1868, it is possible to identify fifteen occasions on which 
Hampton was the major speaker. Of these fifteen, texts are 
available for eight. The seven for which no texts are 
available are all campaign speeches given at Democratic 
rallies during the late summer and fall of 1868. About 
these campaign speeches, two assumptions seem reasonable:
21Wade Hampton, Address on the Life and Character of 
Gen. Robert E. Lee (Baltimore: John Murphy and Co., 1871).
22Wilmington Star in Charleston Daily Courier. 20 
February 1873; and Augusta Constitutionalist in Charleston 
Daily Courier. 22 January 1873.
(1) he delivered more than the seven reported in the papers; 
and (2) they dealt in part at least with the racial 
question, since that was the predominant issue at the time. 
Of the eight for which texts are available, one was given to 
a predominantly black audience (1867 freedmen's address), 
one was given to a racially mixed audience (1865 Richland 
Fork address), and one to a northern audience (1868 Union 
Square address). The others were delivered to predominantly 
southern white audiences. In five of the eight speeches 
Hampton made at least one reference to the race issue. In 
his commencement address at Washington College, his speech 
to the citizens of Charleston after his return from the 
Democratic convention, and his address to the Richland 
County Democratic club, there were no references to race. 
Among the five that contained racial references the most 
extensive development of the subject occurred in the 
freedmen's address and the Richland Fork speech. While the 
other three contained significant references to race, it was 
clearly not the dominant theme.
From 1869 until his campaign for governor in 1876, 
there was only one reference to a speech by Hampton dealing 
with race, the 1869 address to the Georgia State Fair at 
Macon. His other speeches were ceremonial and contained no 
mention of race.
1876-1878
In June of 1876 Hampton returned to South Carolina 
from Mississippi to attend the Centennial Celebration at 
Fort Moultrie.23 Martin Gary had also been in Charleston 
that weekend to advocate a straightout Democratic ticket for 
the fall election. By accident Hampton and Gary departed 
Charleston on the same train, and while traveling together 
discussed the political situation in South Carolina. 
Recognizing in Hampton a man who could unite the various 
factions of the party, Gary persuaded Wade Hampton to accept 
the nomination for governor on a straightout ticket.24 
Following the conversation Hampton went to his mountain home 
in Cashiers, North Carolina and remained there until the 
state convention in August.25
Beginning with the convention and continuing through 
the election of 1878, Hampton engaged in the most extensive 
speaking on the racial issue of his entire career. During 
the 1876 canvass, which started on September 2 and concluded 
November 6, Hampton, by his own testimony, spoke twice in 
every county in the state with the exception of Lexington, 
for a total of approximately fifty-seven speeches at large
23Congress, House, Select Committee on the Recent 
Election in South Carolina, Testimony on the Recent Election 
in South Carolina. 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 1877, 331.
24William Arthur Sheppard, Red Shirts Remembered; 
Southern Brigadiers of the Reconstruction Period (Atlanta: 
The Ruralist Press, 1940), 80-89.
25Recent Election in South Carolina. 331.
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meetings.26 The major theme of these addresses was the 
racial issue. In his December inaugural address he devoted 
a significant portion to reiterating his racial position and 
acknowledging his debt to the blacks for their support.27
Since the first three months of 1877 were occupied 
with the political maneuvering between Wade Hampton and 
Daniel Chamberlain for recognition as the rightful governor 
of the state, it is not surprising that there is no evidence 
of any major speeches being delivered by Hampton. When he 
returned in April from his Washington conference with 
President Hayes, he delivered a short but important speech, 
assuring the people that he would be their governor and 
renewing his commitment to an equitable racial policy.
Other major addresses within the state were given later in 
April at Charleston and at the Darlington County Fair in 
November.28 In all of these speeches his racial policy was 
the prominent theme.
During the summer and fall, Hampton traveled exten­
sively outside of South Carolina. From the middle of June 
until the middle of July, he traveled to New York state.
From the middle of August until early September, he was in 
Virginia and Washington, and for two weeks in the middle of
26Ibid, 305; and Alfred B. Williams, Hampton and His 
Red Shirts: South Carolina’s Deliverance in 1876 
(Charleston: Walker, Evans and Cogswell Co., 1935), 361.
27Charleston News and Courier, 14 December 1876.
28Ib.id, 19 April; 5 November 1877.
September, he was on an excursion to Illinois. On the New 
York trip, he was the featured speaker for the celebration 
in Auburn of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Shields 
Guard, a New York National Guard Company. General Shields 
was his good friend from before the war. In his speech, 
Hampton made direct reference to the recent election and his 
approach to the blacks.29 The July trip included a major 
address at Greenbriar, West Virginia, to a gathering of 
troops from both Virginias. The focus of the speech was 
upon national reconciliation, and it included only a passing 
reference to the battle in South Carolina for "the equal 
rights of all under the constitution.1,30
The September trip to Illinois involved more speeches 
than either of the previous two excursions. The main 
occasion was an address to the Winnebago County Fair in 
Rockford, Illinois. He did not develop the racial issue, 
but spoke again on the broad themes of national reconcil­
iation. 31 On his return trip he joined President Hayes1 
traveling party and delivered addresses in Louisville, 
Kentucky; Chattanooga, Tennessee; and Atlanta, Georgia. The 
ones in Louisville and Chattanooga had no references to race 
and were basically praise for Hayes' policies. The Atlanta
29Ibid, 21, 25 June 1877; for analysis of the speech 
see Ellingsworth, 104-29.
30Charleston News and Courier. 20 August 1877.
31Ibid, 17 September 1877; for a detailed analysis of 
the speech see Ellingsworth, 104-29.
speech occurred after he had separated from President Hayes, 
and was an unscheduled affair. He had planned only to spend 
the night and travel on to Columbia, but Georgia officials 
successfully prevailed upon him to stay over and deliver an 
address to the people of Atlanta. The speech focused on two 
related themes: (1) the recent campaign in South Carolina,
with an emphasis on his approach to the blacks, and (2) the 
statesmanlike conduct of President Hayes.32 In addition to 
these three extended excursions, Hampton also took a short 
trip in mid-October to Raleigh, North Carolina, to speak at 
the State Fair. He did not deal with the race issue.33 Of 
these seven major addresses delivered outside the state the 
race issue was only developed in two of them, probably 
because he chose to deal with broad national reconciliation 
themes, rather than the narrower issue of the race problem 
in South Carolina.
In sharp contrast to 1877, most of Hampton's speaking 
in 1878 was within the state and on the racial issue. Out 
of twenty-eight speeches for which at least a summary is 
available, the platform of 1876 and his policies toward 
blacks were mentioned in all but two. The two exceptions 
were a Washington's birthday address to the Washington Light 
Infantry reunion in which he limited himself to war themes, 
and a speech in Pickens which dealt with what was a critical
32Ibid, 24 September 1877.
33Ibid, 20 October 1877.
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problem for them at that moment, the revenue issue. In the 
instance of the Washington's birthday speech, Hampton did 
address the racial issue later the same day. At a reception 
for the occasion, he strongly appealed for adherence to his 
racial policies.34
In the spring of 1878 Hampton reaffirmed to the 
Democratic congressional caucus his commitment to the 
platform of 1876 and the pledges he had made to the 
blacks.35 Shortly thereafter he took that commitment on a 
speaking tour through the up-state with speeches in 
Anderson, Newberry, Abbeville, and numerous short impromptu 
speeches at locations between.36 In late April and June, 
he delivered ceremonial addresses at the Old Fort cele­
bration in Ninety-Six, the Aiken Schuetzenfest. and at the 
commencement exercises of all black Claflin University. 
Though he adapted to the occasion in each instance he still 
incorporated his commitment to moderate racial policies into 
each one.31
His two strongest racial speeches, in which he clearly 
enunciated his views and denounced the racial extremists in 
the Democratic party, were given during the summer and early 
fall at Blackville in the lower part of South Carolina,
34Ibid, 25 February; 23 September 1878.
35Ibid, 21 March 1878.
36Ibid, 27, 29 March; 1, 11 April 1878.
37Columbia Daily Register. 26 April, 16, 19 June 1878.
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and at Greenville, in the upper portion of the state. The 
election canvass began in Edgefield, shortly after the state 
Democratic convention, and then moved to Spartanburg. At 
that point Hampton became ill and had to retire to his 
mountain retreat for about a month of recuperation. In mid- 
September, he returned to the canvass with his Greenville 
address as well as a few others in the upper and middle 
sections of the state.38 He closed the canvass with an 
unusually strong effort in the predominantly black counties 
in the lower part of the state.39 The year ended with an 
overwhelming victory for Wade Hampton and the Democratic 
party,40 his election to the United States Senate, and a 
tragic hunting accident that cost him a leg and left him 
incapacitated for several months.41
When Wade Hampton went to the United States Senate in 
1879, he left behind him in South Carolina the racial 
conflict in which he had so long been engaged. His policies 
were in place and men of his choosing in power. In 1880 he 
used his power to squelch the gubernatorial bid of his 
political nemesis Martin Gary, and thus William Cooper, Jr.,
38Ibid., 13 August, 21, 24, 28 September 1878; and 
Charleston News and Courier. 19 August; 20, 23 September; 1 
October 1878.
39Columbia Daily Register. 6 October 1878; and Charles­
ton News and Courier. 3, 4, 12, 22, 29, 31 October 1878.
40Simkins and Woody, 548.
41Jarrell, 151-52.
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concludes, "with both party and state safe, Hampton no 
longer felt called upon to take an active role in state 
affairs."42 He remained in the Senate until ousted by Ben 
Tillman in 1890. With the exception of a speech on black 
emigration in 1890, he ceased speaking on the racial issue 
once he went to the Senate.
Throughout the period of a little more than thirteen 
years, three dominant themes emerged in his speaking. The 
Lost Cause theme recurred in his many ceremonial addresses, 
particularly those given to various veteran's gatherings.
The theme of national reconciliation and harmony appeared 
strongly in speeches outside of the state and to a lesser 
degree in those within South Carolina. Because of the three 
political campaigns of 1868, 1876, and 1878, in which he was 
totally involved, and in which race was the major issue, 
this theme became by far the dominant one in his speaking 
from 1865 through 1878.
42William J. Cooper, Jr., The Conservative Regime:
South Carolina. 1877-1890. Johns Hopkins University Studies 
in Historical and Political Science, Series 86 (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 81.
CHAPTER III
RICHLAND FORK ADDRESS AS RESPONSE TO THE ECONOMIC EXIGENCE
Exigence
Lloyd F. Bitzer in his article, "Functional Communi­
cation: A Situational Perspective," defines exigence as "an 
imperfection marked by some degree of urgency; it is a 
defect, an obstacle, something to be corrected. It is 
necessarily related to interests and valuations.1,1 The 
exigence is rhetorical when it is "capable of positive 
modification and where such modification requires or invites 
messages that engage audiences who can modify those exi­
gencies through their mediating thought, judgment or 
action."2 What then was the urgent imperfection that Wade 
Hampton sought to modify through rhetoric, and was the 
perceived imperfection capable of positive modification 
through discourse?
Unquestionably the dominant exigence in the southern 
mind during the immediate post Civil War years and perhaps,
1Lloyd Bitzer, "Functional Communication: A Situational 
Perspective," in Rhetoric in Transition, ed. Eugene White 





arguably, until the present was the new relationship that 
existed between whites and blacks. With the end of the war 
came the end of a way of life. During the spring and summer 
of 1865 some 400,000 pieces of property in South Carolina 
suddenly became free men and women.3 While the overriding 
exigence was the new role of the blacks, urgency was 
expressed through a variety of concerns that generally 
revolved around economic and political issues.
The first Shockwave from the emancipation of the 
slaves was economic. The slaves had a market value of $200 
million4 which was, of course, instantly lost when they were 
freed. While the loss of the slaves without compensation 
represented an exigence that, as four years of fighting had 
proved, was not rhetorical, the new amorphous condition 
between planter and laborer presented a compelling exigence 
that threatened the economic survival of the planter and 
cried out for messages capable of adjusting and harmonizing 
the desires and needs of the blacks with those of the 
planters.
The best study of the new economic relationship that 
developed between ex-slaves and planters in the early years 
after the war is Joel Williamson's After Slavery.5 His
3Simkins and Woody, 12.
4Ibid.
5Joel Williamson, After Slavery (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1965).
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analysis will be used extensively in establishing the
conditions of the period.
"Contrary to tradition," writes Williamson,
the typical slave upon hearing of emancipation did not 
shout with delight, throw his hat into the air, gather 
the few possessions he claimed, and run pellmell for 
Charleston. The great majority received the news 
quietly and began to make deliberate preparation to 
terminate their slavery definitely by some overt act.6
Williamson goes on to point out that "desertion was a common 
means by which the ex-slave asserted his freedom."7 Henry 
Ravenel, a distinguished scholar and planter in the Edge­
field district recorded in his diary for June 14, 1865:
The negroes are very foolishly leaving their former 
masters. Nearly every family in Aiken has lost some.
. . . They all want to go to the cities, either Charles­
ton or Augusta. The fields have no attraction, mine are 
still with me that have been living here.8
A memorial to President Johnson in July sounded a similar
theme:
The able bodied men and women have, in many instances, 
abandoned the farms upon which they were employed, 
leaving behind them the children and the old to be 
supported by the proprietors. . . . Those who remain 
upon the farms are generally indisposed to labor as they 
had previously done . . . and many are loitering idly 
and mischievously through the country.9
While the evidence seems compelling that many slaves
6Ibid., 33.
7Ibid., 34.
8Arney Robinson Childs, ed., The Private Journal of 
Henrv William Ravenel. 1859-1887 (Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1947), 244.
9,1 A memorial to President Johnson for Restoration of 
Civil Government," Columbia Daily Phoenix. 7 July 1865.
deserted their former masters shortly after the war,
Williamson convincingly argues that there were important
differences in the nature and timing of the desertions.
Generally, freedmen who as slaves had labored as domes­
tics, mechanics, and in the extractive industries 
departed at the first reasonable convenient opportunity. 
In doing so, they typically exhibited some degree of 
malice toward their recent owners. On the other hand, 
those who had labored in the fields generally finished 
the year in their accustomed places, and when they left 
seldom departed with expressions of ill will toward 
their late masters.10
The limited early departure of field workers was
brought about primarily through "the insistence of the
occupation forces and the Freedmen's Bureau that plantation
owners and laborers contract to harvest and divide the 1865
crop before parting."11 As early as May, Chief Justice
Salmon Chase was warning the blacks against indolence, and
encouraging them to find steady employment:
They say that you will be disorderly, shiftless, lazy; 
that you will starve rather than work; that wages cannot 
tempt you to work. . . . show that you will be honest, 
temperate, industrious, and faithful in your employ­
ments ; that you are ready to do honest work for honest 
wages."12
The definition of "honest work and honest wages" was to be 
settled upon through the contract system developed earlier 
on the Sea Islands by General Saxton. The contracts 
specified in substantial detail the work to be done by the
10Williamson, 34.
i:LIbid., 38.
12Charleston Daily Courier. 13 May 1865.
laborer and the remuneration to be given. To be reasonably 
certain that the contracts were equitable, "Saxton. . . . 
ordered his agents to visit each plantation upon which 
private parties employed Negroes, to read the contract to 
the laborers, to adjust any differences then and there, and 
to note carefully on the contract itself the assent of each 
worker.1,13 In instances where the workers were dissatisfied 
with the contracts, they were encouraged to finish the agri­
cultural season, and then seek new employers. Gen. Charles 
Van Wyck, addressing a mass meeting of freedmen on August 
11, urged that "those who were dissatisfied with their 
present homes and employers, must be patient and enduring 
and wait until January and if they could better themselves 
to do so, but now to remain close at home and work."14
Apparently as the new year approached many felt they 
could improve their contracts or at least felt the need to 
assert their freedom by some overt act. After examining 
numerous letters, diaries, and journals of planters through­
out the state, Williamson concludes that
Christmas Day, 1865, saw many South Carolina plantations 
entirely deserted by their negro populations. . . .  In 
Spartanburg District, David Golightly Harris recorded in 
his j ournal that all of his "negroes leave today, to 
hunt themselves a new home, while we will be left to 
wait upon ourselves.1,15
13Williamson, 68.
14Columbia Daily Phoenix. 15 August 1865.
15Williamson, 68.
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Thus, while the immediate exigence of keeping laborers in 
the fields for the 1865 agricultural season was satisfied to 
some extent, the future of that supply was by no means 
certain.
In addition to their concern about the constancy of 
the labor supply, many planters were dissatisfied with the 
quality and amount of work performed by the blacks under the 
new arrangement. In a letter to a northern j ournal, a 
Camden planter wrote "they are as indolent and regardless of 
their contracts as was to be expected."16 He went on to say 
that in the past large numbers of blacks were kept on poor 
land, but that it was not economical under the new condi­
tions. By the middle of October, a correspondent for the 
Chicago Times was describing the contract system as a total 
failure:
They have made fair trial of negro labor, and they all 
say it is a complete and total failure. It has been 
fairly demonstrated that the negro, left to himself and 
allowed to work at his own volition, will not work in 
such a manner as to make his labor profitable, either to 
himself or his employer. The people of the South have 
been brought to the verge of starvation this fall, 
solely on account of the bad conduct of the negroes 
between the months of April and September. There was 
abundance of time during that period to have raised 
crops that would have far exceeded the wants of the 
whole population of the South. But owing to the 
desertion of the plantations by the negroes after they 
had made engagements to work, and the inability of the 
planters to procure other laborers the crops have been 
almost entirely lost.17
16Columbia Daily Phoenix. 11 October 1865.
17Ibid., 10 October 1865.
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Concerned about the constancy and the quality of black 
labor under the new system, the planters quickly looked for 
ways to control, stabilize, and guarantee the labor supply. 
In June 1865 the citizens of St. Matthews adopted resolu­
tions to control the movement of the blacks on and off the 
plantations and to hold back enough food for the coming year 
before making any divisions, thus guarding against the 
chance that the black would squander his wages without 
making provision for the following year, and then expect the 
planter to feed him.18 The ultimate, however, in the effort 
to control black labor occurred in the late autumn of 1865, 
with the passage of the Black Codes.
The Black Codes, drafted by Armistead Burt and David 
Wardlaw and passed at the first regular session of the South 
Carolina legislature following the war, granted certain 
rights to the blacks, but at the same time severely restric­
ted their behavior;
Colored persons were to be allowed to acquire property, 
sue and be sued, receive the protection of the law in 
person and property, testify in cases in which they were 
involved, and enter into marriage contracts. . . . 
Provision was made for the care of indigent colored 
persons. On the other hand, a series of restrictions 
attempted to assign colored persons to the position of 
an inferior caste. . . . Unless licensed to do so no 
colored person was to be allowed to follow any employ­
ment— on his own account— except that of farmer or 
servant. . . . Colored persons were not to sell farm 
produce without a written permit. . . . Judicial 
officers were authorized to hire to farmers colored 
vagrants or those engaged in a variety of undesirable 
employments. On the farms the servants must work from
18Ibid., 20 June 1865.
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sun to sun with reasonable intervals for meals, be quiet 
at night, and not leave the premises or receive visitors 
without express permission. They could be discharged 
for cause and have their wages forfeited when departing 
from the service of their masters. The masters were 
given the right to whip "moderately" servants under 
eighteen. Others were to be whipped on authority of 
judicial officers. These officers were given authority 
to return runaway servants to their masters. The 
servants, on the other hand, were given certain rights. 
Their wages and periods of service must be specified in 
writing, and they were protected against "unreasonable" 
tasks, Sunday and night work, unauthorized attacks on 
their persons, and inadequate food.19
Some writers see the Black Codes as a misguided effort 
on the part of southern whites to satisfy the northern 
demand for legislation protecting the blacks, and the 
resulting furor as a misperception of the meaning of 
"protect." To the southerner protecting the black was to 
protect him against his own vices and handicaps, much as one 
might protect a small child, while to the northern mind 
protection meant investing the black with all the rights 
possessed by other citizens.20 Regardless of whether or not 
the codes were designed to palliate the North and gain 
readmission to the Union, they were prima facie efforts to 
stabilize and control black labor, and thereby satisfy a 
pressing economic exigence.
While the planters sought a permanent, controlled 
labor supply, the blacks wanted their freedom recognized,
19Simkins and Woody, 48-50.
20John P. Hollis, The Early Period of Reconstruction in 
South Carolina (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1905), 47; 
Williamson, 72-73.
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equitable remuneration for their labor, and land ownership. 
The black reaction to the regulation of their lives by the 
Black Codes was swift, vocal, and strong. In late November 
a convention of blacks assembled in Zion Presbyterian Church 
of Charleston to protest to the state and the Congress the 
passage of the codes. The delegates asked in a memorial to 
Congress that
the strong arm of law and order be placed alike over the 
entire people of this State? that life and property be 
secured, and the laborer as free to sell his labor as 
the merchant his goods. . . .  We protest against any 
code of black laws the Legislature of this state may 
enact, and pray to be governed by the same laws that 
control other men.21
On the issue of land ownership Williamson observes:
The strongest and most enduring reason why Negroes 
refused to contract during the three year period of 
military occupation was their hope for a land division 
and the common impression among them that any negotia­
tions with their late masters might jeopardize their 
chances for success. This obstacle was most formidable 
during the fall of 1865 and the following winter.22
Finally, by the fall of 1866 the third concern, 
equitable remuneration, was being loudly voiced. On 
November 17 of that year a meeting was held in Sumter to 
discuss wage problems. The freedmen complained that one
21Proceedings of the Colored People1s Convention of the 
State of South Carolina, held in Zion Church. Charleston. 
November. 1865. Together with the Declaration of rights and 
wrongs; an address to the people; a petition to the legisla­




third of the crop was not enough since most of them had
almost nothing.
During the four hours of this great gathering of freed­
men, not a word was said about political rights, negro 
suffrage, or negro equality. The first and last vote of 
the occasion was on the same chord, a fair and 
remunerative return of the services of the laborers.23
As blacks deserted the plantations and their former 
masters in search of freedom, land, and general economic 
improvement, the white planters were faced with the economic 
crisis of securing dependable, cheap labor to till their 
fields. The Black Codes speak clearly of the urgency and 
seriousness with which the planters perceived the problems 
and reflect the dominant belief that only coercive measures 
could secure the labor of the blacks. It is this problem of 
how to secure the permanent labor of the black that Hampton 
addressed at Richland Fork.
Audience
The second essential element of a rhetorical situation 
is an audience capable of modifying the exigence.24 Before 
examining the constraints Hampton used in his effort to 
alter the conditions, it is necessary to examine (1) the 
ability of his audience to modify the exigence and (2) the 
attitudes and interests of the audience that might faci­
litate or inhibit exigence modification.
23Charleston Daily Courier. 24 November 1866.
24Bitzer, "Functional Communication," 27.
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The audience addressed by Hampton on the morning of 
November 22, 1865, was made up of both planters and freedmen 
of the Richland District.25 Richland District is located in 
the center of the state, and is the district in which the 
state capital, Columbia, is located. It is also the 
district Hampton represented in the state legislature prior 
to the war. Speaking to his neighbors, constituents, 
comrades in arms, freedmen, and perhaps even some of his 
former slaves, he was addressing an audience known well to 
him, and he to them.
Was this audience of planters and freedmen capable of
modifying the exigence? The answer is an unqualified yes.
Certainly the North limited the options available to the
planters. They could not remand the blacks to slavery, the
coercion of the Black Codes would soon be set aside, and any
contracts with the blacks were subject to approval by the
army. Within these broad guidelines, however, the whites
and the blacks were left to work out the labor problem.
The crucial fact in the economic history of South 
Carolina during Reconstruction is that, ultimately, both 
whites and Negroes adjusted their demands to the 
requirements imposed by the North and to the needs of 
each other. In view of their traditional relations this 
was accomplished with a rapidity that was amazing. In 
retrospect, it is easy to see that some adjustment was 
virtually inevitable. The white man needed the labor of 
the Negro to make his capital productive; the Negro 
needed the white man's capital to earn a subsistence. 
Yet, the prejudices, the bitterness and suspicion that 
filled the minds of both whites and Negroes complicated 
an already difficult problem. In this context, possibly
25 Columbia Phoenix. 21 January 1866.
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the political dictation of the North was actually 
salutary in that it forced each group to cut through the 
fantastical problem of race so that all might deal with 
the real and pressing problems of economic necessity. 
Under these circumstances, the economically dominant 
whites were forced to concede much to the Negro worker 
which would have come— if at all— only later and with 
more difficulty. . . . From the Northern point of view, 
probably in no area was Reconstruction more completely 
successful.26
Thus, in Williamson's estimation, the only barriers to good 
economic relations between planter and laborer were pre­
judice, bitterness, and suspicion, barriers which were 
certainly within the capacity of Hampton's audience to 
remove.
While it is impossible to know the exact mix of 
attitudes represented in Hampton's audience, it is possible 
to determine attitudes of planters and blacks in general and 
reasonable to assume a cross section of these attitudes 
present in his audience. Since the Black Codes were passed 
by the South Carolina legislature in the same month that 
Hampton gave his speech, they can function as a guide to 
white, planter attitudes. The codes with their restrictions 
on the work and behavior of the blacks expressed the senti­
ments of the vast majority of planters.
The debate on the Black Codes revealed three distinct 
groups of whites: (1) those who opposed the measure as too




Those who opposed the codes as being too severe did
so, not primarily out of concern for the blacks, but a
realistic assessment of the political reaction in the Nort’.i.
"'Unless you want to bring the North down on us,' James
Chestnut had warned the state senator from Kershaw District
as he departed for Columbia, 'repeal all laws enacted for
Negroes and leave the emancipated Negro and the white man on
the same footing before the law.9"27 James Hemphill, an
influential member of the state senate, wrote his brother:
My impression is that our Northern brethren. [emphasis 
in original] who hold our fate in their hands, and who 
are par excellence the Negro9s friends, will consider it
too much a white man9s law, and that it does not
sufficiently protect the freedmen against their former 
masters. It is a most difficult problem to solve, and I 
do not believe that the great body of our people do yet 
appreciate the great change that has taken place in the 
relations between the races.28
A month later, Hemphill restated his concern about northern
reaction to the codes.
The U.S. Congress will take the whole affair of the 
freedmen under their special charge, and make laws which 
shall give them protection which their Northern friends 
may deem necessary. The Code will be regarded by them 
as too much of a white man9s law. Many of its provi­
sions are scarcely compatible with a state of freedom, 
and it will be hard to persuade the freedom shriekers 
that the American citizens of African descent are 
obtaining their rights.29
Other prominent whites who shared the sentiments of
27Mary Boykin Chestnut MS Diary, notes written in 1879, 
in Williamson, 76.
28James Hemphill to W. R. Hemphill, 7 November 1865, 
Hemphill Papers, Duke University Library, Durham.
29Ibid., 1 December 1865.
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Chestnut and Hemphill were Gov. James L. Orr and Francis W. 
Pickens. Governor Orr supported the action of Maj. Gen. 
Daniel E. Sickles when by proclamation of January 1, 1866, 
the general declared the codes null and void.30 In 
September of 1866 Orr called a special session of the 
legislature to modify the codes.31 In addition to his 
official acts, his public statements and private corres­
pondence manifested a liberal spirit toward the blacks.
In a Christmas Day proclamation in 1865, Governor Orr 
urged "kindness, humanity and justice" upon the whites 
in their relations with the freedmen. . . . Several 
weeks later, in a letter to Francis W. Pickens, he gave 
a practical suggestion for the application of his advice 
when he recommended that planters, themselves, should 
voluntarily divide their lands into forty and fifty acre 
plots upon which individual negro families would live 
and work. Pickens, a planter with large land holdings, 
approved, but added the more generous thought that one- 
hundred-acre plots might be necessary to provide each 
with the water, wood, and other resources required to 
operate a farm efficiently.32
Those who supported the codes were not necessarily 
anti-black. Many were simply seeking to show the North that 
they were providing for the protection and welfare of the 
former slaves. The problem was in the interpretation of 
terms. In the northern view protecting the rights of the 
blacks meant securing equal treatment before the law for 
both white and black. To the southerner, however, it meant




protecting him from himself, as one might protect a child.33 
A description of the Negro by John Deforest, a Union officer 
with the Freedman's Bureau in Greenville, indicates that 
this perception of the ex-slave was not held exclusively by 
southerners:
On the other hand, the black was not the vicious and 
totally irrational creature described in reactionary 
journals. He was very ignorant, somewhat improvident, 
not yet aware of the necessity of persistent industry, 
and in short, a grown up child.34
John Hollis saw the codes as the result not of vengeance,
but benign paternalism:
The sentiment displayed toward the emancipated slaves 
does not seem from the published account to have been 
prompted by any spirit of revenge on the part of the 
whites. Indeed it may be said that to some extent the 
white population felt a responsibility for the 
protection of the freedmen in their ignorance and 
destitution.35
To substantiate his point Hollis cites a portion of Governor
B. F. Perry's first message to the legislature:
The negro has lost the protection of his master and he 
must now be protected by the law. This is expected of 
you by the President and Federal Congress and will 
remove all pretense for military rule in the State, as 
well as facilitate your speedy restoration to the Union 
and self government.36
H. R. Ravenel, a planter and scholar, is an excellent
33Ibid., 73.
34James H. Croushore and David M. Potter, eds., John 
William DeForest. A Union Officer in the Reconstruction (New 




example of one who felt the need for a system of compulsory 
labor while at the same time evincing sympathy and concern 
over the treatment of the blacks. In June of 1865 he wrote 
to A. L. Taveau, "we are in a transition to something better 
or worse, and I fear the latter very much, unless some 
system of labor is organized by which the negroes are 
compelled to work.1,37 Two days later he recorded in his 
diary:
I find some difficulty in "arranging terms" with my 
negroes, but strange to say, the difficulty lies in the 
opposite direction from what they most usually do. . .  . 
The condition is so new to both of us, that we find it 
awkward to arrange. I have told them to consider it 
over and let me know what they will be willing to take. 
[He saw the solution in] some discreet and wise agent 
who could aid and advise both Negroes and employers.38
A little less than a year later, he commended the steady
work of the Negroes on his farm and bemoaned the poor return
they would get for their labor because of the condition of
the soil, as well as their treatment by poor whites:
That the low and ignorant classes of our white popu­
lation should feel vindictively inclined toward them, 
may be expected. They will taunt and maltreat the negro 
simply because he belongs to the proscribed race and was 
once a slave. Even if we felt inclined to indulge a 
revengeful feeling at the loss of property in their 
emancipation, we should recollect that it was through no 
act of theirs, that emancipation was effected. . . . Let 
us have the magnanimity to be just, if we have not the 
Christian principles of forgiveness.39
37H. W. Ravenel to A. L. Taveau, 2 7 June 1865, A. L. 




The third group of whites was composed of "those who 
did not think the Code was severe enough. This element 
represented planters and leaders of the heavily Negro 
populated districts and the persisting proslavery party.1,40 
Prior to the convening of the constitutional convention, F. 
W. Pickens expressed his concern to Governor Perry over the 
strength of the proslavery sentiment in the Edgefield 
District. When the vote was taken, however, only eight 
voted against abolishing slavery.41 Edmund Rhett realized 
that slavery in its past form was dead, but nevertheless in 
a letter to A. L. Burt, a co-author of the codes, urged 
"that he [the Negro] should be kept as near to the condition 
of slavery as is practicable."42 Immediately prior to the 
vote on the codes James Hemphill observed that "every 
individual member almost can find some ground of objection," 
and that, "many think it too indulgent of the negro."43
As indicated in the earlier analysis of the exigence, 
the blacks wanted their freedom recognized, a fair remun­
eration for their work, and land. Though many of the field 
hands pressured by the North continued on the farms through 
the summer, their condition was still too similar to slavery
40Williamson, 74.
41Ibid., 71-72.
42Edmund Rhett to A. L. Burt, 14 October 1865, A. L. 
Burt Papers.
43James Hemphill to W. R. Hemphill, 7 November 1865, 
Hemphill Papers.
to fulfill their need to experience freedom. There was a 
general feeling of distrust, but not vengeance, toward the 
planter, an anxiety reinforced by the Black Codes, which the 
blacks interpreted to mean that the whites wanted to strip 
them of freedom and return them as much as possible to a 
position of servitude.44
This distrust of the whites manifested itself in a
concern for fair wages:
Even when the terms of labor were fairly and carefully 
determined by a conscientious employer, Negro workers 
remained suspicious of the white man. In Spartanburg 
District, David Golightly Harris. . . . noted "they are 
no judges, and fear to trade for fear they will [be] 
cheated and have no confidence in themselves or in the 
white man."45
The black frequently could not understand how his portion of 
the crop had disappeared in the advances made to him earlier 
in the season. He simply concluded that the planter was 
cheating him.46
Finally, the belief that the federal government was 
going to give them land significantly influenced black 
attitudes toward making contracts with the planters. "There
44Alrutheus A. Taylor, The Negro in South Carolina 
During The Reconstruction (n.p.: Association for the Study 
of Negro Life and History, 1924; repr., New York: Russell 
and Russell, 1969), 36-37; Sidney Andrews, The South Since 
the War: As Shown by Fourteen Weeks of Travel and Observa­
tion in Georgia and the Carolinas (Boston: Ticknor and 
Fields, 1866; repr., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1971), 
96-97.
45Williamson, 100.
46Croushore and Potter, 73.
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is among the plantation negroes a widely spread idea that 
land is to be given them by the government and this idea is 
at the bottom of much idleness and discontent.1,47 
Williamson concurs that the expectation of a division of the 
land was a major reason why blacks refused to contract at 
the end of 1865.48 Of course, considering the confiscated 
plantations and Sherman8s order setting aside land for the 
blacks, their expectation was not without some foundation.
Thus, at Richland Fork that morning, there were 
perhaps a few who shared the perspective of James Hemphill 
and James Orr, that the Black Codes were politically 
inexpedient, and that a greater recognition of black rights 
was needed. The great majority, however, saw the codes as 
necessary to stabilize labor and protect the indolent black 
from himself. While the extremely harsh views toward blacks 
were centered more in the lower portion of the state, it is 
more than probable that some of these attitudes were 
represented as well. The blacks standing on the periphery 
of the crowd were apprehensive, generally fearful that the 
whites would take advantage of them and eventually return 
them to a status only slightly above slavery.
Constraints




Bitzer, "contains a set of constraints made up of persons, 
events, objects, and relations which . . . have the power to 
constrain decision and action needed to modify the 
exigence."49 Bitzer divides constraints into the attitudes, 
motives, and beliefs of the audience which the speaker must 
harness, and the personal and logical proofs brought to the 
occasion by the speaker.50 This section will examine the 
personal and logical proofs brought to the situation by Wade 
Hampton, and his attempt to harness the motives of his 
audience.
Personal Appeals 
Unquestionably his personal ethos was a powerful 
persuasive appeal for Wade Hampton. As developed earlier, 
his reputation as wealthy planter and Civil War hero was 
well established not only in South Carolina but throughout 
the South. The extent of his popularity was amply 
illustrated by his near victory in the 1865 gubernatorial 
election despite his attempt to dissuade people from voting 
for him.
At Richland Fork Hampton was speaking to neighbors who 
had elected him in earlier days to represent them in the 
South Carolina legislature, had fought under him in the war, 
and now had invited him to address them on how to respond to
49Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," 8.
50Ibid.
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the new situation facing them.
Hampton was not content, however, to rest his ethos 
strictly upon prior reputation but explicitly reminded his 
audience of their relationship. Early in the address he 
reminded them that "years ago, without any agency on my 
part, you called me from my private life to represent you in 
the Legislature, and at each succeeding election I had but 
renewed evidence of your regard and confidence."51 In 
addition to the mutual regard for each other as representa­
tive and constituent, there was the far deeper bond as 
warriors for the Lost Cause. "It was my good fortune to 
lead many of the sons of Richland forth to battle. . . .  I 
have seen them, on many a bloody battlefield, bearing aloft 
the banner of our state as far into the fight and as nobly 
as did any others."
Did Hampton need these explicit reminders to solidify 
his ethos with this audience? In one sense, no; his reputa­
tion was well established among these men of Richland 
County. But in another sense a failure to acknowledge their 
past relationship would have been a severe violation of the 
amenities of the occasion resulting perhaps in some loss of 
ethos. So in one sense the reminders were necessary to 
preserve the esteem in which he was held. What also made 
these opening remarks significant was the stress placed upon
51Columbia Daily Phoenix. 21 January 1866. All further 
references to the text of the address are from this source.
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their respective roles in the past. In both the political
and the military, he had been the leader, they the
followers. The implication was clear, as they had followed
his advice and commands in the past, so they should accede
to his advice in the present. In a later address on much
the same theme in Macon, Georgia, Hampton made the link
between past and present authority more direct:
I beg to offer a few words of counsel, for I feel that I 
can speak to you with authority; not that authority with 
which accident once invested me, but that given by 
affection. In by-gone years you never refused to hear 
me; I never called on you in vain, I never appealed to 
you that you did not respond, and I would fain hope that 
my words will not now fall unheeded on your ears.^2
In addition to his audience of white planters and
former soldiers, Hampton was also facing a large contingent
of blacks, who of course had quite different conceptions of
his ethos. To them Hampton portrayed himself as a man of
truth and good will:
If they [blacks] will ask my people who have lived with 
me for years, not one man, woman or child on my place 
will say that I ever deceived them, or told them what 
was not true. In what I shall say to you, then today, I 
shall speak only what I believe to be true, and I shall 
advise you honestly.
Later, he sought to establish good will when he told them,
"I have always tried to treat my negroes well, and I intend
to do all in my power for them now. I have offered them
good wages, and I tell them if they can do better elsewhere
to go there." The proof that he had treated the blacks
52Ibid., 23 November 1869.
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fairly was offered in his next statement. "Most of them are 
going to remain with me."
Though there is little direct evidence on the 
question, Hampton apparently did have a reasonably good 
reputation among the blacks. As will be discussed in later 
chapters, he was one of the few whites to whom the blacks 
would give an audience even when they disagreed with his 
position.
From his white audience Hampton commanded a deep 
respect born out of a commonality of interests and his 
record of leadership in small measure in pre-war politics 
and in large measure on the battlefield. Thus, there was no 
need to build ethos, only to make acknowledgements and 
reminders necessary to fulfill the amenities of the 
occasion. With the blacks, however, he made a definite 
attempt to establish credibility and good will by citing his 
past dealings with his slaves.
Logical Appeals
The structure of Hampton's argument was a straight­
forward problem-solution development. The problem was how 
to get the fields cultivated. The solution, according to 
Hampton, was to induce by fair treatment the Negroes back to 
the fields. The argument was expressed in a series of 
enthymemes and a final cause-effect analysis.
Hampton began by establishing a premise that didn't 
fit into the logical structure of the speech until later,
but because of its overriding importance in the mind of his 
audience had to be established at the outset. The premise 
was that "the freedom of the Negroes is a fixed and 
irrevocable fact, and the sooner we recognize and act upon 
this fact, the better it will be for all parties." Simply 
put, slavery was dead. He established the premise with 
three supporting arguments. (1) The South had accepted the
terms of surrender and thus was "bound by . . . self respect 
. . . honor . . . [and] true manhood" to keep the terms of 
the agreement. The terms included the abolition of slavery, 
thus the code of a gentleman demanded the acceptance of the 
end of slavery. While making this argument he adroitly 
dissociated himself from the correctness of accepting the 
terms in the first place, and argued it as a fait accompli. 
"I do not propose to discuss these terms; nor will I say 
that it was the true policy of the South to accept them. I 
only state the fact that our people accepted them." For 
those not willing to be bound by honor he argued (2) that 
the South Carolina convention had recognized that slavery 
was dead, and (3) the South Carolina legislature had "rati­
fied the amendment of the Constitution of the United States 
abolishing slavery." Thus, they were bound both by honor 
and law, approved and accepted by their peers to accept the 
freedom of the Negro.
With the question of slavery settled, Hampton began a 
chain of reasoning with the first of several enthymemes:
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"our fields must be tilled." The major premise of this
hypothetical syllogism was in the next statement: "Unless
this is done and done speedily famine will destroy what
little has escaped fire and sword." The complete syllogism
would then be:
Major premise: If we wish to eat, the fields must be
tilled
Minor premise (understood): We do wish to eat
Therefore: The fields must be tilled
He did not seek to establish the relationship between the 
likelihood of famine and the tilling of the fields. He left 
the proof to the experience of his audience.
Hampton then moved to the second link in his argument, 
the question of who would cultivate the fields. His answer 
was
the same labor that reclaimed them from the savage 
wilderness and made them rich with the food of man.
. . . The same trained laborers who produced these 
golden harvests are amongst us, and I believe that their 
services can still be made available.
The argument was a simple categorical syllogism:
Major Premise: Those who worked the fields in the past
are the best for the present and future
Minor Premise: The Negro worked them in the past
Therefore: The Negro is best for the present and future
In his Macon speech, four years later, Hampton
advanced much the same argument, but added further support
to his contention that the Negro was the best labor for the
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fields:
The Negro is undoubtedly better fitted, from his long 
training, his physical configuration and his adapt­
ability to all the diversities of our climate, to make a 
more efficient laborer than any other. Especially is 
this true when the labor is to be performed in the more 
malarial portions of our country.5-3
Thus, while at Macon he asserted specifics as to why the
Negro was the best laborer for the fields, at Richland Fork
the argument was purely circumstantial and drew upon the
experience of the audience for its support: what worked in
the past would work in the present. In one sense, even
though he provided more specifics at Macon, the argument
still rested upon the past observations of his audience,
since he never developed what there was about the black's
configuration that made him better suited for the fields or
about his make-up that made him more adaptable to the
climate.
If the fields had to be tilled, and the black was the 
best one to do it, and slavery was dead, how then could his 
services best be procured? This question constituted the 
final link in Hampton's chain of argument. The answer was 
provided through causal analysis. The goal would be 
achieved "but in one way, and that will be by dealing with 
the negro fairly, frankly and equitably. Let him see that 
we not only recognize his newly acquired rights, but that we 
will protect him in the enjoyment of these rights."
53Ibid., 21 November 1869.
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Necessity would force the black to seek work and when he
did, the planters should
meet him kindly; encourage him when he is disposed to do 
well; offer fair terms to him, and whilst you demand 
from him a strict observance of his obligation, carry 
out honestly and fairly your agreement with him. Show 
him that the white man of the South is his best friend.
The crux of Hampton's argument lay in the dilemma that was 
put to the planter. He needed to have his fields tilled and 
the Negro was best suited for doing it, but the black's 
services could only be obtained through slavery or fair 
treatment that induced voluntary labor. Slavery, as he 
established in his first argument, was dead; the only 
alternative available was to adopt a program of kind treat­
ment. As the problem with most disjunctive syllogisms lies 
in the failure to consider the ground between the two 
extremes, so it did here. Nowhere did he address the use of 
threats, intimidation, and especially legal coercion as in 
the Black Codes as means of securing the black's labor.
The omission of any direct reference to the Black 
Codes is particularly significant, since they were a prime 
topic of conversation when the speech was given. There were 
perhaps two oblique references to the codes. One was his 
reference to protecting the Negro in his enj oyment of his 
rights. An argument used to gain passage of the codes was 
that they were protecting the Negro both from those who 
would seek to take advantage of him and from himself. The 
other reference was in a remark made directly to the blacks
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in the audience that "laws will be made by which every man, 
white and black, in the country will have to show that he is 
making an honest support for himself or he will be taken up 
and put at hard work." The only possible laws that Hampton 
could have had in mind were the Black Codes. To the extent 
that the Black Codes could compel the blacks to make 
contracts with the planters, the need to use fair, kind 
treatment as the only way to obtain their services was 
certainly reduced.
Perhaps because he realized the vulnerability of his 
own argument, he added two additional advantages that could 
be accrued only through the application of fair treatment:
(1) the frustration of the Yankees and (2) the maintenance 
of the class structure by keeping the peasants happy. "You 
will speedily eradicate the foul, the false, the pernicious 
doctrine instilled in his [the Negro] heart by the aboli­
tionists of the North . . . and again have in the South a 
happy, contented and laborious peasantry." Though it was 
inadequately developed, this argument was the key to his 
approach. While other means could be utilized for obtaining 
black labor, at least temporarily, only kind, fair treatment 
could neutralize the attempts of the abolitionists to gain 
control of the blacks and with it radically alter the social 
structure.
A year later, speaking to the Soldiers Association at 
Walhalla, South Carolina, Hampton briefly suggested the same
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approach toward the Negroes. Dealing with him "frankly,
justly, kindly," would cause him to cling
to his old home, his own country, and his former 
masters. If you wish to see him contented, indus­
trious, useful, aid him in his effort to elevate 
himself in the scale of civilization, and thus fit him 
not only to enjoy the blessings of freedom, but to 
appreciate its duties.54
Thus he again argued that the best way to achieve a continu­
ing labor class was by kind treatment of the Negro.
In his Macon address in 1869 he again made the same 
argument but in more detail than Richland Fork or Walhalla.
Our object, then should be to develop to the utmost his 
capacity as a laborer. To do this time is required, and 
we shall have to exercise great forbearance, constant 
prudence, and steady kindness. We must make him feel 
that his interests are indissolubly bound up with ours; 
that high prices for our products insure high wages for 
him. . . . Let us be scrupulously just in our dealings 
with him. Let us assist him in his aspirations for 
knowledge and aid him in its acquisition. . . . In a 
word, convince him that we are his best, if not his 
only, friends, and when we shall have done this, we 
shall not only have placed our labor on a sound footing, 
but we shall have gained in the laborer a strong and 
zealous ally.55
While at Richland Fork and Walhalla he simply asserted the
causal connection between kind treatment and a contented
labor supply, at Macon he supported it with his own
experience:
I speak not from theory but experience— an experience 
which has taught me that the kindest relations can exist 
between the planter and his former slaves, resulting in 
mutual advantage to both parties. My old slaves are 
cultivating the land on which they have lived for years,
54Charleston Daily Courier. 10 October 1866.
55Columbia Daily Phoenix. 21 November 1869.
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and there has been a constant and marked improvement in 
their industry in each year since their emancipation. 
. . .  I have promised to put up for them a schoolhouse 
and church, and to pay a portion of the salaries of 
their teachers. . . . That kind treatment, just dealing 
and sincere efforts to improve their conditions are not 
without effect upon them, is proved by the fact, grati­
fying to myself, that I am now on my way to Mississippi, 
by the request of hundreds of Negroes, besides my own 
laborers, to advise them what course to pursue in the 
approaching election there.56
Consistently, then, Hampton advanced the same causal 
argument introduced at Richland Fork for solving the labor 
problems. The best way to secure the labor and the control 
of the black was through kind, just treatment. At Richland 
Fork his auditors had to accept the statement simply on the 
authority of the speaker, for no evidence was offered to 
support the truth of the assertion. By 1869 he was able to 
offer the limited proof of his own experience to support the 
causal relation.
In addition to his arguments to the whites in his 
audience, Hampton also addressed arguments specifically to 
the blacks at Richland Fork. His arguments consisted of two 
major contentions. The first, which received the more 
extensive development, was that the blacks would have to 
work. The second was that the best place to get work was 
from the white planter.
The first contention that they would have to work he 
supported with three reasons: (1) duty demanded it, (2)
laws would enforce it, and (3) survival required it.
56Ibid.
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"Freedom," Hampton argued, "has its duties as well as
pleasures. And the first duty of every free man is to
support himself and his family. . . . and to do this you
will have to work." For those blacks who might not be
impressed with the call to duty, he moved briefly to the
level of coercion: "Laws will be made by which every man,
white and black, in the country will have to show that he is
making an honest support for himself, or he will be taken up
and put at hard work." Here, as mentioned earlier, he must
have had the Black Codes in mind. While the only backing
for the first two reasons was his word, the third reason was
supported with evidence. "But if you do not work," he told
them, "you will surely starve." This truth was illustrated
by the example of the Indian.
They would not work, and though they were a larger and a 
stronger race than yours, they were driven off by the 
white man, as the wind drives the chaff before it. This 
will be your fate, if you will not work, but choose to 
live like the Indians, in idleness and drunkenness.
Anticipating that some in his audience might rej ect his
argument on the belief that the Yankees would take care of
them and keep them from starving, he engaged in refutation.
"The Yankees don't care for you, and they would be perfectly
willing to see you all die off, so that room would be made
here for their poor people." He had no evidence to support
such an extreme statement, but he made an attempt by quoting
at length from a speech made to the blacks in Florida by the
presidentially appointed governor of that state. The
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governor noted that he was a Yankee by birth and education 
but a southerner by residence for some thirty years. He 
then concluded that he knew well both the Yankee and the 
southerner and "'I tell you today as your friend, that the 
Southern white man with whom you were raised, and who is 
acquainted with your habits and customs, is the best friend 
you have got.'" The governor concluded by telling them 
"'the President will not give you one foot of land, nor a 
mule, nor hog, nor cow, nor even a knife and fork or spoon. 
He has given you your freedom and that is everything he 
intends to give you."' While the testimony of the governor 
did not support Hampton's extreme statement, it did give 
credence to the general notion that the North would not 
support black indolence.
What is perplexing about Hampton's choice of reasons 
used to support the contention that the blacks must work is 
the relationship between his second reason and the other 
two. Reasons one and three presupposed choice, while two 
was clearly coercive. If laws were going to compel everyone 
to have a job, it was rather meaningless to argue that 
blacks ought to choose to work to fulfill the duties of 
freedom or to keep from starving. The choice was not 
whether to work, but where to work. Hampton either did not 
see the Black Codes as an enduring solution and therefore 
stressed the voluntary aspects of work, or he did not 
perceive the contradiction in his arguments.
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Hampton's second contention was that the best place 
for the black to get work was from the planter. "Now, how 
can you support yourselves and your families best? I say by 
hiring your labor to the white people. We want labor to 
cultivate our fields, and we would rather hire you than 
strangers, who know nothing about planting." He offered no 
support for his claims. As in so many of his arguments, the 
proof rested either in his authority or the audience1s 
knowledge.
To his white audience Hampton argued that they needed 
labor, that the blacks offered the best way to fulfill that 
need, and that kind treatment provided the best avenue for 
securing their labor. To the blacks he argued their need to 
find employment and that the best place to do so was with 
the white planters.
Motive Appeals
Hampton, in calling upon the whites to extend fair and 
just treatment to the blacks, was not doing so out of any 
noble, altruistic concern for the welfare of the blacks or 
moral obligation of the whites. The appeal was strictly to 
the self interest of the white planters. Their economic and 
social world had been turned upside down by recent events, 
and, while the world of the 1850's could not be restored, it 
was not necessary to plow under all vestiges of it.
Hampton's rhetorical vision was of contented blacks 
laboring on large farms and plantations for prosperous,
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benevolent white masters. The economic arrangements would 
remain intact. The acquisition of a "happy, contented, and 
laborious peasantry" would be to Hampton and his white 
audience "happy results." To achieve this pre-war vision in 
a post-war environment required only a change of means. 
Whereas slavery had achieved the desired goal in the past, a 
kind, just, benevolent paternalism would be needed to 
achieve it in the present. His appeal was strictly that the 
end justified the means: "the ends you seek not only
justify, but demand the exercise of these virtues to their 
greatest extent."
Lest their self interests were not sufficient to 
justify the necessary exercise of "forbearance" and 
"patience" Hampton appealed to them in the name of 
patriotism:
You seek to restore the prosperity of your country— to 
rebuild her cities— to reclaim her desolated fields— to 
reanimate her with new hope. These are the objects 
nearest to a patriotic heart and to obtain them no 
sacrifice would be too great, no labor too arduous.
Thus, using kindness and fairness as a means of securing the
labor of the black was characterized as a patriot's
sacrifice for his country.
While Hampton's interests and those of his white 
audience were at one and he could appeal to them on the 
basis of a common self interest with a touch of patriotism 
tossed in, he was certainly not at one with the interests of 
the black members of his audience. His vision of a black
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peasant laborer had little appeal for those who had only 
recently left the bonds of slavery and were now enamored 
with thoughts of freedom and land. Consequently, his appeal 
to them was at a more basic level— fear. If they would not 
work, they would be taken up and put at hard labor, or they 
would starve, or like the Indians they would be driven off. 
He made no effort to show the blacks how hiring their labor 
to the white planters would improve their position in life 
or bring to fruition any of their new aspirations. The best 
that he offered was the freedom to make the best contract 
they could. Their field labor was not a first affirmative 
step on the road of freedom and opportunity, but an 
avoidance mechanism to escape the bad things that would 
happen if they didn't work.
Fitness of Response
The immediate exigence was the economic problem caused 
by the emancipation of the blacks. Hampton accurately 
perceived the threat to the survival of the planter and the 
state's agricultural economy in general, and in his first 
major speech after the war sought to modify the exigence 
through the application of rhetoric.
His approach at Richland Fork was the first indication 
of what became a grand, overall, pragmatic, consistent 
strategy for dealing with the larger exigence of black-white 
relations, of which the economic difficulties were only one 
dimension. Hampton advocated new means to achieve old ends.
He accepted the end of slavery but not of a way of life. To 
the white planter he presented the appealing vision of a 
social and economic order as much like the pre-war structure 
as possible. While most of the white South Carolina leader­
ship shared that idealistic vision, Hampton was one of the 
few who possessed enough realism to recognize that it would 
not be attained through force, coercion and intimidation.
The advocacy of fair and just treatment toward the black had 
little to do with moral or legal obligations and everything 
to do with the realistic need to counter the "pernicious 
doctrines" of the abolitionists and gain control over the 
blacks.
In an 1867 letter to James Conner, Hampton revealed
the extent of his commitment to realistic pragmatism:
Every good man who can go to the Convention, even if 
sent by negroes and with negroes, should go. We can 
control and direct the negroes if we act discreetly, and 
in my judgment the highest duty of every Southern man is 
to secure the good will and confidence of the negro.
. . . Like you, I am only solicitous about our State 
government, and if we can protect that from destruction, 
I am willing to send negroes co Congress57
Hampton's writings do not reveal whether or not by November
of 1865 he had foreseen the issues that would be created by
black emancipation and had created a grand strategy for
dealing with them. It is significant, however, that his
strategy for coping with the economic problems by kind
treatment that would secure the confidence of the blacks
57Wade Hampton to James Conner, 24 March 1867, Wade 
Hampton Papers.
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remained essentially unchanged. This strategy was probably 
the only one that could have come close to achieving the 
southern vision.
While in some ways Hampton was offering a realistic 
strategy, his realism did not go far enough. The speech 
failed on two counts: (1) he did not accurately assess the
need of the blacks to assert their freedom, and (2) he 
offered the planters no reason why kind treatment was the 
best means for securing black labor. As indicated in the 
earlier analysis of the audience, one of the strong desires 
among the blacks was the desire for some land of their own 
as a means of asserting their freedom. Hampton totally 
ignored this concern. Considering that his strategy relied 
upon the voluntary actions of both blacks and whites, there 
was remarkably little incentive for the blacks. The choices 
were to make contracts with the planters, starve, or be put 
at forced labor. There were no positive advantages from 
working for the planters— no prospect of future land 
acquisition, no hope of significant financial gain, no 
avenues for practical expression of their new freedom. 
Hampton's vision of a white planter class with a black 
peasant labor class was too much deja vu and nightmare to 
hold any appeal for the blacks. While Hampton ignored the 
black's desire for land, E. B. Heyward, who spoke to the 
same audience at the conclusion of Hampton's speech, fully 
recognized the desire, gave a rather extensive treatment to
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it, and advocated the planters leave to the black laborers a 
portion of ground for raising their own crops, but which 
would be forfeited if the worker violated his contract.58 
Heyward's analysis is clear evidence of the subject's 
relevance and importance to that audience, and Hampton's 
total ignoring of this interest is inexplicable.
Not only did Hampton inadequately respond to the 
interests of the blacks, he provided no reasons, other than 
his opinion, why the whites should take a conciliatory 
attitude toward the blacks. He offered no evidence that 
such an approach would produce the desired result or that 
such an approach was even necessary. In fact the events of 
recent days and his own remarks to the blacks contradicted 
the need to adopt his position. The recently passed Black 
Codes were an attempt to deal with the very problem he was 
addressing. To the extent the Black Codes were enforceable, 
his approach was unnecessary. Nowhere did he attempt to 
show that the Black Codes were unworkable, undesirable, or 
that they would not endure. In fact, to the contrary, he 
argued in his remarks to the blacks that laws would force 
them to work, thereby contradicting his earlier appeal to 
the whites.
At Richland Fork Hampton correctly dealt with the 
exigence of the economic crisis presented by the new 
relationship between blacks and whites. He developed a
58Columbia Daily Phoenix. 21 January 1866.
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strategy for solving the problem, but failed to provide 
adequate constraints for the whites to adopt his position, 
and failed to analyze his black audience's perception of the 
exigence as a need for land as an expression of freedom, and 
not simply survival.
CHAPTER IV
FREEDMEN'S ADDRESS AS RESPONSE 
TO THE BLACK SUFFRAGE EXIGENCE
Exigence
The second major exigence to emerge with emancipation 
concerned the political relationship between black and 
white. It is certainly not surprising that difficulties 
arose as former masters and ex-slaves, rebels and Yankee 
conquerors, Democrats and Republicans, native sons and 
carpetbaggers all sought to define the new relationship. 
While there were many dimensions to the problem, they all 
ultimately were reduced to one overriding consideration, 
suffrage for the blacks. Because of the scope and signi­
ficance of this issue the analysis will focus only on this 
one area.
On May 12, 1865, while many up-state blacks were still 
unaware of their emancipation, a meeting of freedmen was 
taking place at Zion church in Charleston. Chief Justice 
Salmon Chase, Maj. Gen. Rufus Saxton, Maj. Martin R. Delany 
and Reuben Tomlinson, Superintendent of Education for the 
Freedmen's Bureau, addressed the meeting and urged the 
blacks to petition President Johnson and Congress for the 
right to vote. "I wish to leave nothing undone to secure
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you that right— the right to vote/' said General Saxton,
"the right to hold the elective franchise. It is the 
inalienable right of all men, the right of the colored as 
well as the white man."1 Thus the call for black suffrage 
in South Carolina began almost simultaneously with the end 
of slavery.
Under President Johnson's plan of reconstruction only 
those qualified to vote in 1860 were eligible to vote for 
delegates to South Carolina's constitutional convention in 
September, 1865. Blacks, therefore, were ineligible to vote 
for those who would set future qualifications for voters.
As white voters went to the polls, blacks assembled in 
Charleston and St. Helena to petition the convention to 
grant them suffrage on the same basis as the white popula­
tion. Significantly, they were perfectly willing to accept 
a suffrage with educational or property restrictions, as 
long as the restrictions were applied equally to both blacks 
and whites.2 Such, however, was not to be.
Governor Perry presaged the action of the convention 
by stating in his opening address that "this is a white 
man's government and intended for white men only." In his 
view, "to extend this universal suffrage to the freedmen in 
their present ignorant and degraded condition would be
Charleston Daily Courier. 13 May 1865.
2Thomas Holt, Black Over White: Negro Political Leader­
ship in South Carolina During Reconstruction (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1977), 21-22.
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little less than folly and madness."3 Perry later
questioned the wisdom of his approach:
I thought as a matter of policy and justice, that the 
intelligent property holders amongst the freedmen should 
be allowed to vote, and so stated in the original draft 
of my first message to the convention. But my friends 
advised me to leave out this recommendation as it would 
only produce a division in the convention, and there was 
no probability of its being adopted. I did so, and ever 
since regretted it, for if a qualified suffrage had been 
extended to the colored people we might have avoided the 
second reconstruction and the Constitutional Amendment 
imposed by Congress.4
Dr. Alexander Wylie, a delegate to the convention, testified
during the Ku Klux hearings that many delegates favored a
qualified suffrage but like Perry were hesitant to speak for
it:
I . . . favored giving the negroes all civil rights. I 
voted with only three men . . . to give all civil rights 
to negroes, not mentioning color, and proposed that we 
should present some qualifications in regard to educa­
tion and property. I am satisfied that a large propor­
tion of the older men were in favor of that proposition, 
but they looked to their constituents and hesitated.
They expressed themselves so . . . they had not dis­
cussed the matter with the people and were afraid.5
Sidney Andrews, a northern reporter, found no sympathy
for black suffrage:
I did hope . . . that I should find half a dozen men at 
least in favor of giving suffrage to some negroes, as 
many more in favor of abolishing the barbaric color
3Charleston Daily Courier. 16 September 1865.
4Benjamin F. Perry, Reminiscences of Public Men, with 
Speeches and Addresses. 2d Series (Greenville: Shannon &
Co., 1889), 275.
5Congress, Joint Select Committee to Inquire into the 
Condition of Affairs in the Late Insurrectionary States, The 
Ku—Klux Conspiracy. 42d Cong., 2d Sess., 1872, 560-61.
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qualification, and still as many more ready to admit 
that suffrage would be the right of the negro as soon as 
he is able to use it understandingly. Vain hope! If 
there are six men who so much as admit that it will 
probably be right or politic to give suffrage to any 
negro of their State within ten years, four of them must 
be among the thirty or thirty-five whose views I have 
not personally learned.6
The talk, according to Andrews, was all of a "white-man1s
government.1,7
While some members of the convention might have had 
reservations about the tactical wisdom of totally excluding 
the black from the state's political structure, the fact is 
that no other policy was seriously considered. The conven­
tion ignored the petition from the blacks and granted 
suffrage only to white males. In fact the convention 
refused even to count the blacks in establishing a basis for 
representation in the lower house.8
On November 25, 1865, forty-six black delegates from 
nine districts throughout the state met in Charleston to 
protest the treatment of the blacks by the constitutional 
convention and the recent session of the legislature. The 
protests were primarily directed at the economic restric­
tions of the Black Codes and the failure of the consti­
tutional convention to grant equal suffrage. The delegates 
adopted appeals to the people of South Carolina, the state
6Andrews, 89.
7Ibid., 88.
8Simkins and Woody, 40-41.
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legislature, and the Congress. In all of these appeals they 
asked that suffrage be granted them on an equal basis with 
the whites.9
Not surprisingly the appeals were ignored by the white 
power structure of the state, a structure that through its 
own intransigence was about to lose its power to shape the 
destiny of the state, for while they were deaf to the 
appeals of the blacks, such was not the case with the 
Republican controlled Congress. In December the Congress 
turned away the state's elected representatives; in January 
Gen. Daniel Sickles declared the Black Codes null and void.
A month later the Congress guaranteed basic equality of 
rights to the blacks with the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866. Shortly thereafter Congress sent to the states 
for ratification the Fourteenth Amendment.10
The political relationship between blacks and whites 
in South Carolina remained unchanged until March 1867 when 
Congress repudiated the president's plan of reconstruction 
and substituted its own. Under the congressional plan South 
Carolina was placed under the control of the United States 
military. Congress further specified a new constitutional 
convention with delegates elected by all citizens except 
those disfranchised by the Fourteenth Amendment. The new 
constitution would have to grant suffrage to all male
9Proceedings of the Colored People1s Convention. 23-31.
10Holt, 23.
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citizens, be ratified by the voters, and approved by Cong­
ress. The new legislature elected under this constitution 
would have to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment.11
Suddenly, as Thomas Holt puts it, "a revolutionary 
change in black-white relations, 'a new order,' was in the 
making."12 For the first time the black majority in South 
Carolina would have a direct say in the shaping of the state 
government. The revolutionary nature of the change was 
underscored by the almost two to one majority of potential 
black voters over whites. The new registration of voters 
completed in October of 1867 showed 46,346 whites and 78,982 
blacks.13
The exigence was clear and urgent. If the native 
whites did not in some way gain control of these new black 
voters, the white power structure would be swept away and 
control of the state pass to blacks, scalawags, and carpet­
baggers . For many their worst fear was on the verge of 
reality. The strategy for coping with the crisis had been 
suggested in an unsigned editorial in the Charleston Daily 
Courier in the fall of 1866. Observing the growing power of 
the radicals in Congress, the writer advocated the calling 
of a constitutional convention which would grant suffrage to 
anyone who "[is] twenty-one years of age, has resided ___




months in the state, can read and write, and is possessed of
  hundred dollars worth of real or personal property." The
action was needed, in the writer's view, to preempt more
drastic action by the Congress:
The present Congress will not adjourn and leave the 
South a free agent in this matter; now is the time for 
her to anticipate the Radical party. . . . Such an 
amendment would give us greater strength in Congress, 
and instead of running to universal suffrage would 
produce exactly the opposite result.14
Audience
As the political context changed so did the nature of
Hampton's audience. Hampton Jarrell observes:
During 1866 Hampton had appealed primarily to the white 
men of the state for kind treatment of the Negro; but 
. . . by March of 1867 the General realized that the 
power of decision in the state as to harmony or strife 
between the races had passed to the Negro. . . . [and] 
he sought with all his influence to persuade the blacks 
to join the white men of the state in shaping its 
political structure.15
Immediately following Hampton1s address to the freed- 
men in Columbia, Beverly Nash, a black organizer of the 
meeting, spoke to the crowd. Nash endorsed the sentiments 
of Hampton and stressed the bond of friendship that had 
existed between the southern whites and blacks: "We
recognize the Southern white man as the true friend of the 
black man." He acknowledged the economic need for coopera­
tion: "The white man has land, the black man has labor, and
14Charleston Daily Courier. 29 November 1866.
15Jarrell, 16.
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labor is worth nothing without capital. We must help to 
create that capital by restoring confidence, and we can only 
restore confidence by electing proper men to fill our public 
offices." While Nash reinforced cooperation between the two 
groups he completely rejected the idea of a limited suf­
frage: "My doctrine is, that every man, whether ignorant or
not, who is compelled to pay taxes, is entitled to vote."16
While Nash was in Columbia urging cooperation with the 
white southern leadership, another meeting of blacks with an 
entirely different perspective was taking place in Charles­
ton. The meeting was called to ratify a platform for the 
formation of a Union Republican party in South Carolina. In 
addressing the group, F. L. Cardozo and B. F. Randolf, both 
blacks, warned the audience to beware of false claims of 
friendship and kindness by the southern whites who were 
seeking only to beguile them and take away their rights. 
Their true friends were not the former slave owners but the 
men of the Republican party who had "shown their friendship 
by the sacrifice of their lives and their treasure." Wade 
Hampton was specifically mentioned as one who was trying to 
swallow them through flattery, and Nash was denounced as a 
traitor. While the reporter indicated that these impres­
sions were enthusiastically supported by the audience, 
Cardozo prefaced his remarks as if he anticipated some
16Charleston Daily Courier. 23 March 1867.
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contrary views in the audience:
What then, may be asked is the danger? I answer, it 
lies in the intention of the Southern whites to cheat 
us, if possible, out of these great advantages, by the 
false pretension of would-be friends. And here I know I 
begin to tread on delicate ground; I shall, however, 
endeavor to go on fearlessly and without any vindictive 
feeling to any individual. Personally I have been 
treated with the greatest personal kindness by many 
Southern gentlemen. I have received from them indivi­
dual favors and acts of kindness. But this is no 
question of individual or personal consideration.17
While Nash differed with Cardozo and Randolf on the
question of cooperation with southern whites, there was no
difference on the issue of suffrage. The sentiment of the
Charleston meeting was best expressed by E.J. Adams:
A perfect union, justice, domestic tranquility, the 
common defense, the general welfare, and the blessings 
of liberty cannot be secured without universal suffrage. 
It is the only means of defense for the illiterate and 
the poor.18
Six weeks later at a party organizational meeting in 
Columbia a resolution calling for universal suffrage was 
adopted.19 And yet, there were some slight reservations.
B. F. Randolf was so concerned about providing motivation 
for education that at the constitutional convention he had 
inserted in committee a provision that those not able to 
read and write after 1875 would not have the right to vote. 
The convention strongly opposed the restriction and voted 
it down 107 to 2, with even Mr. Randolf voting with the
17Ibid., 27 March 1867.
18Ibid.
19Columbia Daily Phoenix. 2 May 1867.
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majority.20 Thus, the black leadership and a substantial 
number of followers had a commitment to universal suffrage 
that would be difficult, if not impossible, for any of the 
southern whites to overcome.
The blacks, though, were still not a united group. A
correspondent for the New York Daily Tribune reported in
late May his concern over the poor political organization
among the blacks:
There is absolutely none [political organization] 
deserving the name, outside of Charleston and the 
islands and adjacent coast towns. The Union League. . . 
has made little headway here. The only open Republican 
movement is that represented by the convention which has 
just adjourned, and that had representation from only 
nine out of thirty districts.21
He concluded that the blacks feelings were with the Repub­
licans, but the ignorance, poverty, and habit of submission 
prevalent among them threatened the success of the radical 
movement.22
In addition to the lack of organization there were
social differences among the blacks which threatened their
unity. F. L. Cardozo alluded to these differences in his
speech at the organizational meeting in Charleston:
I would . . . warn you of another danger . . . that is 
peculiar to ourselves. From the unhappy state of things
20Proceedinqs of the Constitutional Convention of South 
Carolina held at Charleston. South Carolina, beginning 
January 14th and ending March 17th. 1868 (Charleston: Denny 
& Perry, 1868), 824, 830-35.
21New York Daily Tribune. 23 May 1867.
22Ibid.
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which has existed here in the enjoyment of this new 
privilege the colored people find themselves divided and 
disunited by a variety of sentiments and feelings. 
Whatever may be a man's social status, whatever may be 
his religious views, whatever may be the state of his 
knowledge, if he will come with you and vote for the 
platform, unite with him, if it be Satan himself. Let 
no cause of dissension, no feeling of animosity, no 
objection to social condition, prevent you from securing 
to yourselves and your children the liberty that has 
been committed to you.23
Thomas Holt provides considerable insight into the possible
nature of their division. He delineates three groups of
blacks: the freeborn mulattoes, the urban slaves, and the
field slaves, with the greatest distinction existing between
the mulattoes and the others. While he concurs with other
scholars that the problem was not as great as the white
press made it out to be and that the major issues "were
those dividing black and white, not those between black and
mulatto," Holt still contends "divisions and conflicts did
exist, and they did have political consequences."24 After
noting the religious, social, and economic differences of
the two groups he concludes that
a politically mobilized black constituency was essential 
to the advancement of the brown bourgeoisie. Thus one 
might speculate that the political conservatism of this 
element of the South Carolina group was restrained by 
their dependence on a mainly black, slave-born constit­
uency. Consequently, the freeborn mulatto, bourgeois 
legislators by and large, reached across the "chasm" to 
embrace— sometimes belatedly and haltingly, often with 
vacillation and quibbling at crucial moments— the
23Charleston Daily Courier. 22 March 1867.
24Holt, 59.
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political and economic agenda of the black peasantry.25 
The blacks, then, that Hampton was seeking to influ­
ence were as yet politically unorganized but with sympathies 
strongly inclined toward the radical movement. They were 
largely ignorant and concerned with securing land and food. 
It was an audience with an undercurrent of social and 
economic factions and some difference of opinion on the 
appropriate relationship with southern whites, but rather 




As in the speech at Richland Fork, Wade Hampton was a 
well known figure to his audience of freedmen. His identity 
and his relationship with blacks both past and present were 
clear, and needed no amplification. What he spent almost 
one-third of the speech developing was the trustworthiness 
dimension of ethos. This dimension was critical to his 
success for two reasons: (1) any appeal from the old white
power structure to the newly enfranchised black maj ority 
would have to be viewed with a great deal of skepticism, and
(2) his ultimate appeal would call for the blacks to trust 
the whites. He sought to establish this trustworthiness by 
showing his friendship with the blacks, a friendship which
25Ibid., 68.
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he argued was both sincere and deep.
He sought to establish the sincerity of his friendship 
by arguing the consistency of his messages and the absence 
of any personal motives. In the opening of the address 
Hampton noted that he was speaking to "the colored people of 
this district, amongst whom my life has been passed."26 In 
the past the blacks had treated him with kindness and 
respect and there had been no change in this attitude since 
the end of the war. From these two pieces of data he moved 
to the conclusion that "I am, therefore, justified in 
calling you my friends." He then expressed the hope that 
"as my conduct to you has made you look upon me as your 
friend [as evidenced by the invitation to speak to them] so 
my advice and actions in the future will but confirm you in 
that belief." Once he had established the basis of friend­
ship he moved to defend the sincerity of it: "I mention
these things to you . . . to give you the assurance, if you 
need any, of my sincerity in all the advice I shall offer to 
you today." The "things mentioned" were (1) that he "was 
the first Southern man who addressed a colored audience 
after the close of the war," and that the advice given in 
that speech at Richland Fork was the same he would be giving 
in this one; and (2) that the advice given to whites in his 
Pickens address in the fall of 1866 was consistent with what
26Charleston Daily Courier. 23 March 1867. All other 
references to this speech in this section are from this 
source.
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he would be giving to them. To substantiate his point he 
quoted from what he had told his audience in Pickens 
regarding their treatment of the blacks. From this evidence 
he concluded "I have held one language in reference to your 
people since your freedom.”
The evidence seems to justify his conclusion. There 
are no inconsistencies between statements made to whites as 
opposed to black audiences or between those made in this 
address with those spoken one and two years earlier. In all 
of these instances he was advocating fair, kind, treatment 
and good will between the races, with the whites, of course, 
always occupying the superior position.
In addition to proving his sincerity by the consis­
tency of his messages, he also argued the absence of any 
personal motives:
No personal motives can possibly sway me for I am no 
longer a citizen of the United States or of the Confed­
erate States. The Bill which gives the right of 
suffrage to you, disenfranchises me. I have not even a 
home here, for my home, and the homes of all who love my 
name, have been laid in ashes. I have no political 
rights. I have nothing to bind me to the ruined land, 
but the memories of the past, the appreciation I cherish 
for its people, and the graves of my kindred. These 
ties, however, are strong enough to keep alive in my 
heart, a warm interest in my state, and they are 
sufficient to make one strive always to promote her 
welfare. This motive, alone, brought me here today, for 
it was not until the chairman of your committee urged me 
to come, upon the ground, that I could thus "do good to 
my own people, and to them," that I consented to address 
you.
While there is no reason to doubt Hampton's dedication to 
the welfare of his state, and in fact many reasons for
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accepting it, the reasons presented here border on mis­
representation. While Millwood, the magnificent plantation 
of the Hampton family going back to his grandfather, had 
indeed been converted to cinders by Sherman, Diamond Hill 
and Southern Cross, both of which were in Columbia and 
belonged to the Hampton family, were in fine condition. 
Political control of the state would have a dramatic impact 
upon the economy, and Hampton, tottering on the brink of 
bankruptcy, certainly had a vital interest in the economy. 
While in truth he had been disfranchised and was without 
political rights, he was not without political influence, 
and certainly fully expected within a short period of time 
to regain his rights. Even granting minimum personal moti­
vation, he was still motivated by his vision of a society 
controlled by white aristocrats. The impression which he 
sought to create that he was speaking to them purely from an 
altruistic concern for their welfare was definitely not an 
accurate one.
Secondly, Hampton argued that he was trustworthy 
because of his deep affection for the blacks. This 
affection was based on their past attitudes and actions 
toward him:
Looking at your action [inviting him to speak] in an 
aspect purely personal, I cannot but be greatly grati­
fied at the confidence you have reposed in me. It is 
but another evidence of that life-long kindliness shown 
by your people to myself; a kindliness which I gladly 
reciprocate. From many of you I have met not only 
kindness, but affection. I cannot forget how faithfully 
some of your people clung to me through all the perils
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and privations of the war. I cannot forget that it was 
one of you, who was always amongst the first at my side 
when I was wounded, and the last to leave me. Such 
affection is not often met with, nor is it easily 
forgotten, and while I have a crust of bread it shall be 
shared with this well-tried, this true, this trusty 
friend.
There is little reason to doubt the genuineness and 
depth of his feeling toward the blacks. What is important 
is that this feeling had been expressed within very clear 
societal boundaries. The relationship was not between 
equals but rather between master and slave. "The freedmen 
of Columbia," wrote Harper1s Weekly, "probably understand 
Mr. Wade Hampton quite as well as he understands them. They 
certainly did not believe him to be their chief friend when 
he was in arms for the glorious right of enslaving them 
hopelessly forever."27
Motive Appeals
In a New York Daily Tribune editorial a few days
before Hampton's address, Horace Greeley wrote:
The Union having triumphed by Emancipation, it was the 
manifest policy, the clear interest, of the Southerners, 
to turn at once to the Blacks and say, "we upheld 
Slavery so long as we could, because we believed it best 
for us and for you. But slavery is dead and you are 
free: now we will show you that we were honest in our
devotion to slavery by treating you justly and kindly as 
freemen. Choose your wisest and best men for consulta­
tion with us; let them tell us what guarantees you 
require for your rights, and they shall be freely 
accorded. We are of different races and must remain so; 
but we are all Americans and Southerners; and, if we do
27Harper1s Weekly, 16 April 1867.
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not henceforth live in harmony, it shall not be our 
fault."28
White southerners in 1865 had not followed the steps 
outlined by Greeley, though Hampton had consistently 
advocated kind treatment. By 1867 Hampton's thinking was 
much more along the line of Greeley’s. The key was to 
establish a sense of unity and identity. Greeley1s line,
"we are all Americans and Southerners" was mirrored by 
Hampton's "are you not Southern men, as we are." The 
strategy of appealing to identification was clear to minds 
both North and South.
As indicated earlier, Hampton's whole strategy for 
dealing with the exigence was to gain control over the black 
vote, and the means for doing that was identification. Not 
only in this speech but throughout the spring and summer of 
1867 and the summer and early fall of 1868, Hampton sought 
by verbal and nonverbal means to achieve with the blacks 
what Kenneth Burke labels as consubstantiation.
Nonverbally, Hampton sought consubstantiation by
participating in meetings with the blacks. In his address
at Columbia he was a guest speaker, sharing the platform on
an equal basis with black orators. Simkins and Woody
describe the overall strategy and the manner in which it was
executed during the spring and summer of 1867:
To promote this sort of cooperation, public meetings 
were held at which Negroes were invited to listen to
28New York Daily Tribune. 14 March 1867.
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speakers of both races. To make the gatherings attrac­
tive to the Negroes, they were allowed to march in 
procession to the place of assemblage, members of their 
race were appointed as a special police force to supple­
ment the regular white force, and a free barbecue was 
provided. . . . When these gatherings broke, after 
sturdy repasts of barbecued lamb and kid had been 
enj oyed everyone was in the best of spirits and it 
seemed as if kindly cooperation were going to heal scars 
left by the war.29
While Hampton and others of the white power structure 
sought with banquets and processions to identify themselves 
with the blacks, they were unable to go far enough to make 
it work:
Why should they follow leaders who demanded that they 
speak first and eat their barbecue at a separate table? 
Better far the Negroes agreed, to follow leaders who 
would give the race some of the offices and banquet 
cheek by jowl with them.30
Verbally, Hampton sought identification through his 
language, arguments, and illustrations. Thirteen times in 
the address he used "friends" and eight times "kindness."
The invitation to address them indicated they looked upon 
the whites as friends, "friends with whom you wish to act 
and from whom you are willing to seek counsel." The blacks 
were to test the proffered friendship of northerners and 
southerners and discover their true friends. Finally, he 
identified as a "well-tried," "true," and "trusty friend" 
the servant who was first to aid him when he was wounded in 
battle. The blacks, Hampton observed, had always treated
29Simkins and Woody, 85.
30Ibid.
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him with "kindness." The black orator of the day had 
"spoken wisely and kindly." He urged the whites to treat 
the blacks "kindly." On the one hand Hampton had promised 
the whites that the blacks would reciprocate any kindness 
shown to them, and on the other hand he was gladly recip­
rocating the kindness the blacks had shown to him. In other 
words, Hampton tried to create the oneness of long-time 
friends bound with ties of mutual expressions of kindness.
Hampton's arguments are analyzed later in this chapter 
and will not be duplicated here. Simply put, he argued 
blacks and whites were linked as one. They shared the same 
sun, the same soil and they would share the same suffering 
or the same success. Thus, they were one in environment and 
circumstance.
Two illustrations from his past experience were used 
to exemplify the mutual bonds of kindness and respect 
between black and white. In the one he described an 
incident that had occurred several years earlier in the 
North when a ticket agent told him his two servants could 
not ride with him in the same car. "I told him that I had 
paid their fare; that I thought them good enough to ride 
with me, and therefore quite good enough to ride with his 
fellow-citizens, and that they should go into my car. So I 
brought them in and kept them there." In a second example 
Hampton remembered "how faithfully some of your people clung 
to me through all the perils and privations of the war. I
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cannot forget that it was one of you, who was always amongst 
the first at my side when I was wounded, and the last to 
leave me.” The two examples established an almost familial 
relationship between Hampton and the blacks with Hampton 
being the instigator in one instance and the beneficiary in 
the other.
Through nonverbal means of picnics, barbecues, and 
joint speaking engagements, Hampton tried to appeal to the 
black sense of oneness and identification with the state and 
its white leaders. Verbally the same appeal was made by 
employing terms that characterize a good and close rela­
tionship, and by pointing to past examples of good feeling. 
Unfortunately for Hampton, the chasm was too wide for his 
appeals to span.
Logical Appeals
Hampton's argumentative structure rested on one 
independent, overriding contention and two conditional 
arguments. His first and most crucial argument was that the 
fate and prosperity of the blacks was inevitably linked to 
the welfare of the southern whites. After establishing this 
point, he considered two possibilities and the ensuing 
consequences: (1) that the military bill would be declared
constitutional by the United States Supreme Court and the 
blacks would have the vote; and (2) that the bill would be 
declared unconstitutional and the whites would remain in 
power. This section will analyze each of these arguments.
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His argument linking the welfare of southern whites 
and blacks was critical not only to the success of this 
speech but to his overall strategy of dealing with the black 
question. In a letter written two weeks after his speech to 
John Mullaly, a northern newspaper editor, Hampton clearly 
enunciated his strategy: "If we cannot direct these votes,
it will overwhelm us. Now how shall we do this? Simply by 
making the negro a Southern man, and if you will a democrat, 
anything but a radical."31 Six days after the speech he 
wrote to James Conner, "the highest duty of every Southern 
man is to receive the good will and confidence of the 
negro."32 While he had earlier urged fair treatment toward 
the blacks and argued that it was in the whites best 
interest to treat them kindly, he had told the blacks in his 
Richland Fork address that "we can get along without you 
better than you can without us."33
In making his argument, Hampton first established the 
obvious, that by geography and environment the blacks were 
southern men:
Are you not Southern men, as we are? Is this not your 
home as well as ours? Does not that glorious Southern 
sun above us shine alike for both of us? Did not this 
soil give birth to all of us? And will we not all 
alike, . . . sleep in that selfsame soil?
31Wade Hampton to John Mullaly, 31 March 1867, Wade 
Hampton Papers.
32Wade Hampton to James Conner, 24 March 1867, James
Conner Papers.
33Columbia Phoenix. 21 January 1866.
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Undoubtedly, very few South Carolina blacks thought of 
themselves as southern men. While they had been born and 
were living within the geographic region, it was through no 
choice of their own. They were in the South because they 
had been unable to go anywhere else. Further, to suggest 
that one is a southern man or a northern man carries the 
connotation that he is in sympathy with the social and 
political views of that region. It is inconceivable that 
these blacks, two years out of slavery, were then or had 
ever been in harmony with a system that had kept them bound 
in chains. To argue that they should identify with the 
white power structure because they too were southern men by 
birth was a hollow appeal.
His second argument linking them to the interests of 
the South was at least more substantive if not more per­
suasive:
Your welfare is inseparably linked with that of the 
whites of the South. If we are unjustly taxed, you will 
have to pay your share; if we are oppressed, you will 
suffer; if we are ruined, you will be destroyed. Your 
prosperity depends entirely on that of your country, and 
whatever fate awaits the white people of the South will 
be yours.
He made no attempt to prove the truth of his assertion that 
the fate of white and black was linked together, rather, he 
argued the consequences of the condition. Hampton was 
utilizing Aristotle's topic of the greater and lesser. If 
the "greater," the white land owners, were adversely 
affected by taxes or other economic measures, the "lesser,"
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the poor blacks, would feel the impact as well. Normally, 
the argument would carry, but in this instance the blacks 
had almost nothing to lose. The disparity of their relative 
economic conditions was forcefully set forth by A. L. Burt 
in a protest to the Congress over the new state consti­
tution. "'At this moment the taxable property is held by 
one race, and under that Constitution the political power is 
vested exclusively in the other.9”34 In a speech to the 
1868 constitutional convention R. H. Cain in arguing for an 
appeal for federal money further described the plight of the 
blacks:
This is a measure of relief to those thousands of freed 
people who now have no lands of their own. . . .  I 
believe it is a fact . . . that over three hundred 
thousand men, women and children are homeless, landless. 
The abolition of slavery has thrown these people upon 
their own resources.35
Thus, Hampton9s argument was valid only for the small
percentage of blacks who had an economic investment in the
state. Significantly, Cain in his address to the convention
argued the same point that Hampton was trying to make, but
correctly noted that for the blacks to have any interest in
the economy of the state, they had to be landowners: ,9If
they possess lands they have an interest in the soil, in the
State, in its commerce, its agriculture and in everything
34Resoectful Remonstrance on behalf of the White People 
of South Carolina against the Constitution of the late 
Convention of that State, now submitted to Congress for 
Ratification (Columbia: n.p., 1868).
3Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention. 379.
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pertaining to the wealth and welfare of the State."36
To substantiate his view that blacks and whites were
linked in economic interest, Hampton developed an example of
unjust taxation:
I have said that if an unjust tax is laid upon the 
South, you will have to pay your share of it. Let me 
prove this to you. Many of you are laborers on plan­
tations, working for a portion of the crop. Well, 
suppose you get one, or two, or three bales of cotton, 
as your year's wages. Now, before you can sell this 
cotton, for which you have worked hard, a whole year, 
you have to pay a tax of twelve dollars a bale, for 
every bale you have made. There is a case, in which 
unjust taxation falls as hard, or harder on you, than it 
does on us.
The example did indeed support his generalization, but
certainly did not prove it. Any tax upon goods and services
would affect, as Hampton claimed, both white and black. The
fallacy, of course, is that he was trying to prove a
generalization with only one example. Significantly he
avoided mentioning the tax that was uppermost in the minds
of the planters— the property tax— because it blatantly
contradicted his assertion. The impact of the property tax
would fall almost exclusively upon the white landowners.
The vast maj ority of blacks would not only escape the burden
of the tax, but would stand to gain as planters were forced
to sell some of their land. A. L. Burt in his protest to
Congress saw the consequences of heavy property taxes:
Now what must be the consequences? Property under forms 
of law, in the guise of taxation will be transferred 
from the hands of those who now possess it to others.
36Ibid., 380.
87
It is inevitable. The holders of taxable property in 
South Carolina cannot today, and will not hereafter, be 
able to pay the taxes imposed upon them.37
By 1874 the taxpayer's convention was petitioning Congress
and citing unjust taxes that confiscated their property:
It has been openly avowed by prominent members of the 
Legislature that the taxes should be increased to a 
point which will compel the sale of the great body of 
the land, and take it away from the former owners. The 
fruit of this policy is shown in the fact stated by the 
Comptroller-General in his official report, that for 
default in the payment of taxes for the year 1872 alone, 
268,523 acres of land were forfeited to the State.38
Not only would the blacks not be hurt along with the whites
by taxes, as Hampton stated, they would be significantly
helped.
Following his attempt to establish a general link 
between the economic well being of the two classes, Hampton 
moved to specific arguments dealing with their new right to 
vote. He observed at the outset that the bill giving blacks 
the franchise was being challenged before the Supreme Court 
and that "a great many persons, amongst whom is the Presi­
dent of the United States, think that this Bill is unconsti­
tutional ." With that observation he then considered two 
contingencies: (1) the bill was constitutional and the
blacks would have the right to vote, and (2) the bill was
37Resoectful Remonstrance. 16.
38Proceedings of the Taxpayer1s Convention of South 
Carolina, held at Columbia. beginning February 17, and 
ending February 20. 1874 (Charleston, n.p., 1874), 51.
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unconstitutional and the present government would remain in 
power.
The possibility that the first contingency might be 
true forced Hampton to make a crucial direct appeal for the 
black vote. Hampton provided three groups of men from whom 
the voters would select those who would "make your laws," 
and "frame your government." They could choose (1) "men who 
are ignorant of all law— all science of Government," or (2) 
"strangers who have flocked here to plunder what little is 
left to us," or (3) "the men among whom you have lived 
heretofore— amongst whom you must always live," and whose 
interest it was "to make the blacks enlightened, prosperous 
and contented." From the available choices, Hampton con­
cluded, "it seems to me this latter course would be the 
wisest." Essentially, he was employing the method of 
residues: three choices were available and two were prima
facie bad, thus the only viable choice was the remaining 
alternative. The fallacy in his analysis was the 
unsupported generalization that he asked his audience to 
accept. As with much of his speaking, he offered no 
specific evidence to support his claims. Nowhere did he 
attempt to prove that all the native blacks were "ignorant 
of all law." He totally ignored the substantial number of 
well educated free blacks who had been free for years and 
were well established in business and the professions. He 
had to ignore men such as W. B. Nash, the moderator of the
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meeting to which he was speaking and whose sound judgment 
and advice he had earlier praised. Nowhere did he attempt 
to prove that all the strangers were there "to plunder" 
them; nor did he attempt to show that the whites had a 
genuine interest in the welfare of the blacks.
The proof for his claims was to be found in actions 
not words and significantly, future actions, not those of 
the past:
I do not tell you to trust to professions of friendship 
alone, whether they come from the Southern man or the 
Northern. But what I ask you to do, what I have the 
right to ask of you is, that as we profess to be your 
friends, you will give us the opportunity of showing by 
our actions whether we are sincere or not. If we 
deceive you, then turn to the North, and see if you can 
find better friends there.
The attractiveness of the argument was that it was a no risk
proposition, since the new constitution would have to be
submitted to the people for approval:
Should the new Constitution, then, not give equal 
protection and rights to all, it can be rejected.
Another convention can be called, and another consti­
tution submitted to the people. You have it, therefore, 
in your power to test the good will and honesty of 
purpose of the whites without any danger of inquiry 
[sic] to yourselves.
Hampton's argument was correct; the blacks could allow the
whites to write the new constitution and then reject it if
it were not satisfactory. The problem with the argument lay
in his having to appeal to what the whites would do in the
future rather than pointing to what they had done in the
past. The whites had been in control of the government
since the end of the war. They had revised the constitution
and passed new legislation to meet the changed conditions. 
The constitutional convention had not given the blacks the 
right to vote, they had not even allowed them to be counted 
as a basis for representation in the legislature, but 
instead had echoed and re-echoed the sentiments of Governor 
Perry in his opening address that "this is a white man's 
government." The legislature had shown its concern for the 
welfare of the blacks by passing the severely restrictive 
Black Codes. Instead of trying to explain or in any way 
justify these past acts, Hampton simply ignored them and 
argued that "not only does humanity dictate kind treatment, 
honest dealing, just laws for the colored population, but 
self-interest demands from us the same course." While the 
humanitarian appeal was new, the self-interest argument was 
the same cause-effect analysis that he had employed at 
Richland Fork. The problem was that while Hampton might 
have believed that humanity and self-interest demanded fair 
treatment, the evidence from the past two years indicated 
that at best the whites had varying definitions for "fair" 
treatment and at worst no concern about it. The evidence 
indicated that the actions of the whites were determined 
more by the radical controlled Congress than by 
humanitarianism.
The argument that the blacks could test the sincerity 
of the whites without risk was equally applicable to the 
other alternatives. In fact it is logically more persuasive
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when applied to them. The whites had for two years had the 
opportunity to produce laws favorable to the blacks and had 
not done so. Since the native blacks and "strangers" had 
professed at least an equal interest in the welfare of the 
blacks and had not had an opportunity to prove it through 
legislation, reason would favor giving them the opportunity, 
especially since the product of their labor would still have 
to be approved at the polls.
In his first contingency Hampton dealt with the 
possibility of the bill being declared constitutional and 
the blacks retaining the right to vote. The second possi­
bility he considered was that the bill would be declared 
unconstitutional and the present government continue. This 
state of affairs would then provide an opportunity for the 
whites "to prove that our professions of friendship were not 
idle." He then set forth the case for a restricted suf­
frage. Significantly, in contrast to his earlier tendency 
toward sweeping generalizations, he carefully noted that he 
was not speaking for anyone but himself, a qualification 
which certainly robbed the proposal of much of its force:
While I cannot speak for others, I tell you what I am 
willing to see done. I am willing to give the right of 
suffrage to all who can read and who pay a certain 
amount of taxes, and I agree that all, white as well as 
black, who do not possess these qualifications shall be 
excluded. I would not take this right from any who have 
heretofore exercised it, but I wish to see an educa­
tional and property qualification for voters adopted in 
the future.
To support his contention he argued that (1) advantages
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would come from his proposal, and (2) universal suffrage did 
not exist.
The advantages of qualified suffrage, in Hampton's
estimation were two:
It will be a strong inducement to all to seek education 
and to obtain for themselves a real and tangible 
interest in the State. It will . . . contribute not 
only to the material prosperity of the State, but to the 
increase of virtue and education among her people.
These advantages were presented as self evident truths and 
no support was offered. It is possible to accept as 
reasonable his conclusion that a qualified suffrage would 
serve as some inducement toward education and property 
acquisition, though it is not clear to what extent a person 
not motivated by personal gain to acquire property and 
education would be motivated by the prospect of voting. 
Despite the lack of verification this motivation was 
generally accepted by both black and white. The same 
position was argued at length in the 1868 constitutional 
convention where qualified suffrage was rejected not because 
it wouldn't motivate but because it would place the state 
back in the control of the white southerners. While reason­
able to infer that some, regardless of how few, would be 
motivated to acquire property and education, one cannot make 
the leap from the desire to the realization as Hampton did 
in the second half of his statement. Not only must there be 
a desire, but also the means of attainment. Horace Greeley, 
editor of the New York Daily Tribune, generally favored a
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qualified suffrage, but opposed it in the South because the 
means of attainment were not readily available.39 In the 
constitutional convention, F. L. Cardozo argued that 
Charleston was the only place in the state with a system of 
common schools and that it would take ten years to establish 
an adequate system.40
In fairness to Hampton, he did advocate aiding the
blacks in their quest for knowledge. Speaking to white
Georgia planters in 1869 he urged;
Let us assist him in his aspirations for knowledge and 
aid him in its acquisition. . . . I do believe that in 
proportion as you make all labor, other than compulsory, 
intelligent, you render it profitable. If this is true, 
we should educate the mind, the heart and the soul of 
the Negro, looking at the question only in its material 
aspect and leaving out of consideration altogether those 
higher and nobler motives which should prompt us to do 
so.41
The system for accomplishing the goal called for the 
planters to put up a school house on their land and help pay 
the cost of the teacher.42 It was a system unlikely to 
lift, in the near future, the bulk of illiterate blacks to a 
level acceptable for voting. In this address to the 
freedmen, however, Hampton gave no suggestion as to how 
blacks would acquire either education or property.
39New York Daily Tribune. 6 February 1867 in Charleston 
Daily Courier, 13 February 1867.
4°Proceedinqs of the Constitutiona1 Convention. 825.
41Columbia Daily Phoenix. 21, 23 November 1869.
42Ibid.
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While evidence showing that qualified suffrage would 
indeed provide greater material prosperity and an increased 
level of education in the state was absent from the speech 
and under the existing system logically unsupportable, a 
third unmentioned advantage was absolutely clear. With 
black illiteracy estimated at eight-five percent of the 
population,43 the unquestionable consequence of qualified 
suffrage would have been the virtual elimination of the 
blacks from the ballot box.
Hampton's second main argument for qualified suffrage
was that universal suffrage did not exist:
No one under twenty-one years of age is allowed to vote, 
nor can foreigners do so until they have been in this 
country some years. . . . Thus, you see that there is no 
such thing as universal suffrage, nor do I think it 
desirable, that there should be.
Essentially, he was arguing a straw man. For the most part, 
those supporting black suffrage were not contending that the 
state did not have the right to set requirements for voting, 
only that the requirements should not exclude the black from 
casting a ballot. Since there was no such thing as univer­
sal suffrage, Hampton concluded, "you would have no right to 
complain of a law which would put within your reach and that 
of your children, any privilege, enjoyed by any class of 
citizens." Thus, any limitation upon the right to vote 
should be acceptable as long as it was applied equally to 
all involved. Obviously, saying that some qualifications
43Williamson, 236.
for suffrage are justified is not the same as saying all 
qualifications are justified. The issue was not the general 
one of whether there should be universal suffrage, but the 
specific one of whether blacks should vote.
Hampton's logical appeals simply cannot sustain 
careful analysis. Throughout the speech he employed 
sweeping unsupported generalizations linking the fate of 
white and black and asserting the benefits of a qualified 
suffrage. He engaged in no refutation or counter­
argumentation. It was as if no arguments existed that were 
counter to his own. Not only did he ignore possible counter 
arguments, but, in what was probably his greatest logical 
failure, he ignored the record of the past. To argue the 
good faith of the whites toward the blacks and omit all 
reference to the past represented massive misjudgment. The 
record was not good, but somehow he had to deal with it.
With every avowal by Hampton of what the whites would do in 
the future, his audience had to be asking why the whites had 
not done it in the past. The issue was too large to ignore 
as Hampton chose to do.
Fitness of Response
The best assessment of Hampton's address is that it 
was an appropriate but inadequate response to the exigence. 
It was appropriate in that he both recognized the critical 
issues and dealt with them in a positive manner. It was 
inadequate in that while he sought accommodation with the
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blacks, what he was offering was too little, too late.
Unquestionably the most pressing issue in South 
Carolina from the spring of 1867 through the national 
elections in the fall of 1868 was the political power of the 
blacks, and specifically their right to vote. Immediately 
after passage of the Reconstruction Acts, which granted 
suffrage to the blacks, Hampton spoke to the issue. Whereas 
in 1865 the thrust of his Richland Fork address was on the 
need for black labor and economic cooperation, in the 
freedmen's address the ground had shifted to suffrage and 
political cooperation.
Hampton's response was also appropriate in that he
approached the exigence in a positive manner. Earlier at
Richland Fork and at Walhalla he had been positive in urging
the whites to deal kindly with the blacks because it was in
their best interest to do so. His approach to the blacks,
however, had been more negative in tone, warning them of
dire consequences if they did not return to the fields. In
the freedmen's address, however, there were no threats or
warnings, but rather a recognition of their political
equality with the whites and a high level appeal for them to
put the interest of South Carolina above other motivations.
An editorial in Harper's Weekly commended Hampton's approach
to the situation:
The meetings of the Freedmen in South Carolina, and 
especially that at Columbia which was addressed by Mr. 
Wade Hampton . . . are significant. They show the 
utmost good sense upon the part of the orators. They
97
are, of course, attempts to gain the control of the 
colored vote; but that is a legitimate purpose and they 
are exactly the results which we have always anticipated 
from the wise Radical policy of Congress. . . .  It is 
the most healthy sign we have seen in the Southern 
States. . . . It is a practical acceptance of the 
situation.44
While doubting his ability to persuade the blacks, the
editorial specifically congratulated
Mr. Hampton upon his conduct. It is that of a citizen 
who thoroughly comprehends the situation, and of a 
soldier who concedes that his cause is lost. Such a man 
will either leave the country, or if he remains, will 
adapt himself to its changed conditions when he per­
ceives that they are changed.45
The Richmond Times saw Hampton's response as indica­
tive of "a sagacious, practical statesman and one that 
should be 'universally imitated.'"46 The New York Times 
praised Hampton's position and expressed the view that if 
the South would adopt such a view it would "contribute very 
largely to the harmony of sentiment between the two 
sections."47 W. B. Nash, the black leader who spoke on the 
same occasion with Hampton, later wrote in a letter to the 
Columbia Daily Phoenix that "when I heard the noble senti­
ments expressed there by him . . .  I threw down the hatchet 
and called on my people to do the same, and to meet our
44Harper's Weekly. 6 April 1867.
45Ibid.
46Richmond Times in Columbia Daily Phoenix, 26 March
1867.
47New York Times in Columbia Daily Phoenix. 22 October
1867.
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white citizens half way in a Christian-like spirit."48 As 
Harper1s Weekly had observed, it was no mystery to anyone 
that Hampton was trying to gain control of the black vote, 
but he was trying to do it by recognizing a changed poli­
tical condition and responding to it in a realistic, 
pragmatic fashion.
While Hampton's response was appropriate, it was 
inadequate. Horace Greeley in the New York Daily Tribune 
saw the position of Hampton and the blacks as being irrecon­
cilable through compromise:
We take Wade Hampton of the well-disposed ex-rebels who 
are sincerely desirous of the welfare of the freedmen, 
but wish to control their action; we take the Charleston 
meeting as the representative of the freedmen throughout 
the South. . . . There is a radical difference in the 
conviction of these two, to be adjusted by no compro­
mise. . . . Practically, it is a question of voting. It 
is whether the negroes shall go over to Wade Hampton, or 
whether he shall go to the negroes. March 19, he gave 
them the ultimatum of the Southern whites— "thus far we 
can go to please you; come over the rest of the way to 
us." March 22, the negroes gave their answer— "malice 
toward none, charity to all, but— we vote with the 
Republican party.1,49
Hampton was genuinely willing to compromise, as he had
indicated in his correspondence with James Conner; not only
was he willing to grant a qualified suffrage but also to
allow the blacks to take the congressional seats as long as
the whites kept control of the state. The problem was that
Hampton could not go far enough in his compromise, and there
48Columbia Daily Phoenix, 3 April 1867.
49New York Daily Tribune, 29 March 1867.
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was no need for the blacks to compromise. Hampton offered a 
qualified suffrage which was unacceptable even to Beverly 
Nash, the black organizer of the joint meeting who was 
urging the blacks to support the state's established 
leaders.50 In fact Hampton had to carefully qualify his 
offer of limited suffrage to show that he was only speaking 
for himself and not the white leadership in general. Thus, 
the blacks faced a choice between an uncertain, qualified 
suffrage at the hands of those who had only recently given 
them the Black Codes, and a reasonably certain unqualified 
suffrage from those who had been working for their right to 
vote. It was not a difficult choice.
50Charleston Daily Courier. 23 March 1867.
CHAPTER V
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1876 AS RESPONSE 
TO THE BLACK DOMINATION EXIGENCE
Exigence
The exigencies of 1867-68 and 1876 were essentially 
the same in that both concerned which race would control the 
government of South Carolina. In 1867, however, black 
dominance was only a threat, whereas by 1876 the black 
majority had been in power for eight years with all its real 
and imagined abuses of government. Part of the frustration 
of the whites came from being one of only three states still 
under reconstruction government, and knowing that Missis­
sippi in 1875 had overthrown its black majority and returned 
the state to the control of the native whites. The con­
sensus of white opinion toward black supremacy was expressed 
in an 1888 article by Wade Hampton, in which he concluded 
that "it would involve total and absolute ruin to the south 
and infinite and irreparable loss to the whole country."1
The exigence of black control remained constant, but 
the urgency to modify it increased as the years passed, and 
various efforts by the whites to bring about change failed.




Unjust taxation and corrupt administration were the two 
strongest perceptions lending urgency to the need to modify 
the situation.
In 1871 and 1874 members of the white establishment 
called taxpayer conventions to publicize the policies of the 
government and to petition Congress for relief. The 1871 
convention was called "to investigate the accounts of the 
comptroller and the financial agent and to determine the 
amount of the public debt with a view to seek further action 
as might be necessary for the protection of public creditors 
and taxpayers."2 According to Simkins and Woody the machi­
nations of Gov. Robert Scott, Att. Gen. Daniel Chamberlain, 
and financial agent H. H. Kempton successfully prevented the 
convention from uncovering the truth.3
The 1874 convention was not as much an investigation 
of a specific issue as a proclamation of the various fiscal 
ills of the radical government. In a memorial to Congress 
drafted by Armistead Burt, he argued that it was the policy 
of the administration to tax land "to a point which will 
compel the sale of the great body of the land and take it 
away from the former owners." He showed that "for the year 
1872 alone 268,523 acres of land were forfeited to the 
State."4 Additionally Burt cited the extravagance of the
2Simkins and Woody, 156.
3Ibid., 158-59.
4Proceedings of the Taxpayers1 Convention. 156.
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Republican governments by comparing expenses of leading 
items for 1865-66 with those for 1873. The contrast was 
$260,000 to almost $2 million. He attacked particularly the 
printing expenses, showing that the $331,945 spent for 
printing in 1873 was $60,765 more than the total spent on 
printing from 1800-1859.5
By way of rebuttal the Republican administration sent 
a response to the United States Congress. The incumbents 
correctly showed that 1865-66 was atypical and then tried to 
justify the increased cost over more typical years. 
Significantly, the Republicans did not refute the charge 
that their tax policies were leading to the confiscation of 
land, but claimed that the goal was socially desirable in 
order to achieve a more egalitarian society.6
While the Taxpayer's Convention identified and publi­
cized the increased cost of government, the confiscatory tax 
policy, and the strong possibility of corruption in the 
government printing operation, it brought no change in 
conditions. President Grant received the committee bearing 
the appeal and responded that it was not a matter for the 
federal government but for South Carolina, and laid the 
blame for the problem on the views of the white
5Ibid., 52.
6Reply of the Central Committee of the Republican Party 
of South Carolina to the Memorial of the Taxpayer1s Conven­
tion in Reynolds, 253-61.
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establishment. Congress likewise claimed the issues were 
beyond their power and refused to get involved.7
Along with the exigence of heavy taxation was that of 
corruption of Republican politicians. It is not the point 
of this study to argue the degree of corruption or the 
culpability of individuals, since that ground is adequately 
discussed by numerous historians. The two facts of impor­
tance for this study are (1) corruption did exist to a 
significant degree, and (2) the conservatives perceived the 
corruption as massive and destructive.
Historians of the period, redeemer and revisionist 
alike, recognize that corruption was prevalent in the 
radical regimes. Reynolds along with Simkins and Woody 
paint the fraud and corruption in vivid colors with a broad 
brush, while more contemporary historians such as Holt, 
Williamson, and Bleser use delicate bristles and subtle 
hues. Holt accepts the fact that bribery was widespread, 
but argues that it usually dealt only with financial matters 
and concludes that it did not significantly alter the voting 
patterns of individual legislators. "Clearly, corrupt 
inducements were simply one of several factors that must be 
weighed by a lawmaker in arriving at a political decision."8 
Carol Bleser in his excellent study of the land commission




observes, "although the land experiment was humanitarian in 
concept, in practice it was sabotaged by internal dissen­
sion, riddled with corruption, and harassed by the criticism 
from the Conservatives."9 Bleser documents several frauds 
by the land commission and then cites Gov. Robert K. Scott 
as "one of the worst corrupters of the Land Commission 
Act."10 Williamson specifically details the corruption 
prevalent in the "Bond Ring" and the "Railroad Ring" and 
estimates that during the period some twelve to fifteen key 
figures managed to steal "from scores of thousands to 
several hundred thousand dollars each."11
The significance of the corruption issue is that both 
Republicans and Democrats recognized and publicly denounced 
the corruption. Attorney General Daniel Chamberlain wrote 
in a published letter to W. T. Trenholm that "incompetency, 
dishonesty, corruption in all its forms, have 'advanced 
their miscreated fronts,' have put to flight the small 
remnant that opposed them, and now rules the party which 
rules the state.1,12 Robert Elliott, a black member of the 
South Carolina legislature and speaker of the house during 
the Chamberlain administration, attracted great attention
9Carol Bleser, The Promised Land: The History of the 
South Carolina Land Commission. 1869-1890 (Columbia: Univer­
sity of South Carolina Press, 1969), 47.
10Ibid., 54.
11Williamson, 390.
12Ku Klux Conspiracy. 1251.
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during 1874 with his bold calls for reform.13 The central 
issue in the gubernatorial campaigns of 1870, 1872, and 1874 
was corruption in government. The issue, though, is greatly 
complicated by the difficulty in distinguishing the corrup­
tionists from the reformers. According to Lamson:
There was of course nothing exceptional in the 1870's, 
about public servants who advocated reform on the one 
hand while systematically defrauding the public on the 
other. Men like Moses, Naegle, Patterson, Tomlinson, 
Cardozo, Whipper, Smalls, and even on occasion Robert 
Brown Elliott, to mention only a few, . . . all talked a 
noble game while often playing an ignoble one.14
Daniel Chamberlain is an excellent example of the problem.
Lamson clearly sees him as a hypocrite: "Although he set
himself apart as an honest man and a reformer, there is
ample evidence that he was a member of the infamous Bond and
Railroad rings."15 In confidential letters to F. W.
Dawson, however, Chamberlain confessed poor judgment but
denied culpability for any wrong. "That I hoped to make
money— dreamed of thousands— there is no doubt, but I never
knew of or consented to any transaction even in this
connection, which involved any injury to the State as I then
understood it."16 Whatever his past experience had been
13Peggy Lamson, The Glorious Failure; Black 
Congressman Robert Brown Elliott and the Reconstruction of 
South Carolina (New York; W. W. Norton, 1973) 184-88.
14Ibid., 155.
15Ibid.
16Daniel H. Chamberlain to F. W. Dawson, 9 June 1875,
F. W. Dawson Papers, Duke University Library, Durham.
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there is no question but that he was sincere and effective
in his reform efforts after 1874. In his biography of F. W.
Dawson, E. Culpepper Clark writes;
It has been as difficult for historians as for contem­
poraries, to resolve the enigma of Chamberlain1s close 
contact with the corruptionists and his apparent good 
character. The best explanation is found in Robert 
Means Davis's notebook, "Campaign of 1876," . . . Davis 
a contemporary observed that as attorney general 
Chamberlain knew about some of the frauds but refused to 
reveal them, even though he did not profit personally.17
In spite of the difficulties in discerning between corrup­
ters and reformers the point seems clear that corruption was 
widespread and available as an issue for both Republicans 
and Democrats.
From after the 1868 election until 1876 the conser­
vatives felt it was pointless to offer Democratic candidates 
in state elections. Realizing the futility of direct 
confrontation, the native whites sought at least to get 
their foot in the statehouse door through a program of 
fusion with more conservative Republicans of both races.
True fusion campaigns were run in 1870 and 1874 while in 
1872 some of the whites supported bolters in the Republican 
party.18 The strategy called for a nonpartisan campaign 
based upon honest reform without regard to party or race.19
17E. Culpepper Clark, Francis Warrington Dawson and the 
Politics of Restoration: South Carolina. 1874-1899 (Univer­
sity, Ala: University of Alabama Press, 1980), 47.
18Simkins and Woody, 444-73.
19Charleston Daily Courier. 4 May 1870.
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In 1870 the Union Reform party was created and nominated 
white Republican Richard B. Carpenter for governor and white 
Democrat M. C. Butler for lieutenant-governor. Despite an 
active campaign and endorsements by several leading northern 
Republican newspapers, the Union Reform party failed by more 
than thirty thousand votes.20
The 1874 fusionist effort was by far the most encour­
aging of all efforts of the conservative whites:
The Independents . . . came within 12,000 votes of 
defeating the regulars in the gubernatorial contest, and 
they won Charleston county with its bulging twenty 
legislative seats. Independent Republicans and Demo­
crats held a total of fifty-four seats in the House, 
while in the Senate there were eight Independents and 
seven Democrats for a combined strength of fifteen.21
Had the promise of exerting a conservative control over the
legislature been realized the events of 1876 would no doubt
have taken a different course.
To understand the situation in 1876 it is necessary to 
look at the political alignments that developed between 1874 
and 1876.
The 1874 campaign was one for reform. Not only was 
this the battle cry of the bolters but of the regular 
Republicans as well. "In the spring of 1874, virtually 
every Republican leader in the state was talking reform, and




a strong minority was moving energetically to achieve it."22 
Republican newspapers North and South as well as the Grant 
administration demanded reform. In fact there are indi­
cations that the Grant administration toyed with the idea of 
supporting a conservative candidate for governor, but in the 
end stayed with the regular Republicans.2 3 Whatever the 
intentions of the other party leaders, Governor Chamber­
lain's calls for reform were apparently sincere. Williamson 
lists the reforms initiated by Chamberlain and indicates 
that by mid-1875 he was drawing support and praise from 
conservatives who had denounced him in 1874. Strangely 
enough a strong alliance developed between Chamberlain and 
F. W. Dawson, editor and part owner of the Charleston Daily 
Courier and one of Chamberlain1s harshest critics in 1874.24 
At the same time the governor was developing support among 
the white conservatives, he was creating division within his 
own party. "Relations between the governor and the Negro 
Republican leadership had deteriorated considerably, 
especially those between Chamberlain and House Speaker 
Robert B. Elliott.1,25 Elliott saw Chamberlain's actions as 
a threat to the dominant political power of the blacks. If,
22Williamson, 399.
23Holt, 177; and Williamson, 400.
24Holt, 183; and Williamson, 401-02.
25Holt, 185; for detailed analysis of the relationship 
between Chamberlain and Elliott see Lamson, 195-234.
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from Elliott's perspective, Chamberlain succeeded in holding 
together a coalition of white conservatives, reform-minded 
white Republicans, and upper class blacks who were being 
hurt by corruption, then the poor blacks would be the 
losers; thus Elliott worked strenuously to unite the black 
legislative vote to oppose many of the initiatives of 
Chamberlain.26
The most significant confrontation between Chamberlain 
and the black leadership occurred over the election to 
judgeships of W. J. Whipper and Franklin J. Moses , Jr. 
Whipper, a northern black, was nominated to a judgeship in 
the First Circuit, which included Charleston, and former 
Governor Moses for a judgeship in the Third Circuit. Both 
Chamberlain and the conservatives denounced the men as 
corrupt and unfit to serve as judges. The corruption of 
Moses is generally accepted while the case of Whipper is not 
quite as clear. Holt observes that the nominee had been 
twice court-martialed while in the army, but Lamson notes 
that he
was certainly not a stupid man, nor was he essentially a 
bad man . . . .  he was not one of the "friends" referred 
to in the Woodruff diary; and except for his admittedly 
dubious dealings with the sinking fund commission, he 
was not cited in any other connection in the Report on 
Public Lands.27
Whether the opposition to him was to his color or his
26Holt, 186-96.
27Holt, 185; and Lamson, 209.
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character is not particularly germane. The important issue 
is that Chamberlain and the conservatives portrayed Whipper 
and Moses as the personifications of corruption, and a vote 
for their election was a vote for corrupt government. 
Elliott, on the other hand, saw their election as a party 
power move against Chamberlain. "Practically every speaker 
supporting these nominations invoked the necessity for 
strict party unity. At the caucus Speaker Elliott had 
declared that he would measure each member's Republicanism 
by his vote on this issue."28 In a strategic ploy the vote 
was taken while Chamberlain was out of town and the men 
elected. While Chamberlain with a legally questionable 
tactic prevented the men from taking their seats by refusing 
to sign their commissions, his victory was pyrrhic. The 
damage had been done. For the white conservatives the 
evidence was obvious, the commitment to corruption by the 
Republican party was so deep that no one could control or 
reform it.29 Immediately after he learned of their election 
Chamberlain responded, "'One immediate effect will 
obviously be the reorganization of the Democratic party 
within the state as the only means left for opposing . . . 
the terrible crevasse of misgovernment and public 
debauchery.8"30 One day after Chamberlain’s statement the
28Holt, 186.
29Lamson, 225; Simkins and Woody, 479; and Holt, 187.
30Charleston News and Courier. 20 December 1875.
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News and Courier in an editorial called for the reorgani­
zation of the Democratic party and on January 1 the Columbia 
Daily Register published a call for a meeting of the state 
Democratic Executive Committee, and the Democratic party was 
reborn in South Carolina.31
Through eight years and three elections the native 
whites had failed in their efforts to undermine the power of 
the Republican party and its black majority. The exigence 
of black domination had not changed throughout the period, 
but two factors provided a sense of urgency at the beginning 
of 1876: (1) the election of Whipper and Moses seemed to
indicate conclusively the futility, even with a reformer 
governor, of looking to the Republicans for relief; and (2) 
the recent overthrow of radicals with their black majority 
in Mississippi gave hope that it could be done in South 
Carolina, even as it increased the frustration of being one 
of the last southern states still under radical control.
Audience
While numerous factions and groups made up the South 
Carolina political scene in 1876, Hampton primarily directed 
his attention to two broad categories that were necessary to 
modify the exigence: apathetic and disillusioned conser­
vative whites, and blacks.
3Charleston News and Courier, 21 December 1875; and
Columbia Daily Register. 1 January 1876.
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Blacks
The black audience was the key to any hope of success 
for the Democratic party. The 1875 census of voting age 
males showed 110,744 blacks to 74,199 whites.32 With a
35,000 vote majority, the blacks had the power to control 
any election.
The black vote, however, was not a single, unified,
monolithic political force. Holt's analysis of black
political leadership documents that in the Republican party
divisions existed both between blacks and whites and among
the blacks themselves:
Prominent mulattoes from the freeborn class sometimes 
allied themselves with the conservatives in local and 
state elections. . . . Furthermore the statistical 
correlation of voting behavior with socio-economic 
background evident in earlier legislatures suggests an 
underlying class schism among negro legislators.33
The lack of adequate data prevented Holt from applying a
statistical measure to the 1874-75 legislature, but he was
able to detect an apparent tendency on the part of upper
class blacks to break with the party stance and vote with
the conservative whites on several key issues.34
In addition to the splits along class lines in voting 
behavior, there were also divisions over the reform
32Congress, Senate, South Carolina in 1876. Testimony 
as to the Denial of the Elective Franchise in South Carolina 





movements of 1870, 1872, and 1874. In each instance the 
majority of blacks voted with the party and defeated the 
reformers. Regardless of the outcome, the evidence demon­
strates among the black leadership and the rank and file a 
willingness to break with the regular party leaders in an 
effort to obtain better government.
The Union Reform party of 1870 was a movement outside 
the Republican party that represented a coalition of Demo­
crats and both white and black Republicans. M. C. Butler, a 
Democrat and one of the advocates of the straightout 
campaign of 1876, was the nominee for 1ieutenant-governor 
with Republican Richard B. Carpenter for governor. Approxi­
mately one-fifth of the convention delegates were black, and 
many of them were nominated for county offices. While the 
effort failed massively, it did mark the first coming 
together of white Democrats and black Republicans as 
political equals in a reform movement.35
The 1872 and 1874 splits occurred within the Repub­
lican party, and though both were unsuccessful, the 1874 
campaign significantly narrowed the margin of defeat from 
thirty thousand in the earlier campaign to only twelve 
thousand. The voting results indicate that large numbers of 
black Republicans and white Democrats supported the reform 
ticket which had as its candidate for 1ieutenant-governor
35Simkins and Woody, 447-56; and Taylor, 194-98.
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Martin R. Delany, a black.36
The division among black Republicans reached its 
zenith toward the end of the Chamberlain administration.
From the perspective of Robert B. Elliott, black speaker of 
the house, Chamberlain was on a course that was diametri­
cally opposed to the interests of blacks.37 Holt observes 
that "the governor's program did spark divisions within the 
party and among negro legislators in particular."38 The 
extent and intensity of the division are exemplified by the 
Republican conventions in April and September of 1876. At 
the April convention the floor became a battleground where 
Elliott sought to discredit Chamberlain by denying him a 
place as a delegate to the Republican National Convention. 
The charges and countercharges of corruption became so 
acrimonious that at one point guns were drawn, tables 
overturned, and the convention turned into an uproar. 
Chamberlain won the skirmish and gained a seat on the 
delegation but only after he delivered, at four in the 
morning, a powerful defense of his Republicanism and his 
reform policies.39 Though the skirmish and the control of
36Simkins and Woody, 472-73.
37Charleston News and Courier. 15 September 1976.
38Holt, 182.
39Charleston News and Courier. 11, 12, 14 April 1876; 
see also Holt, 198-99; and Walter Allen, Governor Chamber­
lain's Administration in South Carolina; A Chapter of 
Reconstruction in the Southern States (New York; Putnam, 
1888), 258-70.
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the party were Chamberlain's, the victory was by no means 
decisive.
Chamberlain's opposition showed its strength at the
state nominating convention five months later. Though
Chamberlain was able to retain the nomination for governor
he was forced to run on a ticket with two of his bitterest
enemies. In a letter to William Lloyd Garrison written two
months after he relinquished his claim upon the office of
governor and left the state, he described how close he came
to forcing the convention into a showdown vote between
himself and R. B. Elliott:
I made a grave mistake in that I did not refuse to run 
on a ticket with R. B. Elliott. . . . Elliott's base 
presence on the ticket justly gave offence to some 
honest men of both races. . . .  I took the resolution 
unknown to any friends, to walk into the convention and 
throw up my nomination and avow that I did it because I 
would not run on a ticket with Elliott. I knew it would 
result in putting him off the ticket. I had actually 
risen in my office . . . for this purpose, when I was 
met at the door by a dozen or more of my most devoted 
colored supporters who came to congratulate me on the 
surrender of Elliott in seeking to stand on a ticket 
with me! [emphasis in original] I was disarmed of my 
purpose and relinquished it. It was a mistake.40
While social class and the need for reform were 
working to split the blacks, white violence and protection 
of their rights were concerns that pushed them together in 
the Republican party. Taylor notes the effect of the Ku 
Klux outrage of the early 1870's:
The failure of the liberal Democrats to rebuke the
40Daniel Chamberlain to William Lloyd Garrison, 11 June 
1877 in Allen, 505.
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lawlessness of their party associates and the refusal of 
Democratic officials to convict partisans of crime 
committed against Negroes and radical whites prevented 
any considerable cleavage between the mass of Negroes 
and the Republican party. Indeed, so far from accomp­
lishing their purpose, the action of the Democrats 
compelled the continued allegiance of the Negroes to the 
Republican party. This was the logical course for the 
Negroes since the Republicans had afforded them such 
protection as they had received.41
It is not germane to this analysis to explore the nature and
causes of the Ku Klux violence. Specific cases are amply
documented in the testimony before a joint committee of
Congress.42 What is important here is that it was violence
by conservative whites against black Republicans and white
radicals for political reasons, and that blacks throughout
the state knew of it.
For the blacks that Hampton sought to reach in the 
autumn of 1876, violence was not only a memory, it was a 
present reality. The most significant and widely publicized 
of all the violent racial encounters of 1875-76 was the 
Hamburg riot in July of 1876. In the conflict between a 
band of white men and the black militia, one white man and 
six blacks were killed and numbers wounded. Five of the 
blacks were killed in cold blood.43 The response by the 
blacks came at political gatherings in Charleston and 
Columbia. In Charleston on July 17 they met to denounce
41Taylor, 203.
42Ku Klux Conspiracy.
43Holt, 199-200; see also extensive testimony in Recent 
Election in South Carolina; and South Carolina in 1876.
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the violence:
We enter our outrages. We protest against these men and 
their aides and abettors, and . . .  we demand that 
Governor Chamberlain shall . . . invoke all the powers 
of the state to bring M. C. Butler and his clan to 
justice.
They furthermore issued a resolution "that the massacre of 
colored citizens at Hamburg, S. C. is unworthy of any 
civilized community and deserves the censure and condem­
nation of the civilized world."44 Similar sentiments were 
expressed three days later at a Columbia meeting called by 
R. B. Elliott. At this meeting the blacks published their 
grievances in an "Address to the People of the United 
States."45
A final important perception of the blacks was that 
their political freedom and social advancement were directly 
linked to the Republican party. The right to an unqualified 
suffrage had come not from the Democrats but the Repub­
licans. Under the Republican banner over 250 of their race 
had been members of the legislature between 1868 and 1876, 
and numerous others held local and county offices.46 Not 
only were they serving as local officers of the law and 
members of the state militia, but they were sitting with
44Charleston News and Courier. 18 July 1876.
45An Address to the People of the United States,
Adopted at a Conference of Colored Citizens. Held at 




whites as jurors and taking instructions from black judges. 
Black controlled legislatures had provided free common 
schools, admission to the state university on a non racial 
basis, and a land commission to help the poor obtain 
property. While fraud and mismanagement had prevented the 
realization of much of the new legislation, it nevertheless 
had been undertaken under the aegis of the Republican 
party.47
The black voters that Hampton sought to reach in the 
fall of 1876 were far from a simple undifferentiated mass. 
They were separated by class, education, and morality, and 
concepts toward the nature and function of government, but 
they were pulled together by heritage, and fear for the 
preservation of their personal safety and political rights.
Whites
Hampton's white audience, while far more sympathetic 
to his views, was also not without its differences. On the 
one hand there were large numbers who were politically 
discouraged, disillusioned, and generally apathetic toward 
efforts to overturn the black maj ority; on the other hand 
among the politically active there were strong differences 
regarding the approach to be taken by the campaign.
According to Williamson,
after the fiasco of 1868 and until 1876, most native 
whites virtually surrendered the state to
47Holt, 152-70; and Taylor, 153-88.
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Republicanism. . . . Most whites simply withdrew from 
active politics, concentrated upon improving their 
economic situation, and gave up hope of regaining 
political power.48
Hampton himself is a good example of this attitude. After
the 1868 campaign he withdrew from active politics in the
state and devoted his efforts to ameliorating his economic
distress. It was not until 1876 that he actively took part
again in South Carolina politics. James L. Orr, one time
Democratic stalwart, saw the twenty-five thousand vote
Republican majority as insurmountable, and joined the
Republican party as the only practical way to effect good
government.49 Others looked at the numbers and quit. "In
every election in which the fusionists participated,
possibly more eligible white voters stayed home than went to
the polls."50 From the fall of 1868 until December 1875 the
Democratic party was essentially non-existent in South
Carolina. In Taylor's words, "the machine all but went to
pieces between 1868 and 1876."51
Among the politically active there were several topics 
of division. There was early division over whether the 
Democratic ticket should be straightout, or a compromise
48Williamson, 353.
49James L. Orr, "Ex-Governor Orr's Reasons for Joining 
the Republican Party in South Carolina," Southern Politics. 
August 1870.
50Williamson, 354.
51Taylor, 188; see also Simkins and Woody, 180.
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with better elements of the Republican party, within the 
straightout group were significant differences over the 
strategy and tactics to be used during a campaign.
The division between the compromise and straightout
factions was prominent between January and August 1876. The
straightout faction, led by Martin Gary of Edgefield County,
demanded that only Democrats be nominated for state and
federal offices.52 In his testimony before the Senate
investigating committee, A. C. Haskell, Democratic campaign
chairman, explained why the party rejected cooperation for a
straightout approach:
A large portion of the people of the state were willing 
to put Mr. Chamberlain on our ticket, notwithstanding 
past prejudices . . . on the ground that he had shown 
indications of a desire to reform. . . . But the public 
opinion overcame that upon the ground, both that the 
record of the past was very strongly against him, and 
that the experiment had been tried but had repeatedly 
failed . . . it was thought to be a hopeless effort. If 
we took Mr. Chamberlain, he would at once lose all 
control over his own party.53
Though sentiment for the straightout campaign was 
probably strongest in Edgefield County, there was support 
from throughout the state. As early as August 1875 The 
Columbia Daily Register issued a clear call for a 
straightout campaign.54 A year later the Pickens Sentinel, 
Camden Journal. Abbeville Medium. Charleston Journal of
52,lPlan of the Campaign," Martin Gary Papers, South 
Caroliniana Library, Columbia.
53South Carolina in 1876. 791-92.
54Columbia Daily Register. 11 August 1875.
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Commerce. Keowee Courier. and the Abbeville Press and Banner 
were all calling for the party to go straightout.55 In 
Richland County, nominees for delegates to the August state 
convention were asked to state their position on a straight- 
out campaign. All of the elected delegates including Wade 
Hampton supported the straightout position.56
At the May convention of the party, the delegates went 
into secret session to discuss strategy for winning with a 
straightout ticket. The reporter for the Columbia Daily 
Register noted the absence of strong fusion sentiments at 
the convention. The fusionists, however, were strong enough 
to defeat a resolution by Martin Gary calling for a 
straightout campaign, and delay any commitment to a campaign 
strategy until the convention reconvened in August.57
In contrast to the straightouts, F. W. Dawson, editor 
of the most influential newspaper in the state, the 
Charleston News and Courier, felt the only way to overcome 
the black maj ority was not to nominate a candidate for 
governor and allow Daniel Chamberlain to be reelected. 
Chamberlain's reform measures had won him a substantial 
amount of acceptance and praise among Democrats. In a 
series of articles in July 1876 the Charleston News and 
Courier set forth in detail the praiseworthy reform record
55Ibid., 3 June 1876.
56Ibid., 8 August 1876.
57Ibid., 6, 7 May 1876.
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of the governor.58 For whatever motives, Chamberlain
shortly after his election in 1874 "consciously sought to
destroy the existing Republican alliances and to create a
new coalition with elements of the former Democratic
regime."59 Frequently, upon the advice of his good friend
F. W. Dawson, he appointed Democrats rather than Republicans
to state and local offices.60 It is thus Chamberlain who
best summarizes the rationale for the cooperationists:
They knew and recognized the fact that the republican 
party embraced a maj ority of at least twenty-five 
thousand of the voters of the state. They knew and 
recognized the fact that the colored race, who consti­
tute the larger part of the republican voters were 
attached to that party by . . . the profound conviction, 
whether mistaken or not, that the great boons so 
recently conferred on them— freedom and suffrage— were 
safe only . . . under the protection of the party which 
had conferred them. They believed upon evidence too 
clear to leave room for doubt that for this cause no 
number of these voters, sufficient to change the 
relations of our parties, could be detached from the 
republican party by argument or legitimate persuasion or 
other lawful methods of influencing their political 
action.6 1
Much the same idea was expressed by F. W. Dawson in a July 
13 editorial when he argued that the only way a straightout 
ticket could win would be by "fraud and force."62 Rather 
significantly, A. C. Haskell in a letter to the editor in
58Charleston News and Courier. 5-18 July 1876.
59Holt, 179.
60Ibid., 183.
61Recent Election in South Carolina. 356-57.
62Charleston News and Courier. 13 July 1876.
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the Charleston Daily Register attacked Dawson for malicious 
reporting but did not respond to the substance of Dawson's 
argument.63
The division between the two factions of Democrats 
remained sharp until one event in the middle of the summer 
obliterated the dividing line. Chamberlain's handling of 
the Hamburg riot not only alienated him from many of his 
Democratic supporters but also drove a wedge between him and 
his most powerful ally, the Charleston News and Courier. 
After having published only two weeks earlier an endorsement 
of Chamberlain, the paper broke with him on July 20: "We
have supported Governor Chamberlain's reform measures, and 
we have frankly expressed our opinion of the Hamburg riot, 
but we must protest against any move that wears the appear­
ance of taking advantage of a local disturbance to prop up 
the waning fortunes of South Carolina Republicanism."64 
James B. Kershaw, a cooperationist, noted:
I think the unhappy affair at Hamburg will be made such 
use of in the canvass that no alternative would probably 
have been left us than to take it straight. At all 
events it is a luxury once more to be able to put 
forward the men we like best."65
Ben Tillman, looking back at the events, put the matter
rather succinctly, "If there had been no Hamburg riot, it is
extremely doubtful whether there would have been any
63Columbia Daily Register. 15 July 1876.
64Charleston News and Courier. 20 July 1876.
65Ibid., 28 July 1876.
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straightout campaign in 1876.1,66 At the August convention, 
the straightout supporters were in control. After a lengthy 
secret session, Wade Hampton emerged as the unanimous choice 
to head the ticket, with a full slate of Democratic candi­
dates for state offices joining him. "With a Straightout 
Democrat heading the ticket, the white population for the 
first time in eight years united in a definite, fixed 
purpose.1,67
The party was united in the fixed purpose of over­
throwing the radical regime and replacing it with white 
native Democrats, but below the surface there were still 
differences as to how that should be done. While for many 
the concept of a straightout campaign was synonymous with 
fraud and violence, there was definitely a continuum that 
ranged from murder at one end to non violent demonstrations 
of strength and authority at the other. At the one end, 
argument and persuasion as a means for reaching the blacks 
was discountenanced and ridiculed, while at the other they 
were embraced as viable tools. Martin Gary and Wade 
Hampton, respectively, represented the two ends of the 
continuum.68
The audience that Hampton faced as he began the 
campaign was composed of blacks, large numbers of whom, as
66Tillman, 29.
67Simkins and Woody, 495-96.
68Tillman, 28-29; and Williams, 82-83.
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Chamberlain had observed, were convinced they owed their 
freedom and suffrage to the continuance of Republican 
administration, but who also were divided over class, 
philosophy, and personalities. The politically active 
Democrats were aroused and outwardly united behind a man and 
a cause, while below the surface strong differences in 
philosophy, manner, and method seethed. The politically 
inactive and discouraged were there to be informed and 
rallied.
Constraints
Rather than analyze a single campaign speech, this 
section will look at Hampton's campaign speeches as a whole 
and place them within the total campaign strategy. The 
analysis will cover speeches given from the time of his 
nomination on August 16 to his final campaign address on 
November 4 in Columbia. During this period he spoke at 
fifty-seven large meetings, and in all but one county.69
Campaign Strategy 
One of the major factors influencing the direction of 
South Carolina Democrats in 1876 was the overthrow of the 
radical government with its large black majority in 
Mississippi. In November of 1875 the Columbia Daily 
Register quoted an article from the Augusta Chronicle and
69Recent Election in South Carolina. 305? and Williams, 
161, 357.
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Sentinel calling for the people of South Carolina to learn
from Mississippi:
The Democratic victory in Mississippi was the most 
sweeping political revolution since the war. . . .  It 
only now remains to rout the Radicals from South 
Carolina and Louisiana. . . . Let the white people of 
those states learn a lesson of wisdom from 
M i s s i s s i p p i „ 7 n
A few months earlier the Register had quoted the New York 
World praising the work of Mississippi Democrats and setting 
them forth as an example for other states with black 
majorities.71 Martin Gary took the advice and turned to 
Mississippi for guidance in overthrowing South Carolina's 
black majority. In a letter to Major T. L. Barker of 
Charleston, General S. W. Ferguson of Greenville, Missis­
sippi described how the whites of Washington County overcame 
a black maj ority of five thousand. According to Ferguson, 
the keys to success were letting the white radical leaders 
know their lives were forfeit if there were any disturb­
ances , showing up at all radical meetings to contradict the 
speakers to their faces, and monitoring the polling places. 
All of the above with considerable elaboration appeared in a 
thirty-three plank plan for the campaign of 1876 drafted by 
Martin Gary. Gary even included one recommendation ver­
batim: "never threaten a man individually, if he deserves
to be threatened, the necessities of the times require that
70Columbia Daily Register. 11 November 1875.
71Ibid., 22 July 1875.
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he should die."72 Gary's plan was specifically for Edge­
field County, but certainly clearly revealed a plan that
could be used in any county with a black majority.
The heart of the plan was the Democratic rifle clubs
that were to be established in each township. They were to
be uniformed with red shirts, armed with pistols and rifles, 
arrayed under military command, and ready to ride to any 
place in the county at a moment's notice. They were to be 
present in force at all radical meetings to verbally assault 
the speakers and confront them with their "lies." In 
general they were to intimidate the Republican white leaders 
and impress the blacks with the Democrats' power and 
determination. Additionally, each man was responsible to 
use any means necessary to insure that one black man did not 
vote the radical ticket.73 In a revision of the original 
plan, Gary gave more specific instructions on intimidating 
the blacks at the polling places on election day and 
stuffing the ballot boxes. In no case would there be any 
rational appeals made to the blacks; they were to be told 
that the Democrats were going to win with or without them, 
and they could join the winning side if they wanted. They 
were to be told that many blacks had already joined the 
Democrats, but names could not be released because of fear
72S. W. Ferguson to T. L. Barker, 7 January 1876,
Martin Gary Papers; and "Plan of the Campaign," Martin Gary 
Papers.
73"Plan of the Campaign," Martin Gary Papers.
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of Republican reprisals.74 To tighten the link to the 
Mississippi plan, General S. W. Ferguson was present at the 
August Democratic convention and following its close, spoke 
at a rousing celebration of the work of the convention.75
The practical outworking of the plan was described by
Ben Tillman and Governor Chamberlain. According to Tillman,
"Gary's doctrine of voting early and often changed the
republican majority of 2,300 in Edgefield to a democratic
majority of 3,900 thus giving Hampton a claim to the office
of governor.1,76 Tillman further claimed that the Hamburg
Riot exemplified the policy of intimidation:
Butler, Gary, and George Tillman had to my personal 
knowledge agreed on the policy of terrorizing the 
negroes at the first opportunity, by letting them 
provoke trouble and then having the whites demonstrate 
their superiority by killing as many of them as was 
justifiable.77
In his Senate testimony Governor Chamberlain described
his experience with Democrats showing up at Republican
meetings and demanding a division of time. In early August
he went to speak at a Republican meeting in Edgefield:
The public meeting was practically broken up and 
prevented. There was nothing like free speech allowed 
by the democrats who were assembled there. The 
demonstration was so overawing and threatening in size
74"Plan of the Campaign." There are several versions 
of this document in the Gary Papers.




and so brutal and determined in its character as to make 
it a practical denial of free speech; and although . . . 
the meeting was called by republicans and no invitations 
extended to any other party to take any part in it, yet 
the white people, led by General Gary and General 
Butler, did take possession of it and did practically 
deny free speech. . . . They came upon the platform, and 
they practically enforced their demand of equal rights 
with us . . . and General Butler and General Gary both 
addressed the audience before the republicans, who had 
called the meeting, were at all recognized; and General 
Gary announced that they had come there to be heard, and 
they were going to be heard; if there was any trouble in 
consequence of the enforcement of the demand to be 
heard, that he wanted it to be understood that the 
responsibility would be with the republicans and the 
republican leaders, intimating that if there should be 
trouble and bloodshed, the leaders would be killed or 
injured first. . . .  I yielded to them simply because I 
was not willing to take the responsibility of a 
massacre.78
The governor went on to describe similar episodes within a 
few days of each other at Newberry, Abbeville, Midway, and 
Lancaster.
A. C. Haskell, Chairman of the Democratic Executive
Committee, repeatedly denied that the campaign strategy
involved violence, intimidation, or fraud. Haskell in his
testimony before both the House and Senate investigating
committees outlined the instructions given to the county
chairmen at the beginning of the campaign:
The general plan of the campaign was impressed upon 
them, at the base of which was, that there was to be no 
force, no demonstrat ion of military force or physical 
force, other than consisted in mere assemblages of 
numbers, and that there was to be no actual violence 
whatsoever in the state; that the campaign was to be 
conducted on the clearest and broadest principles of 
equal rights to all men, and full consideration to the 
colored race, and that we were to win them by argument
78South Carolina in 1876. 7-9.
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and persuasion.79
Ten days before the election he again called together the
county chairmen and impressed
upon every chairman that he was to go back to his county 
with this understanding, that not only should they not 
use force at the election, but there must be no 
demonstration of force; there must be nothing to intimi­
date, awe, frighten or otherwise deter the colored 
people from going to the polls.80
Regarding the practice of dividing time, Haskell testified:
My instructions always were to go to the meetings and to 
remain perfectly quiet, but ask for a division of the 
time and if it was rejected to remain perfectly quiet; 
to keep order, listen to the speakers, and use any means 
at their command, by the ordinary rules of mass 
meetings, to indicate their pleasure or displeasure— to 
hiss or applaud as they pleased— but by no means to make 
any demonstration or threaten force or use it.81
Wade Hampton avowed that
the principles upon which I conducted the canvass were 
the same as those I had announced in my acceptance of 
the nomination. I not only declared my disapprobation 
of any intimidation, but I said there should be none; 
that if there were any attempts made looking in that 
direction anywhere in the state, I should withdraw from 
the canvass.82
Throughout the campaign he contended there was no violence 
or intimidation at any of his meetings except Beaufort, 
where a black audience refused to hear some of the speakers 
who were traveling with him. At all of his meetings he 
offered any Republican the opportunity of dividing time, and
79Recent Election in South Carolina. 341.
80Ibid., 342.
81South Carolina in 1876. 831.
82Ibid., 984.
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specifically instructed the executive committee that Demo­
crats were to request and not demand a division of time at 
Republican meetings. In his view, the plan of the campaign 
was to "endeavor to call out the colored people to listen to 
us, to show them that their interests were our interests 
. . .  to appeal to them by argument, and to reach their 
heads through their hearts."83 Later in the same testimony 
Hampton revealed his confidence in appealing to the blacks:
I believed that it could be carried by an appeal to the 
best element of the colored people; that they were 
suffering, as we were, by the stagnation of trade and 
the ruin of the industrial interests of the state, and I 
felt satisfied that an appeal to them would enlist 
enough of them to carry the election.84
What then was the plan for the campaign, violence or
persuasion, Hampton or Gary? The best conclusion seems to
be that both were employed. In essence as the Senate
maj ority report concluded, there was both a high road and a
low road: "Legitimate methods of political conversion
constituted the canvass. Illegitimate methods constituted
the campaign," and
General Hampton . . . took no open part in the campaign. 
. . . General Hampton was not permitted to hear anyone 
urge violence, nor did he ever see any armed men, nor 
did he personally [emphasis in original] know of any 
physical violence or unlawful intimidation."85
In light of his emphasis upon persuasion in 1865 and 1868,
83Recent Election in South Carolina. 306.
84Ibid., 311.
85South Carolina in 1876. 157-58.
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his control over the Red Shirts during the dual governorship 
and his eventual total break with Martin Gary it is not hard 
to accept as genuine his belief that he could persuade 
enough blacks to join him to give the Democrats the elec­
tion. He was also practical enough to know that violence 
would bring federal troops and that was the last thing the 
Democrats wanted.
While he may not have condoned the tactics of intimi­
dation, he at least had to know what was taking place. He 
had been in Mississippi during that election, he was at the 
August convention during the five hour secret session, he 
heard the address of General Ferguson, and he surely had to 
know of the campaign documents of Gary. Hampton may have 
believed that Gary's tactics were a necessary end to be 
tolerated for the greater good of ridding the state of the 
radicals. In any case it is doubtful that he had the 
political clout to control certain elements of the party.
The zealots had been laying the groundwork for the campaign 
for almost a year prior to Hampton's involvement. Hampton 
was not the master strategist behind the campaign, but 
rather was selected by the Butler-Gary faction because of 
his ability to unify the party and inspire the Democrats 
with zeal, confidence, and determination.
The testimony of A. C. Haskell was considerably less 
sincere than that of Hampton. While he professed that the 
party policy regarding dividing time was to be done in a
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quiet, peaceful manner, and only upon the voluntary consent 
of the Republican leaders, his own testimony of his experi­
ences in going to Republican meetings contradicted his 
claim. In all of the occasions he cited as peaceful there 
were disturbances, threats, and guns, and in one instance 
the overt promise to kill the leaders if violence broke out 
over their putting forward a black Democratic speaker. In 
every instance the meeting ceased to be under the control of 
those who had convened it. While disavowing knowledge of 
the Mississippi plan he executed it to perfection.
James Conner, a Charleston lawyer, former chairman of 
the Democratic Executive Committee, former cooperationist, 
and candidate for attorney general, was a good friend of 
Hampton and traveled with him through a substantial part of 
the canvass. In a letter to his wife at the end of October, 
Conner observed, "our chance to carry the negro was not by 
argument or reason but by letting him see that we were the 
stronger, to impress him with a sense of our power and 
determination— hence the demonstrations we made.1,86 In 
another letter shortly after the election he described the 
inability of the whites to buy the votes of blacks on 
election day, even though ample money was available.87
In summary, while there were two overall strategies at
86James Conner to his wife, 24 October 1876, James 
Conner Papers.
87Ibid., 11 November 1876.
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work in the campaign, by far the most pervasive appears to 
be the Mississippi plan with its fraud and intimidation, 
rather than the persuasive approach of Hampton. The 
Mississippi plan with variations in intensity was applied 
from the mountains to the coast. While Hampton may have 
believed in his ability to persuade the blacks, there is 
little evidence to support a widespread belief in the 
ability to win the blacks through rational argument.
Hampton's Speeches
Personal Appeals
Wade Hampton was one of a very few men in the state 
who had the respect of both black and white. "There was no 
other person in South Carolina better fitted than this 
nominee for the role of arousing white sentiment and of 
convincing Northern opinion of the liberal intentions of his 
party."88 In a letter to the editor in which he recommended 
Wade Hampton as the party's nominee, M. C. Butler called him 
"one of our most prominent, patriotic and popular country­
men" and saw him as the best man to "reconcile whatever 
discordant elements there may be in the Democratic party of 
S.C."89 In addition to being seen as a man who could arouse 
the whites, appease the North, and reconcile the party, he 
was, perhaps most importantly, perceived as the best man to
88Francis Simkins, "The Election of 1876 in South 
Carolina," South Atlantic Quarterly 21 (July 1922): 239.
89Colurobia Daily Register. 8 July 1876.
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bridge the racial gap. A. C. Haskell testified:
He was nominated as a representative of the interests of 
both races. He has always been recognized in this 
state as a conservative man. . . . After the war he was 
the first man who was looked to by the colored people 
here in Columbia as their friend and representative and 
so he acted. We did not nominate him as an extreme 
democrat, but as a reform man, who was eminently 
conservative, and who would be able to unite the two 
races better than anyone else we could select in the 
state.90
For the native whites, Hampton was more than a 
pragmatic choice. As the highest ranking South Carolina 
officer in the Confederacy he was the embodiment of the Lost 
Cause. Many of the men in the state had fought under his 
command. In the interim since the war he had addressed 
numerous reunions of confederate veterans. Williamson 
expresses well this relationship between Hampton and the 
state:
When South Carolina found Hampton in 1876, it was if she 
had re-found herself. Indeed, she had. Hampton was, 
above all, the creature of the society that had reared 
him. He was the personification of its ideal, carrying 
in his human form the inflexible rectitude, the sober 
courage which all South Carolinians idealized but few 
possessed. . . . In turning to Hampton in 1876, white 
Carolinians were listening again to their consciences.91
For the whites Hampton's reputation was so well established 
that it was unnecessary for him to attempt to build ethos 
through his speeches. While there were a few references to 
his devotion to duty and the Lost Cause, they were minimal
90South Carolina in 1876. 792.
91Williamson, 407.
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and relatively insignificant. He was telling his white 
audiences what they wanted to hear and he didn't need to 
build his ethos to do that. Even in Edgefield where his 
instructions were direct, forceful, and counter to what Gary 
was advocating, he included no reminder of his past military 
authority.92
The stress on building ethos had to be directed toward 
the black voters. The critical element of ethos was 
trustworthiness. He was asking the blacks to set aside 
their history of slavery and black codes and trust him with 
their newly gained civil and political rights. It was 
critical to his argument that he establish himself as a 
trustworthy individual.
Hampton employed three techniques to establish his 
trustworthiness: (1) To establish the intensity of his
commitment he promised drastic future action if there were 
any attempt to violate his promises, and he gave both past 
and present examples of his standing up to whites on behalf 
of blacks; (2) to demonstrate his consistency on the issue 
of suffrage he pointed to his past position; and (3) through 
testimony and example he tried to portray the mutual respect 
and confidence existing between him and the blacks. All of 
these appeals did not appear in any one speech, but one or 
more of them appeared in most of the speeches, and some of
92Charleston News and Courier. 21 October 1876.
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them were published in a campaign booklet.93
In establishing the intensity of his commitment, he
repeatedly promised to resign his office if the legislature
tried to tamper with the rights of the blacks:
I declare to Heaven that if there should be elected a 
Legislature that attempted to do away with one single 
right or privilege now enjoyed by the colored people, 
that, so help me God, I would resign if I could not 
defeat them.94
He gave impact to this commitment by citing two examples of 
his standing up to whites to guarantee rights to a black 
person. Both were reprinted in the pamphlet distributed 
throughout the state. In one instance in Mississippi a 
slave who did not belong to Hampton was about to be lynched 
for murder. Hampton heard of it, went to the owner and told 
him:
"If you will get two more men, and give us all double- 
barreled guns, I will take him out of the hands of those 
men, put him back in jail, and give my life before he 
shall be subjected to lynch-law." They told me if I 
opposed the intention of those men they would lynch me.
I said let them do it, but I would go and tell them if 
that man is lynched at their hands, they would be guilty 
of murder. I did so, and I would risk my life to 
sustain the laws of South Carolina, and to protect the 
lives of her citizens.95
The other example occurred in Walhalla at the beginning of
the campaign. At the Democratic meeting Hampton asked if
93Wade Hampton, The Pledges of Gen. Wade Hampton. 
Democratic Candidate for Governor. to the Colored People of 
South Carolina. 1865-1876 (n.p.: n.p.).
94Charleston News and Courier. 31 October 1876.
95The Pledges of Gen. Wade Hampton. 6-7.
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there were any Republicans present who wanted to speak.
When a black man stood and declared he was a Republican, the 
crowd became boisterous and unruly. Hampton quieted the 
crowd and allowed the man to speak in peace.96
The second proof of his trustworthiness and the one 
most frequently used was the claim that he was the first man 
in the South to advocate suffrage for the blacks, usually 
pointing out that it was before Congress had acted and while 
Gov. Oliver Morton of Indiana and Gov. John Andrew of 
Massachusetts were still opposing suffrage for the blacks.97 
There is inconsistency among the various texts as to exactly 
what Hampton claimed. In some speeches he was reported to 
have taken his position in 1865, while in others it was 
1867. In some instances he was the "first man" and in 
others the "first man in the South" to advocate black 
suffrage.98 In fact he was referring to the position he 
adopted in 1867.99 Whether he was the first man in the 
South to take that position is unclear, but he was one of 
the earliest southern advocates. In testifying before the 
Senate investigating committee he observed that he was well 
in advance of the rest of the South Carolina whites at that
96Ibid., 7.
97Charleston News and Courier. 10 October 1876.
98See addresses delivered at Sumter and Yorkville in 
Charleston News and Courier. 10, 16 October 1876.
" South Carolina in 1876. 991.
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time.100 In some of his speeches he tried to use this 
earlier division as further proof of his own sincerity in 
advocating voting rights for blacks, and the fact of his 
nomination as an indication that South Carolina whites had 
adopted his position.101
His final appeal for trustworthiness was established
by examples of his past dealings with blacks, particularly
those who had once served him as slaves. At Abbeville he
quoted a letter from a former slave who said, "You were
always good and kind to me when your slave, and knowing that
you are a good and kind man— a man who will do what he
promises— I write to say that I will vote for you, and get
all the black men I can to do the same."102 In the same
speech he went on to describe his good relations with his
former slaves at his Mississippi plantation:
These colored people, hundreds of them, with their 
ancestors, have lived on my estate in Mississippi for 
over two hundred years, and they are living there still. 
They have never left me; they live all around me, and 
since the war, such confidence have I in them that I 
have not even a lock on my house. There is no protec­
tion except those colored people who have grown up from 
childhood with me. . . . These colored people, when they 
want help, come to me for it.103
He then told of one of his former slaves, who, as he lay
100Ibid.
101Charleston News and Courier. 31 October 1876.
102Ibid., 20 September 1876.
103Ibid.
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dying, called for Hampton and
turned over all his property into my hands, asking me to 
sell his cotton and take care of the money for his wife 
and children, and to protect them. . . .  I tell you 
this, my colored friends, to show you that those colored 
men who know me trust me.104
There is no evidence to suggest that any of these 
appeals were illegitimate or inappropriate. To the con­
trary, the evidence indicates that he was consistent in his 
advocacy of fair and kind treatment of the blacks and 
recognition of their political rights. Generally blacks 
indicated a respect for him by attending his meetings and 
listening to him when they would not hear other white 
men.105 As indicated at the beginning of this discussion, 
the whites also perceived him as a man who was respected and 
trusted by the blacks. The only flaw in his appeal was in 
his discussion of his early position favoring black 
suffrage. His black audience knew that he advocated their 
suffrage only after it was apparent they were going to get 
it anyway, and that while the North was offering full voting 
rights, Hampton offered a suffrage with educational and 
property restrictions. Overall, though, his claim for 
trustworthiness was reasonable and supportable.
Motive Appeals
Hampton employed four basic motive appeals during his
104Ibid.
105South Carolina in 1876. 986, 994.
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canvass: (1) the use of spectacle to inspire whites with
elan and confidence, and to awe the blacks with the whites' 
power and authority; (2) the appeal to economic survival by 
showing the threat from radical corruption; (3) the call to 
patriotism to join as one in saving the state; and (4) the 
creation both verbally and nonverbally of a bandwagon 
effect.
A. B. Williams, a young reporter for the Charleston 
Journal of Commerce. traveled with the canvass and provided 
a description of the speaking occasions. Williams was 
heavily biased for Hampton and thus one must allow for some 
exaggeration, but even with allowances, the demonstrations 
and processions still appear impressive. At the opening of 
the canvass in Anderson "the crowd was estimated at 6,000 
and 1,600 mounted men, organized in rifle and other clubs, 
rode in the procession, while a long line of Democratic 
clubs on foot marched and yelled— the 'Rebel yell."'106 At 
Greenville he was met with a crowd of 5,000 to 6,000 and 
1,500 mounted men, while in Spartanburg there was an equal 
number of mounted men and the firing of artillery. By the 
time the entourage reached Newberry, the procession included
4,000 mounted men, "and the first appearance of the 
regularly uniformed mounted Red Shirts."107 At every 
campaign rally there was much firing of cannon, marching,
106Williams, 161.
107Ibid., 167, 181, 200.
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riding of men uniformed in red shirts, and moving in 
military order.
While making no direct link to the mounted Red Shirts 
and the firing of artillery, Hampton in his testimony before 
the House investigating committee agreed that blacks were 
easily influenced by "a display of force."108 James Conner, 
writing to his wife, gave a clear statement of purpose for 
all the display. "Our chance to carry the negro was . . . 
to impress him with a sense of our power and determination—  
hence the demonstrations we made; for the darkey is impres­
sible [sic! and the spectacular takes him." The only problem 
with this approach was as Conner continued, "Chamberlain 
brought in the troops and showed to the negro that there was 
a power stronger than ours and the negro ceased to come to 
us. The same influence or motive that brought him in the 
one case kept him away in the other."109
The economic appeal was essentially the same one he
had been making since the war; the blacks and whites were
1inked together economically, and if the whites failed the
blacks would be on the bottom of the destruction:
If you allow the white people of South Carolina to go 
down this time, you will go down so deep that no plummet 
can ever reach you. If we, the white people of South 
Carolina were to leave you the State, and give you 
everything,— land, houses, churches, banks— you could 
not live without them. The only way to bring about
108Recent Election in South Carolina. 330.
109James Conner to his wife, 24 October 1876, James 
Conner Papers.
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prosperity in this state is to bring the two races in 
friendly relation together.110
Later in the speech he linked the prosperity to good govern­
ment and then cited Georgia as an example of prosperity for 
the blacks under a white Democratic government. While 
Hampton did not go into any specifics regarding corruption 
and its economic impact, Gen. Robert Toombs of Georgia who 
spoke immediately after Hampton, gave details on the fraud 
and stealing of the radicals and how it directly affected 
the economic well being of the blacks.111 At Edgefield he 
used a comparison he had employed years earlier and 
threatened the blacks with the fate of the Indians unless 
they helped restore economic prosperity to the state. Along 
with the negative, however, he did again cite the economic 
advantages that had come to the blacks in Georgia since the 
radicals had been thrown out.112 In Charleston, the appeal 
had a slightly different tone when he contended:
I tell the colored man he will never have any protection 
for his life or property under this corrupt carpetbag 
government. Why? Because they have not the power to 
protect you. And they never will have the power until 
they are supported by the capital and intelligence of 
the Democratic party.113
He did not clarify what he meant by protection, but it
certainly could have been interpreted by his hearers as an
110Charleston News and Courier. 20 September 1876.
^Ibid.
112Ibid., 21 October 1876.
113Ibid., 31 October 1876.
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oblique reference to proscription.
Earlier that month there had appeared in the News and
Courier a series of one-liners, interspersed among news
items, encouraging Democrats to do business with other
Democrats: "If you want a porter, employ a democrat; If you
want a driver, employ a democrat."114 More than twenty such
appeals appeared with each giving a different service or
occupation. The News and Courier also carried a series of
resolutions adopted by the Sixth Ward Democratic Club of
Charleston. Proscription was one of the subjects addressed:
In our opinion the interest of the democratic party will 
be promoted if, in purchasing supplies, employing 
laborers, and so forth, those cooperating with that 
party will give the preference to persons who intend to 
join us in this struggle for an honest government.115
Hampton denied before the House investigating committee that 
he had said anything in his speeches specifically about pro­
scription, but had argued only that the economic interests 
of the two races were linked. Furthermore, after the 
election he had sent out a directive specifically forbidding 
proscription.116 The closest he came to the subject was in 
his September speech at Marion:
I have told the colored people that the men who own the 
land, the men who pay the taxes, the men who have the 
title-deeds from the Almighty, will take you by the hand 
as their friends if you come with them and help them to 
redeem the State. But they say, on the other hand, if
114Ibid., 2 October 1876.
115Ibid., 21 September 1876.
116Recent Election in South Carolina. 330-31.
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you do not come with them, and rather go with the 
corrupt crew who have, for eight years, ruled and ruined 
the State, then you will have to look to them for your 
living and protection. We offer to the colored people 
the right hand of fellowship; we hold out to them the 
olive-branch of peace, but you cannot expect us, when 
you allow your state to be dragged down to infamous ruin 
by alien adventurers, to help you who have been the 
cause of all the suffering which will assuredly follow. 
We give you your choice now, either to come with your 
white friends, who never have deceived you, or to go 
with the carpet-baggers, who have deceived and plundered 
you for eight years. If you think your carpet-bag 
friends are right, then, when your trouble comes, go to 
them for the help and protection you will assuredly 
need.117
He illustrated the interpretation that should be given 
his remarks by citing what a Greenville man had told his 
workers. If the Republicans returned to power he would not 
be able to afford hiring any of them for the next year, but 
if the Democrats took control he was confident the economy 
would improve so that he could give them a $3.00 raise. "He 
didn't say that if they voted the democratic ticket he would 
pay them higher wages, but simply if that party got into 
power he would do so, showing how certain he was that under 
home rule the prosperity of the state would be insured."118
As in past instances, the appeal to the economic 
motives of the blacks was more negative than positive.
There was some positive ground, as in his promise that money 
designated for schools would be spent for education and not 
siphoned off by fraud, and in the citing of the improved
117Charleston News and Courier. 2 October 1876.
118Ibid., 20 September 1876.
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condition of blacks in Georgia. Fear, however, certainly 
predominated. Return of Republican rule would mean economic 
collapse for the whites and, employing Aristotle's topic of 
the greater and lesser, far beneath the rubble would be the 
blacks, or like the Indian, they would be scattered to 
oblivion. Even if he did not directly endorse proscription 
there was no mistaking the message that their jobs were 
threatened if they helped the Republicans to victory.
The appeal to patriotism called from Hampton his most
emotional language. He called for black and white to
forsake party and to stand together to rescue the state from
destruction by the radicals:
I can only implore our people, white and black, to come 
together and sustain this cause. It is not the cause of 
a party. It is not the cause of a clique. It is not a 
struggle for party supremacy. It is a struggle for this 
grand old home of ours. It is a struggle to save South 
Carolina from foreign adventurers and thieves. It is a 
struggle that white and black can struggle shoulder to 
shoulder, to sustain. This dear old land belongs to us, 
and, if we are true to ourselves, if we are true to our 
fathers, if we are true to our children and to our God, 
we cannot fail to transmit it free and prosperous to our 
children. . . . Nothing on the face of this great earth 
would have induced me to enter this contest, but the 
sole hope that I might save South Carolina. And I tell 
you that there is not a man in this State who is making 
a greater sacrifice than I am. And now I ask you all, 
white and black, in the name of Carolina, in the name of 
our children, and in the name of your God to stand by 
and sustain this great cause to the last.119
In Charleston black and white lost their separate 
identities and became one as patriotic Carolinians:
I came then to speak to you, my friends, not as a party
119Ibid.
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man. I do not come to speak to my white friends or my 
colored friends, but I speak to Carolinians, and I speak 
as one pleading for a cause as noble as ever stirred the 
heart of a patriot; for it is the cause of our native 
land. . . . It is not a party fight. . . . But it is 
simply an issue of patriotism. It is an issue of life 
and death to the State of South Carolina.120
Hampton called upon the men of Aiken to sacrifice
their lives for the dear old state. Chamberlain had
received federal troops to maintain order in the state.
Hampton was afraid there would be some provocation that
would set off a collision between the whites and the troops.
Such an event could place the state under martial law and
obviate the ballot. To forestall such a scenario, he
pleaded with the men of Aiken to remain passive, seek
redress of their rights in the courts, and die rather than
offer resistance:
If, by the inexorable law of military authority, they 
are even ordered to fire upon you, say to them, "we have 
no war against the United States government; we 
recognize the flag which waves from the Golden Gate of 
California to the Granite Hills of New Hampshire. It is 
ours. If you fire on us, we know that in our deaths 
American liberty will live." I see beside me today men 
who offered their lives on many a battlefield. I say to 
them, offer them again; you could not die in a nobler 
cause.121
In the name of patriotism, then, blacks and whites 
were consubstantiated into Carolinians, and the cause 
ennobled by being lifted above a mere political campaign and 
placed on the level of protection of family, heritage, and
120Ibid., 31 October 1876.
121Ibid., 23 October 1876.
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soil that had been given them as a birthright from God.
This appeal would seem particularly appropriate for the 
whites, many of whom had gone off to war to defend their 
homeland and their way of life. The merits of the appeal 
for the blacks is not as apparent, and certainly not as 
strong as for whites. Many of them did see themselves as 
native Carolinians and loved the soil of their birth, but 
for the majority who under the Democrats had never had a 
chance to own so much as a shovel full of that red clay and 
sand the appeal to patriotism seems particularly weak.
The bandwagon appeal was both verbal and nonverbal.
The nonverbal aspect was in the design of the canvass 
itself. It started at Anderson in the extreme northwest 
corner of the state, where white Democrats were in the 
maj ority and progressed slowly and systematically through 
the middle counties to the coast, where the blacks were in 
control. This progression from the mountains to the coast, 
from Democratic to Republican, and white to black control, 
allowed time for the up-state enthusiasm to spread to the 
low-country. Anderson had been one of the first counties to 
enthusiastically call for a straightout campaign. Many of 
the down-state counties who had been inactive and 
discouraged because of large Republican majorities suddenly 
caught fire when they heard what was happening in the upper 
counties. After seeing the initial outpouring of enthusiasm 
and determination demonstrated by the whites at these early
149
meetings, H. V. Redfield, a Republican correspondent, wrote 
that the Democrats were going to carry the state.122
Verbally, the bandwagon effect was created as time and
again in the low-country Hampton announced the election won
or almost won and invited his audience to join with the
victors. In Marion, he declared, "I have seen brave men
enough on my march to assure you that victory is secure.*'123
In Edgefield he announced:
We have already won the battle. I have already seen 
enough people enrolled in our Democratic clubs to ensure 
our election, and not only that, but by a much larger 
majority than we could have hoped. The only thing to be 
done now is to secure the fruits of victory.124
At Aiken, a few days later, it was much the same thing:
"I bring you the news of the great battle waging throughout
the State, of a battle already won. . . .  we already have
colored men in our Democratic clubs sufficient to carry the
election alone."125 And in Charleston at the end of October
he proclaimed, "I can tell you here that there are already
enough colored men enrolled to bear it to victory. We have
won the fight."126
Again and again he announced that they had the 
election won and the only danger was in being cheated out of
122Williams, 161, 162, 167, 168, 179.
123Charleston News and Courier. 2 October 1876.
124Ibid., 21 October 1876.
125Ibid., 23 October 1876.
126Ibid., 31 October 1876.
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the fruits of victory. Of course there was no way he could 
make such a statement with any degree of accuracy. It was 
simply designed to impress the blacks with the size and 
strength of the Democratic movement and to encourage whites, 
particularly those in heavily black counties.
Finally, Hampton employed ridicule to make Chamberlain
and the Republican ticket appear weak and incompetent.
Throughout his canvass, Hampton repeatedly chided Chamber-
lain for not dealing with whatever unrest existed in the
state rather than turning to Washington, and for not
dividing time with him at the Democratic rallies. At
Yorkville he charged: "He who should perform the functions
of Governor for the whole people; he who, when there comes a
riot . . . instead of being there to see that the laws are
enforced and that life, liberty and property are protected
flies to the United States government for troops."127 In
Marion he made direct reference to the Combahee riots:
These outraged colored men . . . had written again and 
again to Governor Chamberlain to protect them and he 
turns to them a deaf ear. He does not go there and runs 
to Washington. I say here that if governor Chamberlain 
will call on me and give me the authority for three 
days, I pledge myself to go among those Combahee rioters 
not armed with even a pen knife, and I further pledge 
myself that they will listen to me and order will be 
restored in twenty-four hours.128
His most forceful ridicule occurred at Abbeville:
Now fellowcitizens is not this a nice condition of
127Ibid., 16 October 1876.
128Ibid., 2 October 1876.
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affairs when the Governor of a state, the so-called 
Governor of a state, cannot protect himself or protect 
his people. Look at the riots that have recently 
occurred in South Carolina. What does the Governor do? 
He packs up his carpet-bag, puts off for Washington and 
cries for United States troops. . . . Think of the time 
when George McDuffie was your governor, and try and 
imagine him in the event of a riot calling on United 
States troops instead of appealing to the hearts of his 
people . . . if you place me in the chair once honored 
by him, if I cannot suppress a riot, if I can not go to 
the people of Carolina white and black, and say to them 
these are the laws and you must uphold and enforce 
them— if I cannot appeal to Carolina's sons to support 
me in the laws that I am sworn to maintain, then cast me 
out with scorn from the office that I dishonor.129
Not only was Chamberlain inept and cowardly in his
handling of the riots, he was also afraid to meet Hampton
on the stump. At Yorkville, Hampton indicated that the
governor had agreed to meet him there in a joint discussion,
but had apparently backed out:
After declining first, he, when pressed, accepts, and 
the first place appointed for the meeting was here. But 
where is he to-day? Where is your Governor, who ought 
to be present to represent you? I can tell you why he 
is absent. He has libelled the fair name of the people 
of South Carolina, and he does not meet men who will 
prove to his face that he is a liar.130
Two weeks later at Charleston, Hampton again mentioned his
invitation to Chamberlain to meet him face to face:
But, he will not come out and meet the people of South 
Carolina, because he knows that if he does he will see 
flashing from indignant eyes reprobation of his conduct. 
He will see, in the stern faces of white men and black 
men, contempt of the man who has been a traitor to the
129Ibid., 20 October 1876.
130Ibid., 16 October 1876.
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white and black man alike, a traitor to his position and 
to his trust.131
In the middle of September at Abbeville he told the crowd he
had sent a telegram to the governor offering joint meetings
and promising that the white men of the state would protect
him.132
The problem with Hampton reproaching Chamberlain for 
not appearing at the meetings is that no agreement was ever 
concluded between the two parties for joint sessions.
Hampton did telegraph an invitation to Chamberlain for joint 
discussion. The governor responded that it was a matter 
that needed to be handled by the executive committees of the 
respective parties and referred the request to Robert 
Elliott, the chairman of the Republican committee. 
Correspondence between A .  C. Haskell, the Democratic chair­
man, and R. B. Elliott indicates a reasonable readiness by 
the Republicans for joint discussions but a total lack of 
flexibility by the Democrats. The Republicans were willing 
to accommodate the Democratic schedule for six of a proposed 
eight engagements, but the insistence by the Democrats that 
all of the sessions had to meet their schedule forced 
negotiations to be broken off on October 18.133
The evidence indicates that Hampton had no reason to
131Ibid., 31 October 1876.
132Ibid., 20 September 1876.
133Copies of correspondence of both parties appear in 
Allen, 392-97.
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expect Chamberlain to appear at Yorkville or at any of the 
other Democratic meetings. Haskell proposed that joint 
meetings begin at Yorkville but that proposal was never 
adopted by both sides. Thus, Hampton1s ridicule of Cham­
berlain for not meeting him face to face seems totally 
unfounded and inappropriate. The inflexibility of the 
Democrats is also puzzling. It was part of their campaign 
design to confront the radicals face to face wherever 
possible and to attract as large an audience of blacks as 
possible; joint discussions would have achieved both objec­
tives. Yet, their total intransigence in the negotiations 
precluded the realization of those goals.
While Hampton was wrong in reproaching Chamberlain for 
not fulfilling an agreement he never made, he was correct 
that Chamberlain feared to openly campaign throughout the 
state. His experiences with the Red Shirts at Newberry, 
Edgefield, and Midway during the summer and prior to the 
nominating convention were so devastating and intimidating 
that the Republicans did not attempt any type of canvass at 
all until the middle of October, and Chamberlain did not 
give any speeches from the time of his nomination to the 
election:
The exceedingly violent tone of the men who were chiefly 
responsible for inaugurating the straight-out policy was 
one cause of fear . . . and the result was that from 
the time of my nomination until the 14th of October, no 
general canvass of the state was made. Between the 14th 
of October and the day of election we managed to hold 
one general political meeting in each county. But the 
local leaders in the counties, in some instances, in the
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upper part of the state were afraid to go out in the 
country to attend the local meetings, for fear of their 
lives. . . .  I did not speak at all to the people from 
the time I was nominated until the election, simply 
because it was not considered safe; it was regarded by 
my friends as an unnecessary exposure of my life. . . .
I was very anxious to do it for some personal reasons, 
but I finally consented not to do so, because it was not 
considered personally safe.134
He also indicated in his testimony the desire for an agree­
ment with the Democrats for joint discussions since he felt 
they would have been protected under such an agreement, but 
the rigid demands of the Democrats cancelled that possi­
bility. 135
In the perception of whites, the blacks were easily 
impressed and intimidated by a show of force and strength. 
They were for the most part vulnerable economically and
j
largely dependent upon white planters and merchants for 
economic survival, and most though reared in slavery were 
natives of the state. Hampton sought in his appeals, both 
verbal and nonverbal, to address all of these motives. In 
the spectacle of mounted, organized, uniformed whites there 
was strength and power that contrasted sharply with a 
governor who would not respond to the taunts of the oppo­
sition and personally go forth to quell the riots and 
confront his accusers. Repeatedly blacks were made to fear 
the disastrous economic consequences if the Republicans 
stayed in power. Along with the heavy dose of fear was the
134South Carolina in 1876. 24.
135Ibid.
155
uplifting appeal to do one's duty for God, family, and 
country, and redeem the state from the corrupters. For the 
whites the need was to inspire confidence and create zeal; 
and this he did through the spectacular parades and demon­
strations, the perpetual proclamations of success, and the 
call to give all for the grand old state.
Logical Appeals
A large part of Hampton's arguments consisted of 
refuting the belief held by many blacks that the Democrats 
would take away their rights if they regained power. To 
refute this major concern, he used three basic arguments:
(1) the interest of the whites, (2) the integrity of his 
word, and (3) the numerical superiority of the blacks. His 
constructive arguments were also three: (1) the Republican
candidates were corrupt and therefore unfit; (2) the whites 
needed to maintain discipline; and (3) the rights of the 
blacks were secure.
His first argument to refute the belief that blacks 
might lose their right to vote under the Democrats was an 
enthymeme built upon another enthymeme. The underlying 
enthymeme was a maxim that people will do what is in their 
self interest. Hampton argued that black suffrage gave 
South Carolina a greater voice in Congress because it 
enlarged the base for determining the number of represen­
tatives, thus it was in the self interest of the whites to 
leave black voting rights alone. His understood major
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premise was that having a greater voice in Congress was in
the self interest of the whites:
By the votes of the colored man the South has more votes 
in Congress, the South has more votes in the Electoral 
College, the South has more influence in the Union, and, 
therefore, we of the South would be fools, politically, 
if we tried to cut away the 800.000 colored votes that 
give that power and influence.136
On the surface the analysis appears valid. The black 
vote did in fact give a greater voice to the South, and it 
was in the South's interest to have greater influence in 
Congress. The flaw in the argument, however, is in the 
unstated major premise that it was in their interest to have 
a stronger vote in Congress. It was true as long as the 
whites could control the votes at home. If the black vote 
posed a threat to white control of the state then influence 
in Congress would quickly be sacrificed to maintain power at 
home. Hampton clearly indicated this position in 1867 when 
he was willing to compromise with the blacks and give them 
Congress if the whites could have the state.137 In the 1876 
campaign he made it clear that the state was more important 
than the national election and encouraged blacks to vote 
Republican nationally if they felt the need, but to vote 
Democratic in the state.138 Thus the major premise was true 
only so long as the black vote represented no threat to
13Charleston News and Courier. 31 October 1876.
137Wade Hampton to James Conner, 24 March 1867, James
Conner Papers.
138Charleston News and Courier. 31 October 1876.
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state control by the whites.
His second line of refutation was his personal pledge 
that a Democratic administration would not tamper with the 
rights of the blacks. As proof he offered his personal 
integrity and examples of his past relations with the 
blacks. Since his argument from ethos is discussed above, 
it will not be repeated here, except to say that it was one 
of his strongest arguments.
His third refutative argument was one he had used in 
1867. Essentially he was offering them a no lose situation: 
"If you trust the white people of South Carolina once, and 
then if you find any of your rights impaired, you are strong 
enough in the state to turn them out of office. We cannot 
be elected without the aid of the colored people."139 He 
amplified the argument by observing that the whites had 
joined with the Republicans on three occasions to support 
reform candidates, but without success. They had tried one 
approach to reform and it hadn't worked, now it was time to 
try another, and it was without risk because they had the 
majority. The problem was that the Democrats had had a 
chance and had done all they could to keep the blacks as 
close to slavery as possible. Patrick Henry had claimed 
there was no way of judging the future but by the past and 
unfortunately for the Democrats there was little in their 
past actions that boded well for the black. As subsequent
139Ibid., 20 September 1876.
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history proved there were numerous mechanisms by which the 
will of a majority could be circumvented.
The argument that gave Hampton the greatest delight,
judging by the frequency of use and vividness of phrasing,
was his attack on the fitness of the two leading Republican
candidates, Robert Elliott and Daniel Chamberlain. He
quoted the charges Elliott and Chamberlain had made against
each other in the bitterly contested Republican convention.
Chamberlain says Elliott is the most corrupt man in 
South Carolina, and Elliott goes into the convention, 
before Chamberlain has received the nomination, and 
draws from his pocket a paper and reads a part of it,
and says: "If I was [sic] to read all that I have in my
possession I would destroy Governor Chamberlain . . .  I 
could convict Governor Chamberlain of larceny and 
consign him to the penitentiary."14 0
Hampton then carried his conclusion to the absurd by
pointing out that if Elliott and Chamberlain were elected
the first duty of Elliott would be to prosecute the governor
and put him in the penitentiary. At this point in the
argument he suggested that if he could be certain Elliott
would faithfully fulfill his oath of office, he would
withdraw from the race just so he could see Chamberlain
placed in jail.141 Hampton's enthymeme was:
Major Premise: A party with corrupt candidates cannot
reform government
Minor Premise: The Republican party has corrupt
candidates
140Ibid., 31 October 1876.
141Ibid.
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Therefore: The Republican party cannot reform the
government
While Elliott's and Chamberlain's charges against each other 
made up the heart of his support for the minor premise and 
was always used, on occasion he strengthened the support by 
citing the comments of two other candidates about each 
other: "Take the two next men on the Republican ticket. 
Cardozo says Dunn is a thief. Dunn says Cardozo is a thief 
and a liar. That is what they say about themselves. Very 
likely they are both telling the truth." Hampton then 
showed the inconsistency of Chamberlain's call for reform 
two years earlier, when now "the very men whom he denounced 
as the most corrupt men in South Carolina are on the same 
ticket with him."142
The Republican party was certainly vulnerable on the 
corruption issue, and Hampton capitalized on it. The 
statements by Elliott and Chamberlain were public knowledge. 
Chamberlain fully realized the inconsistency of his presence 
on the ticket with Elliott143 and it was entirely possible 
that Elliott had some damaging documents relating to 
Chamberlain's past. In any case the argument was a telling 
one, and put the Republicans in an embarrassing situation. 
Even Chamberlain's law partner, Samuel Melton, could not 
support the whole ticket. In a letter to James Conner,
142Ibid.
143See pp. 114-15 above.
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Melton expressed his dilemma: "There is a certain sort of 
propriety in my adhering to the ticket with which he 
[Chamberlain] has associated himself, and which, aside from 
political consideration, is unworthy of support, as a 
whole."144 Melton expressed extreme displeasure at the 
selection of Robert Elliott for attorney-general and 
therefore his intention to vote for Conner.
One argument that was addressed exclusively to the 
white members of his audience was that they needed to avoid 
disturbances if they did not wish to lose the election. The 
argument was one of direct causality. Disturbances, or any 
civil unrest would give Chamberlain an excuse to call for 
federal troops and possibly impose martial law; and either 
would cost the Democrats the election. It was unnecessary 
for Hampton to establish the link between unrest and federal 
troops. Immediately after the Hamburg riot, Chamberlain had 
consulted with President Grant over the possible need for 
troops. The action was well known by the whites, and as 
discussed earlier was the breaking point between Chamberlain 
and his Democratic supporters. On October 17, after the 
Ellenton riots, the president granted Chamberlain1s request 
for additional federal troops. Thus, when Hampton spoke at 
Edgefield on the eighteenth and at Aiken on the twentieth, 
his audience knew that more federal forces were on their way
144Samuel Melton to James Conner, 26 September, James 
Conner Papers.
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to the state. Additionally, the region had already experi­
enced the presence of federal infantry during the Ellenten 
riot in late September.
Hampton went beyond arguing that violence would bring 
the troops to contending that the radicals were hoping for 
and even encouraging outrages to justify federal soldiers:
They [Republicans] have but one hope, and that is they 
may be able to goad this people into armed resistance. 
That conspiracy has already been hatched. . . . They 
hope now, by scattering troops throughout the state, to 
bring about a collision. And give a pretext to bring
more troops to see that the board of canvassers will
count us out and make us lose the victory.145
At Aiken and at Marion he referred to a letter from
Gov. Adelbert Ames of Mississippi in which Ames told the
radical leaders
that it would be a good thing for their cause if twenty 
or thirty negroes were killed, as it would furnish grist 
for the outrage mill. . . . and that if they could raise 
the cry of the bloody shirt before the North, the 
success of the party in Louisiana was ensured.146
Another part of the radical strategy, according to Hampton,
was to send to their campaign meetings "only those engaged
in the national contest, so that if we should break up the
meetings or any riot should occur they can appeal to the
United States bayonets, and then they can put the state
under martial law."147
The conclusion was clear. At all costs the whites had
145Charleston News and Courier. 21 October 1876.
146Ibid., 2, 23 October 1876.
147Ibid., 23 October 1876.
to avoid any provocation: "It is of the utmost importance
that the canvass should be peaceable. All bloodshed must be 
avoided."148 He stressed the urgency of his conclusion by 
reminding the old soldiers present of the necessity for 
strict discipline and adherence to command in the military. 
He then made the analogy to the campaign with himself and 
the executive committee in command. They had the best 
information; therefore, it was imperative that their 
instructions be obeyed, and their instructions were to keep 
the peace. Those at Aiken he entreated to not only avoid 
collision with the federal troops but to receive them as 
friends: "These men who met us in war, when we laid down
our arms, and recognized the supremacy of the old flag and 
the perpetuity of the Union, were no longer our enemies, but 
are the best friends we have North. Treat them kindly."149 
At Edgefield he added a commendation for the way they had 
already greeted the troops.150 It is significant that he 
presented the argument in its most developed form at Aiken 
and Edgefield. Aiken County had already experienced the 
Hamburg and Ellenton riots which were the prime cause for 
Chamberlain's request for federal aid. Edgefield County, 
the home of Martin Gary and the Mississippi plan, was 
adjacent to Aiken, and many of the men from Edgefield had
148Ibid., 2 October 1876.
149Ibid., 23 October 1876.
150Ibid., 21 October 1876.
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been involved at Hamburg and Ellenton.
Beyond the argument in his speeches, the controversy 
over the purpose and need for federal troops was vigorously 
pursued in the press, letters, addresses to the people of 
the United States, and eventually in testimony before both 
House and Senate committees investigating the election. The 
Democrats produced testimony that generally throughout the 
state peace prevailed, and there had been no interference 
with the courts and the process of law enforcement, and 
whatever problems there were could be handled by forces 
within the state. Chamberlain on the other hand flatly 
denied any political motive in requesting troops and 
produced testimony that the Democratic rifle clubs consisted 
of thirteen thousand armed and trained white men in a 
nonlegal paramilitary organization and that in Aiken and 
Edgefield counties they had intimidated the law enforcement 
authorities and were terrorizing and killing blacks.151
It is beyond the scope of this study, if not impos­
sible, to unravel the accuracy of these competing claims. 
Probability, however, would seem to rest with Chamberlain. 
Gary, in his plan for the campaign, expressly endorsed 
riding roughshod over the blacks and even killing if 
necessary to ensure the election. Since he advocated such 
measures, and since such measures were claimed to have
151Reynolds, 381-90; Allen, 365-427; Recent Election 
in South Carolina; and South Carolina in 1876.
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occurred, it is not difficult to believe that they in fact 
did occur. It is also not difficult to believe that 
Chamberlain, based on his personal experiences at Edgefield 
and Newberry, was ready to believe the reports of whites 
acting in a lawless manner. It is quite reasonable that 
Chamberlain, afraid even to venture forth to make campaign 
speeches, acted sincerely when he called for federal troops 
and not as part of a political conspiracy to defraud the 
Democrats.
Hampton and the Democrats did not want the soldiers 
for as James Conner indicated, it upset the strategy of 
impressing the blacks with their strength. By arguing that 
civil unrest and violence would work to the advantage of the 
Republicans, Hampton sought to stifle the violent tendencies 
of the Gary faction of the party and bring it more under the 
authority of the executive committee.
In a campaign marked by violence and intimidation, 
Hampton sought throughout the canvass to employ rational 
appeals to reach both blacks and whites. He used both 
enthymemes and causal analysis, and supported key conten­
tions with sufficient evidence to make them convincing. His 
attack on Elliott and Chamberlain was more entertaining and 
reinforcing than probative since the data was readily 
available, and most of the audience had already made up 
their minds on the issue. The appeal to certain whites for 
discipline and control was necessary and, in spite of the
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wrongfully assigned motives, causally valid to the extent 
that a direct collision with the federal troops would have 
harmed any chance they had of winning. There is no evidence 
however that the argument had any significant impact upon 
the behavior of whites in those counties. His most exten­
sive argumentation was in an effort to convince blacks that 
their rights were secure with the Democrats. He approached 
them from the perspective of the three principal partici­
pants in the scene, the whites, himself, and the blacks, and 
tried to show them that their rights were secure with a 
three fold lock. The whites wouldn't tamper with their 
rights because it would hurt their power in Congress; he 
wouldn't tamper with them because he was a man of his word; 
and the blacks had the votes to stop any tampering. Thus, 
there were three independent checks upon any tampering with 
their rights. He produced evidence to support premises in 
all three enthymemes, but only in the argument from his 
character could he point to past example.
Fitness of Response 
On their face the election returns of 1876 showed 
Hampton elected by a maj ority of 1,134.152 The returns, 
however, of Edgefield and Laurens counties were thrown out 
by the Republicans. In Edgefield the total vote exceeded 
the number of eligible voters by more than 2,000, and the
52South Carolina in 1876. 988.
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votes for Hampton went beyond the eligible white population 
by approximately 3,500.153 With those two counties out 
Chamberlain won the election by about 3,000 votes.154 Both 
sides claimed victory, and for five months political chaos 
reigned with two governors, two legislatures, and a state- 
house guarded by federal troops. Finally on April 11, 1877, 
one day after federal troops were removed by President 
Hayes, Chamberlain turned over the office of governor to 
Wade Hampton, and the Democratic victory was complete.155
The exigence had been removed, but had victory been
achieved through rhetorical means or through violence,
coercion, fraud, and intimidation? The weight of evidence
seems to indicate the latter. A. B. Williams, who traveled
with Hampton as a reporter, concluded:
Nobody ever will know how the state would have gone with 
a fair and free election. The Democrats cheated and 
intimidated and bribed and bulldozed and repeated where 
they could and the Republicans did likewise. It was war 
and revolution, a battle for life, and force and cunning 
were applied and the law was disregarded by both sides.
. . . In the upcountry Red Shirts rode about in troops 
from poll to poll voting in each and hindering and 
scattering negroes who were trying to do likewise.156
Even Hampton Jarrell, a strong apologist for Wade Hampton,
concedes there was no way to explain the vote in Edgefield:
153Ibid., 568.
154Simkins and Woody, 514.
155por detailed accounts of this period see Simkins and
Woody, 514-41; Reynolds, 393-462? and Allen, 428-87.
156Williams, 365.
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There was fraud, no doubt, in Edgefield, but probably 
not to the extent alleged. Most later stories of fraud 
and intimidation stem from Edgefield, the home of both 
Gary and Tillman; but this county was the exception, not 
the rule, as to the campaign in the state at large.157
However, one must add to Jarrell's restricted view of fraud
the testimony of James Conner, who was certainly not allied
with the Gary faction, that they tried to buy votes in
Charleston but failed.158 Even if Edgefield were atypical,
without its incredibly bloated majority for Hampton, he
would have lost. Typical or not, the Edgefield vote was
critical to the outcome.
There is likewise no way to determine how many blacks 
voted for Hampton. Estimates ranged from a low of three 
thousand by Chamberlain159 to a high of seventeen thousand 
by Hampton.160 A. C. Haskell put the figure at about 
fifteen thousand.161 Haskell based his estimate upon an 
analysis of voting in the twenty-four counties where 
separate black and white poll lists were kept. By deducting 
Chamberlain's vote from the total black votes cast he was 
able to determine that at least 8,191 black votes had been 
cast for Hampton. By projecting the same ratio of black
157Jarrell, 98, 99.
158James Conner to his wife, 11 November 1876, James 
Conner Papers.
159South Carolina in 1876. 40.
160Recent Election in South Carolina. 333.
161Ibid., 823.
votes for Hampton to the eight counties that had not
reported poll lists by race, he arrived at a minimum of
14,237 blacks who voted for Hampton.162 The determination
of the eight thousand minimum in the twenty-four counties
seems reasonably accurate. If one uses the 8,191 to
determine the percentage of total votes cast in those
twenty-four counties that were black votes for Hampton it is
slightly over seven percent. Applying the seven percent
figure to the total votes cast in the election would reveal
a black vote for Hampton of just over thirteen thousand.
The best estimate for the black vote for Hampton would seem
to be from twelve thousand to sixteen thousand. James
Conner did not give any estimate of numbers but did indicate
the black vote for Hampton was less than what he had
expected: "They fooled us to death. Thousands who had
promised us to vote Hayes and Hampton voted the straight
Republican ticket."163 Ben Tillman, a devotee of Martin
Gary, claimed Hampton
blundered egregiously in urging the policy of per­
suasion; and of convincing the negroes by argument to 
vote with us. He always maintained that sixteen 
thousand negroes voted for him in 1876; but every active 
worker in the cause knew that in this he was woefully 
mistaken."164
On the other hand, one of the key elements of the Gary
162South Carolina in 1876. 568-71.




strategy was to keep blacks away from the polls, but as the
returns indicate, this effort was an obvious failure since
blacks voted in record numbers:
We submit that if the charges generally made against us, 
of intimidation, were true, the evidence of 105,366 
colored votes having been cast is a denial stronger on 
its face than any personal testimony can be. Admitting, 
for the argument . . . that there may have been threats 
made for the purpose of intimidation yet, if they were 
made, they were entire failures, because the colored 
vote is within 5,000 of a declared census. . . . It is 
larger by thousands than any colored vote hitherto cast 
in this State.165
Jarrell argues that the claims and boasts of intimidation
and fraud were exaggerated by certain elements of the
Democratic party in order to justify their approach toward
the blacks:
The matter [vote count] is significant because the 
divergent policies of Hampton and Gary (and, later 
Tillman) towards the negro were largely justified by 
their contradictory claims as to how the election had 
been won. . . . Gary was to insist that the election was 
won only by intimidation and fraud and that any other 
course with the negro was treason to Straightout Demo­
cracy. 166
Out of all the claims and counter claims a few con­
clusions regarding the results of the election seem pos­
sible. First, no one, not even the staunchist Democratic 
apologists, can deny that cheating and intimidation occurred 
in Edgefield. Second, the evidence seems clear that Hampton 
received at least in excess of eight thousand black votes 
and probably in the range of twelve thousand to fifteen
165South Carolina in 1876. 72.
166Jarrell, 102.
170
thousand. Third, without the fraudulent votes of Edgefield 
and the black votes cast for Hampton, there would have been 
no Hampton victory. Fourth, there is no way of determining 
how many of the black votes cast for Hampton were the result 
of bribery and intimidation and how many of free choice.
Thus the claim of victory was the product of both coercion 
and persuasion.
The key concern for this study is not so much the 
success or failure of the campaign as the appropriateness of 
the approach Hampton took in trying to modify the exigence. 
Martin Gary and his faction of the party saw the exigence as 
nonrhetorical, one that could not be modified by the appli­
cation of rhetoric. They believed the blacks were incapable 
of responding to rational persuasive appeals and therefore 
fashioned a campaign of fraud and intimidation. On the 
other hand, every piece of evidence indicates that Hampton 
did not concur in that view, but rather saw the exigence as 
rhetorical and tried to modify it through persuasive 
appeals. Repeatedly Hampton asserted his commitment to 
persuasion:
The canvass opened . . .  in Anderson, and I there took 
the ground . . . that we would endeavor to call out the 
colored people to listen to us, to show them that their 
interests were our interests, and to tell them that of 
course, they had a right to vote as they pleased, but to 
endeavor, as I used the expression at one time, to 
appeal to them by argument, and to reach their heads 
through their hearts. That was the ground upon which 
the campaign was organized, and most of each speech of
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mine during the canvass was generally addressed to the 
colored people.167
Hampton believed he was nominated because he could appeal to 
the blacks: "The two reasons [for his nomination] were that 
I would bring out all the white vote, and that I would bring 
to my support a large number of colored people with whom my 
relations had always been friendly."168 His speeches were 
completely consistent with his claim. From his acceptance 
speech before the all white Democratic nominating convention 
in Columbia to a practically all black Republican audience 
in Beaufort, from Pickens in the up-state to Charleston in 
the low-country he advocated and employed the use of 
persuasion and denounced all use of violence and intimi­
dation. In the congressional hearings none of the testimony 
linked Hampton to any occasion involving violence or 
intimidation. In the period immediately after the election 
when five thousand Red Shirts descended upon Columbia, he 
counseled peace and confidence in legal measures, and 
dispersed the crowd.169 Gary and his supporters did not 
perceive Hampton as supportive of their tactics. A letter 
to the editor in the Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel accused 
Hampton of ignoring the straightouts when he selected the 
state executive committee and of adopting a "milk and cider,
167Recent Election in South Carolina. 305-6.
168South Carolina in 1876. 991.
169Williams, 418.
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peace and prosperity, conciliation of Radicals and flattery
of negroes policy, instead of the bold and aggressive policy
inaugurated by the straightout leaders.1,170 Furthermore,
according to Haskell, Gary was asked to modify his use of
violent language in his speeches:
It was always heard with great regret, and was directly 
contrary to the spirit of our party and to our whole 
campaign . . . His speeches were not approved in that 
respect. It is a great peculiarity of the man that he 
uses violent language very often, and he was asked to 
modify it.171
Hampton knew of Gary's plan for the campaign, and while he 
did approve a show of strength to impress the blacks, it 
seems clear that he rejected the spirit of Gary's campaign 
of violence, and instead sought a solution through rhetoric.
His appeals were well adapted to his audience and the 
occasion, and many were the same ones he had used in 1865 
and 1867: the economic mutual interests of black and white
and the comparison of the fate of the blacks to that of the 
Indian had been used in 1865; his character, patriotic love 
of the state, and the numerical majority of the blacks were 
all employed in 1867. The appeals still had the same 
problems they had encountered earlier. With the exception 
of his character, he had no present or past examples to 
demonstrate the good faith of the Democrats toward the 
blacks. At times, as in the attack on Chamberlain for
170Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel. 10 January 1877.
171South Carolina in 1876. 833.
failing to appear and the conspiracy by the Republicans to 
create outrages, he tended to adjust the facts to suit his 
argument, but not to an extent that exceeded the propriety 
of most political rhetoric. He was able to speak to large 
numbers of blacks and convinced a substantial number to vote 
the Democratic ticket in the state. On the whole, his, and 
not Gary's, was the appropriate response to the situation.
CHAPTER VI
ADDRESSES AT BLACKVILLE AND GREENVILLE 
AS RESPONSE TO THE BLACK POLITICAL PARTICIPATION EXIGENCE
Exigence
Precisely at noon on April 11, 1877, the personal 
secretaries of Daniel Chamberlain and Wade Hampton met at 
the office of the governor of South Carolina. A few words 
were spoken, keys were passed from one representative to the 
other, and for the first time in eight years the seal of the 
state of South Carolina was again in Democratic hands.1 But 
to insure control of the state, the Democrats also needed 
the legislature. By the end of April, the Democrats had 
increased their majority in the House from six to forty, and 
by the end of the special session in June they had obtained 
a majority in the Senate.2 Consequently, when the regular 
session of the legislature convened in the fall of 1877 the 
Republican party had been thoroughly routed, and Democrats 
were in complete control of state government.
Once the exigence of black domination had been over­
come, at least temporarily, the issue turned to the means 
for maintaining the dominant position. During the campaign




Hampton had pledged that race would not be an issue in his 
administration, but that all men regardless of color would 
be treated equally under the law. The exigence that 
Governor Hampton faced in 1877-78 was a challenge from 
within the Democratic party to abandon his pledges and 
defeat the Republicans at the next election by fraud. His 
speaking on the race issue during his term as governor was 
to reassure the blacks of his policy, remind the whites of 
the good faith of the blacks, and resist that element of the 
party that was attacking his policy.
Shortly after his election, Hampton made it clear that 
he intended to keep his pledges and pursue a moderate course 
toward the blacks. One of his first acts, according to his 
testimony before the House investigating committee, "was to 
publish a card advising that there should be no proscription 
for political opinion in the State." He did this to reduce 
the potential for confrontation between blacks and whites, 
prevent harm to the economy, and above all honor "the 
pledges that I had given through the canvass that we would 
endeavor to bring about a union of the races here, in peace 
and harmony; and I thought it would be a most advisable step 
to take to show that we were not disposed now to look back 
after the election, but to go forward and redeem the pledges 
we had made."3 In his inaugural address, a month later, he 
reaffirmed his commitment and praised the blacks for their
3Recent Election in South Carolina. 331, 333.
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role in helping to elect him. After enumerating the
specific pledges of the campaign he added:
To the faithful observance of these pledges we stand 
committed; and I, as the representative of the Con­
servative party, hold myself bound by every dictate of 
honor and of good faith to use every effort to have 
these pledges redeemed fully and honestly. It is due 
not only to ourselves but to the colored people of the 
State, that wise, just, and liberal measures should 
prevail in our legislation. We owe much of our late 
success to those colored voters who were brave enough 
to rise above the prejudices of race and honest enough 
to throw off the shackles of party, in their deter­
mination to save the State. To those who, misled by 
their fears, their ignorance or by evil counsellors, 
turned a deaf ear to our appeals, we should be not 
vindictive but magnanimous. Let us show to all of them 
that the true interests of both races can but be secured 
by cultivating peace and promoting prosperity among all 
classes of our fellow citizens.4
In April, when Hampton returned from Washington with
the news that federal troops would be withdrawn from the
state, he again announced that he would "know no race, no
party, no man, in the administration of the law." He then
appealed to the blacks to trust his administration, and to
throw all of them out at the next election if they did not
fulfill their promises.5 In his first message to the
legislature he called upon them to improve the system of
free education so as to
place the means of education within the reach of all 
classes in the State. . . . We are bound alike by every 
consideration of true statesmanship and of good faith, 
to keep up in the State such a system of free schools as 
will place within the reach of every child— the poorest 
as well as the richest, black as well as white— the
4Charleston News and Courier. 14 December 1876.
5Ibid., 7 April 1877.
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means of acquiring an honest and honorable education.6
Historians of the period generally agree that Hampton
was sincere in his pronouncements and made every effort to
fulfill both their spirit and letter. George Tindall
documents at least eighty-six black Hampton appointees among
which were trial justices, jury commissioners, and at least
one commissioner on a county election board.7 Tindall cites
specific instances of Hampton's appointments of blacks as
well as testimonials from prominent black leaders of their
pleasure at his performance.8 Holt concurs with Tindall on
Hampton's appointments but faults them for being to minor
offices. Cooper cites additional testimony from black and
white Republicans supporting Hampton's racial policies and
concludes, "most observers— contemporary and subsequent—
have found Hampton sincere in his concern for the Negro."9
Jarrell in his detailed study of Hampton's racial position
contends that
the dominant theme of the two years of his adminis­
tration . . .  is his struggle to end discord in the 
state— between parties, between the two races, and 
between the North and South— and to redeem his pledges
6Wade Hampton, Message No. 1 of His Excellency Wade 
Hampton, Governor of South Carolina (Columbia: State of 
South Carolina, Executive Department, 1877), 7.
7George Brown Tindall, South Carolina Negroes, 1877- 
1900 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1952), 
22.
8Ibid., 23-26.
9Holt, 211; Cooper, Jr., 93.
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in a political atmosphere that made such redemption 
extremely difficult, if not impossible.10
This difficulty in redeeming his pledges came in large
part in the form of Martin Gary of Edgefield and his coterie
of followers. In Jarrell's words,
from the first, he [Gary] had seen the political problem 
of the state as one, not of parties, but of races. He 
had viewed with utmost scorn all preceding efforts at 
conciliation or fusion, and he did not shrink from any 
degree of violence necessary to eliminate the negro 
majority from the political life of the state.11
An early objection to the racial policies of the governor
was Gary's opposition to an annual two mills property tax
for schools. The primary problem for Gary was that whites
would be taxed to provide schools for blacks. "Nine-tenths
of this tax would be paid by white people and three-fourths
of it would be spent in educating pickaninnies. . . . He was
unalterably opposed to taxing whites to supply the teachers
for blacks."12 Hampton1s views prevailed so that during his
administration funding for education increased from $189,000
to $316,000 with blacks receiving about $20,000 more than
the whites but the per capita amounts being essentially
equal.13
At the Edgefield County Democratic convention in June 






that the issue in South Carolina was race, not politics.14
Later in August, Gary was scheduled to review the militia
and deliver an address in Greenville. The speech was
designed to be a strong straightout speech, but when Gary
saw blacks marching with whites, he was incensed and turned
the speech into one of his strongest attacks on Hampton5s
racial policies.15 Captain J. W. Gray, the white commander
of the militia, was so antagonized by the remarks that he
issued a response:
The true expression of the feelings of the State volun­
teer troops— and I take it, of the Democracy of the 
State— toward the colored race is to be found in an 
invitation extended by myself as commander of the 
Fourteenth Brigade, after consultation with other 
officers, inviting the Mountain City Guards, a colored 
company belonging to the National Guard, to parade and 
be reviewed in line with my brigade. This is the first 
instance where colored troops have ever marched in line 
with the white citizen soldiery of South Carolina. The 
event is a moral result of the "Hampton Democracy," and 
who does not say "Hurrah for Hampton!"16
Gary responded the next day:
I do not suppose that anyone will dispute, or care to 
share with General Gray the honor of having brought 
about by his invitation "the first instance where 
colored troops have marched in line with white citizen 
soldiery of South Carolina." He claims that the event 
is a natural result of "Hampton Democracy." I suppose 
that we will next hear of "dining" or dancing with the 
colored brothers and sisters as . . . the natural result 
of "Hampton Democracy."17
14Charleston News and Courier. 4 June; 15 August 1878.
15Ibid., 22 August 1878; Sheppard, 263-64.
16Charleston News and Courier. 26 August 1878.
17Ibid., 29 August 1878.
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His reference to "dining" was more than a careless exagger­
ation. When Hampton and Superintendent of Education Hugh 
Thompson visited the president of Claflin University, a 
black school, they found themselves obliged to eat with two 
black dinner guests. Gary knew of the incident and wanted 
to use it against Hampton, going so far as to include it in 
an article attacking him for his pro-black sentiments.
Upon the advice of a trusted political advisor, however,
Gary did not publish the article.18 In a letter to Gary, 
Ellis Graydon, a political colleague, observed that he had 
been "blowing the nigger dining on Hampton, and it meets 
with universal condemnation.1,19
In Edgefield County Gary led the successful movement 
to prevent the participation of any blacks in the Democratic 
primary.20 At the state convention Gary was instrumental in 
adding to the platform a resolution to "repudiate all fusion 
or coalition with the Republican Party."21 It was not 
enough for Gary to have the state under the control of the 
Democrats; he wanted the blacks eliminated from politics.
The proper pattern for achieving his objective was Edgefield 
which not only had no blacks voting in the Democratic
18Cooper, Jr., 91.
19Ellis Graydon to Martin Gary, 19 August 1878, Martin 
Gary Papers.
20Charleston News and Courier. 4 June; 25 September
1878.
21Ibid., 2 August 1878; Sheppard, 258.
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primary but had no delegation attending the Republican
convention.22 This sentiment was expressly stated in the
Augusta Chronicle and Constitutionalist;
Republican and race majorities can be overcome every­
where as they were overcome two years ago in Edgefield, 
Abbeville, Aiken, and Barnwell. But the fight must be 
made as it was made in those counties. The straightout 
policy must be adopted, and a bold and aggressive 
campaign inaugurated. If this is done, the Republican 
vote in the present Legislature can be wholly eliminated 
from the next General Assembly.23
M. C. Butler thought it preposterous that anyone would even
consider fusion with the Republicans. "I cannot think that
Hampton or any other sane man would advise a fusion with the
Radical party now that we have control of the state. Did
they give us representation when they were in power?"24
Gary's position was so strongly contrary to Hampton1s 
that the governor refused to speak from the same platform 
with him. Gary volunteered his services for the campaign to 
the executive committee and specifically asked to be used in 
the low-country; Gary, however, was assigned to speak only 
at Aiken. In an interview with a reporter from the Columbia 
Register the chairman of the executive committee said, "It 
was not deemed politic . . . to send him . . . to the 
'eastern and southern counties.'" Additionally, he
22Charleston News and Courier. 22 July 1878; Columbia 
Daily Register. 8 August 1878.
23Augusta Chronicle and Constitutiona1ist in Columbia 
Daily Register. 18 April 1878.
24M. C. Butler to Martin Gary, 3 April 1878, Martin 
Gary Papers.
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explained Hampton's refusal to speak on the same platform
with Gary: "Governor Hampton was dissatisfied with his
[Gary's] speech at Greenville, and also at his sneer of what
he termed the 'Hampton Democracy,' and that under the
circumstances, it would be unpleasant for him to speak at
the same time, with one who differed with him so widely upon
the issues of the day."25 Even Gary's friends thought he
was going too far in some of his statements, and urged him
to tone them down:
I think I would not come down too heavy on the race 
issue. . . .  I think the old Bald Eagle had better tone 
down his speeches just a little— or rather I should say 
omit some parts which too roughly proclaim the inferi­
ority of the negro."26
For Hampton the exigence was clear. His policies and
his pledges toward the blacks were under attack by the Gary
faction of the party. At times the attack was frontal as in
Gary's opposition to the education tax, the Edgefield
resolution, and his remarks at Greenville, but Gary's
strategy included oblique assaults as well:
General Butler's speech at Center Spring, killed their 
movement and the resolution of Buist [at the Democratic 
Convention] made it impossible for them to go before the 
people. We stopped them there, they now can't make 
fusion speeches, and they stultify themselves if they 
make straight out speeches.27
25Columbia Daily Register. 22 October 1878.
26J. H. Hudson to Martin Gary, 7 September 1878, Martin 
Gary Papers.
27Martin Gary to Hugh Farley, 25 August 1878, Martin 
Gary Papers.
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In other correspondence with political confidant Hugh Farley 
he outlined the plan of praising Hampton but attacking other 
members of his administration. "I made a speech on the 17th 
in which I came out for Hampton for Governor, but at the 
same time have given my reasons for differing with him. I 
have thrown the responsibility of his mistakes upon the
v
lawyers of his administration.1,28 The attack would also be
made under cover of correspondents:
The policy to be pursued is not to make a personal fight 
against the present state ticket, except under cover of 
correspondents. Henry said he would write you a letter 
criticising them. In your editorial I would take the 
broad ground of a fair and impartial division of the 
offices amongst the Democracy of the State.29
Gary seemed convinced that if he could change Hampton1s
advisors he could significantly alter the direction of his
policies. "If we do not surround Hampton with good advisors
we are gone. The present state officers have not got spirit
enough to oppose Hampton when they know he is wrong.1,30
Thus the battle lines were clearly drawn. Through public
opinion, convention maneuvering, and purging of his
advisors, Gary sought to diminish the influence of Hampton
and to alter his policy of moderation toward the blacks.
Audience
Though Hampton's audience in 1878 was composed of many
28Ibid., 20 April 1878, Martin Gary Papers.
29Ibid., 20 May 1878.
30Ibid., 8 April 1878.
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of the same people he had addressed a year and a half 
earlier, there was a totally different attitudinal fraL.^- 
work. The whites who had in their perception been fighting 
for their existence had won and were in total control of the 
machinery of state government. On the other hand the blacks 
had had a year to test the promises and experience life 
under the "new" Democratic party.
Among the blacks there existed two predominant atti­
tudes, which were not mutually exclusive: (1) demorali­
zation and (2) satisfaction with the policies of Hampton. 
Holt concludes that blacks and radical leaders were demoral­
ized by the defeat in 1876: "The apathy, fear, and defeat­
ism engendered by that campaign and President Hayes's 
betrayal were still pervasive in the Republican Party."31 
County organizations were without leadership, and in 
Colleton County, William Driffle, a former Republican 
representative and "one of the early organizers among 
Republicans in Colleton, declared that the party had died in 
1876 and he was there to help bury it."32 At the state 
convention in August, the Republicans did not nominate a 
ticket for state offices, but concentrated on county offices 
and the legislature.33
Not only did the Republican state convention not put
31Holt, 213.
32Ibid., 215.
33Columbia Daily Register. 9 August 1878.
up any opposition to the state offices, but also it only 
narrowly defeated a resolution endorsing Governor Hampton.34 
This attempted endorsement was not atypical of the general 
response of blacks and even white Republicans toward 
Hampton. In April of 1878, E. P. Clark, managing editor of 
the Springfield (Massachusetts) Republican, visited the 
state and wrote a lengthy appraisal of conditions in South 
Carolina after one year of the Hampton administration. The 
writer claimed to have spoken with white and black, Repub­
lican and Democrat, up-country and low-country citizens in 
his effort to discern attitudes. He concluded: "The
concurrent testimony of all these Republicans, white and 
black, is the most sweeping commendation of Governor 
Hampton's course and the most implicit confidence in the 
man." He then quoted Dr. Benjamin Boseman, the black 
postmaster of Charleston "'as expressing absolute confidence 
in Governor Hampton and entire satisfaction with his course. 
We have no complaint whatever to make. He has kept all his 
pledges.'" The postmaster of Columbia, also a black, 
expressed similar sentiments.35 In an interview in the 
Washington Post Republican ex-Governor R. K. Scott offered 
his endorsement of the Hampton government and gave his 
opinion that the blacks were "satisfied with their treatment 
under Hampton. I am quite sure they would rally to his
34Columbia Daily Register. 8 August 1878.
35Ibid., 19 April 1878.
186
support and elect him over any man whom the Republicans
might nominate."36 In Barnwell County a mass meeting of
blacks at Great Cypress Township unanimously adopted
resolutions praising Hampton's administration and calling
upon other blacks throughout the state to do likewise.37
While there was no doubt some dissatisfaction among blacks
with the Hampton regime, the preponderance of evidence
clearly indicates a generally positive attitude toward the
governor. Even J. J. Wright, a black justice of the state
Supreme Court whom the Democratic legislature had forced to
resign, came out in support of Hampton:
He has kept every pledge he has made, and on the seventh 
of next November he will be reelected Governor almost 
unanimously. He will get nine-tenths of the colored 
vote. I speak advisedly on that point. There is not a 
decent negro in the state will vote against him.38
In analyzing the attitudes of the white audience of 
1877-1878, it must be remembered that Hampton and Gary 
represented opposite poles of the political spectrum within 
the Democratic party. J. H. Hudson in his letter to Gary 
suggesting that he tone down his racial language warned Gary 
that his position was "a little in advance of the Straight- 
outers, and far [emphasis his] in advance of the fusionist
36Washinaton Post in Columbia Daily Register. 9 May
1878.
37Columbia Daily Register. 7 September 1878.
3Philadelphia Times in Columbia Daily Register. 21
August 1878; and Tindall, 17, 18.
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and policy men.”39 In his testimony before the Senate 
investigating committee, Hampton admitted that when he 
advocated a qualified suffrage for the blacks in 1868 he was 
in advance of the rest of the whites and that "it did not 
meet with general concurrence throughout the state."40 The 
question then is where along that continuum was Hampton1s 
audience.
E. P. Clark in his evaluation of the political milieu
was keenly aware of the division within the Democratic
party, and sought to determine the sympathies of most of the
whites. Clark indicated he had "investigated this point
with considerable care" by asking "a good number of people"
whether Democrats would support any other man in carrying
out the policies promoted by Hampton. Some believed "not
one in ten," but a consensus felt it was something less than
a majority. The writer concluded:
The policy which he has carried out the past year is not 
the policy of the old Democratic party of South 
Carolina; it is not the policy which those old leaders 
meant to enforce when they got control of the State. 
Popular enthusiasm for the man has finally suppressed 
all open opposition to his course, but there is a large 
element of the party which at least does not like 
Hampton's liberal course.41
A good example of this dichotomy between loyalty to the man
and support for his policies came in Hampton's initial test
39J. H. Hudson to Martin Gary, 7 September 1878, Martin 
Gary Papers.
40South Carolina in 1876. 991.
41Columbia Daily Register. 19 April 1878.
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in the legislature. One of the first jobs of the legis­
lature after Chamberlain had departed was to fill the office 
of chief justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court since 
the former chief justice had died in early April. Hampton1s 
choice for the post was Associate Justice A. J. Willard, a 
carpetbagger from New York who had decided for Hampton in 
the 1876 election dispute. A substantial portion of the 
legislature supported Samuel McGowan, a native white from 
Abbeville. The political battle was fought on May 14 in a 
Democratic party caucus that lasted from 8:00 p.m. until 
3:00 a.m. at which time Willard finally received the last 
vote needed to give him a majority. Afterward, according to 
Sheppard, those who voted for Willard claimed, "'Hampton did 
it. The Governor told us to do it. We wanted to vote 
right; but we couldn't help it when the governor said 
otherwise. 11,42
At the Democratic convention in Fairfield County 
general resolutions were offered supporting the governor and 
his administration; before voting, though, Thomas W.
Woodward wanted to explain his vote. He began by announcing 
his shock and consternation at Hampton's support for 
Willard, appointment of R. H. Gleaves, and support for the 
seating of the Mackey House and Prince Martin in particular. 
He concluded:
But, sir, despite all this, and more than can be
42Sheppard, 198-214.
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alleged, I favor and love this man. I know, personally, 
that he possesses those magnetic attributes of head and 
heart which will endear him to this people, and which 
will keep the honor of the old Palmetto State and the 
welfare of its citizens uppermost in his mind. Having 
said this much, which consistency required that I should 
say, I shall vote for the resolutions, and shall stand 
prepared to go forth at any moment in the new campaign, 
as of old, in obedience to orders from headquarters.43
Martin R. Delany, a black trial justice in Charleston,
remarked upon losing his job, 181 lost as soon as they got
rid of him [Hampton] by sending him to the U.S. Senate, as
he was too liberal for the rank and file of the party
leaders.8,44 George Tindall concludes that Hampton8 s
policies were "opposed by the majority of the whites and
upheld only by the immense prestige of Hampton.8,45
On the other hand, as Cooper points out, Gary was 
never able to muster widespread support for his position.
He lost every legislative fight to Hampton.46 He wanted the 
United States Senate seat that was available when the 
Democrats took power, but because of Hampton8 s influence it 
went to M. C. Butler. His speeches and private correspon­
dence reveal four main objectives for the election in 1878: 
(1) keep blacks out of the Democratic party and out of 
office, (2) convince the Democrats of the need to keep 
Hampton in the governor8s office for the next two years, (3)
43Columbia Daily Register. 5 April 1878.




change the personnel surrounding the governor, and (4) get 
himself elected to the United States Senate.
His first obj ective was made clear by his statements 
and actions at the Edgefield convention.47 The barring of 
blacks from any participation was the pattern to be adopted 
in all the counties. The press and the county organiza­
tions, however, were generally not sympathetic. The 
Charleston News and Courier denounced the resolutions and 
later excoriated Gary for his "intolerance” and "abuse of 
the colored people."4s The Columbia Register welcomed black 
voters to the ranks of the Democracy and rejected extreme 
men who were trying to drive them away.49 In the county 
conventions resolutions were adopted encouraging black 
participation in the party.50 In Sumter a committee was 
formed to solicit black participation, and in Orangeburg it 
was determined that a proportional division of offices 
should be made with the blacks.51 Thus, outside of Edge­
field, Gary's attempt to totally proscribe the black from 
political participation failed.
For Gary to have a chance at the United States Senate
47Charleston News and Courier. 4 June 1878.
48Ibid., 4 June; 25 September 1878.
49Columbia Daily Register. 6 September 1878.
50Charleston News and Courier. 7, 10, 13 June; 12 
August 1878.
51Ibid., 7 June; 12 August 1878.
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seat in 1878, he had to keep Hampton from getting it. In a 
letter to his close ally Hugh Farley he revealed his 
strategy: "I wish you to show that he is the only man that
can keep the blacks and whites harmonious for the next two 
years."52 A series of letters to the Columbia Daily 
Register signed Cato argued strongly the point urged by 
Gary.53 Again, Gary was unsuccessful.
In his letters to Hugh Farley in April and May 1878, 
Gary made clear the need to change the state ticket and 
surround Hampton with better advisers.54 Yet at the state 
convention the entire ticket was unanimously renominated.55
In his guest for the Senate, Gary received encouraging 
news from friends throughout the state. Ellis Graydon 
wrote, "I am glad to see that your stock is rising con­
siderably in this county. They pick you against Hampton.
. . . You can beat any man in the state for the U. S. Senate 
if left to the vote of Abbeville.1,56 But on December 10, 
1878, Gary himself, along with 150 others, Democrats and 
Republicans, cast his vote to send Hampton to the United
52Martin Gary to Hugh Farley, 25 August 1878, Martin 
Gary Papers.
53Columbia Daily Register. 21, 23, 28, 30 November; 10 
December 1878.
54Martin Gary to Hugh Farley, 6, 20 April; 20 May 1878, 
Martin Gary Papers.
55Charleston News and Courier. 2 August 1878.
56Ellis Graydon to Martin Gary, 19 August 1878, Martin 
Gary Papers.
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States Senate. Gary's name was not even placed in 
nomination.57
The best conclusion on the attitudes of the whites is 
offered by Cooper: "Most white South Carolinians were not
so sincere as Hampton in their determination to accord the 
negro equal treatment with the white; but, on the other 
hand, most did not accept the harsh, bitter attitude of 
Martin Gary."58 Hampton's audience, then, was clearly in 
the center between the two extremes and open to persuasion.
Constraints
Since many of the same arguments from 1876 reappear in 
1878 there is not great merit in repeating the analysis.
The best way to gauge his response to the 1878 exigence is 
to look closely at two speeches that were delivered shortly 
after there were direct challenges to his racial policy. In 
June, Edgefield County barred blacks from participating in 
the Democratic primary and passed resolutions that the real 
issue in the state was race and not party.59 Apparently 
there was some sentiment in Barnwell County to follow 
Edgefield's lead.60 Thus, at Blackville in Barnwell County
57For a detailed account of Gary's Senate attempt see 
Cooper, Jr., 53-59; Sheppard, 268-78, gives a detailed but 
biased view of events surrounding the senatorial elections.
58Cooper, Jr., 93-94.
59Charleston News and Courier. 4 June 1878.
60New York Herald in Columbia Daily Register. 11 July
1878.
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at a fourth of July reunion of Hart's Battery, Hampton 
delivered a forceful denunciation of the Edgefield policy. 
James Conner was the main speaker, and Hampton was not on 
the program, but at the conclusion of Conner's address the 
crowd called for Hampton and he took the opportunity.
Because of the nature of the occasion the speech was short, 
but the substance was wholly devoted to the pressing 
exigence.
The other speech that represents a direct response to
an immediate, frontal attack occurred in Greenville. Here
as described earlier, Gary made a speech directly attacking
the governor1s policy toward the blacks.61 In a letter to
James Conner, Hampton indicated his intention to use his
forthcoming speech at Greenville as a direct reply to Gary.
He explained to Conner why he did not directly attack Gary
and the Edgefield resolutions in an earlier speech at
Edgefield, and then continued:
Gary had then given me no ostensible ground to attack 
him, but he has done so since in his card replying to 
Gray of Greenville. The people of this county have 
asked me to go and do away with the harm he wrought by 
his foolish speech, and I shall then pay my respects to 
him. I do not intend to enter in a controversy with 
him, but I shall denounce his allusion to the results of 
Hampton democracy as a piece of impertinence. I am 
tired of his pretended support and his covert inso­
lence. 62
61See p. 179 above.
62Wade Hampton to James Conner, 5 September 1878, Wade 
Hampton Papers.
194
The Greenville speech provides an excellent opportunity to 
analyze his direct response to Gary.
Blackville Address
Motive Appeals
The predominant tone of the speech was moralistic.
The theme was boldly declared three fourths of the way 
through when he asked rhetorically, "Is it not better to 
fail in doing right than to succeed by doing wrong?"63 In a 
clear two-valued orientation his policies were on the side 
of right and those of Martin Gary, though he did not name 
him, were aligned with evil.
On the side opposed to Hampton were "demagogues," "men 
who subordinate everything to office, to wealth, to place 
and to power." They were "extreme men" and men who made 
promises with no intention of keeping them. They were the 
promoters of fraud as the avenue of victory. On this side 
were those who did "wrong," served "mammon," and who would 
have as their fruits of victory only a "worthless bauble."
Hampton's side, however, was the side of "duty," 
"honor," "right," and "God." With him were men of character 
who "would cut off their right arms before they would 
violate their pledges," and "would die before they would 
perjure themselves by placing men wrongfully in office."
63Columbia Daily Register. 7 July 1878. All further 
references to the Blackville speech in this section are from 
this source.
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The fruits of his policy would produce benefits to be 
"enjoyed by our children and children's children for 
generations to come."
He further appealed to their own self respect. If 
they countenanced fraud as he had heard some men advocating, 
then "before many years pass over your heads you will not be 
worth saving, and will not be worthy of the state you live 
in." If after going to the blacks and securing their help 
for the victory of 1876, they said, "'Now we have no use for 
you. You shall not vote even at the primary election.' If 
this be the policy of South Carolina, then am I sadly 
mistaken in the people of South Carolina." Thus, to engage 
in fraud was degrading, and to break their promises indi­
cated a lack of character.
While the perfect dichotomy between good and evil was 
a bit overstated, his casting the issues in moral terms 
seems perfectly appropriate. To exclude blacks from any 
voice in the Democratic party as had been done in Edgefield 
was a complete abrogation of the commitments Hampton and 
most of the party had made in 1876. To willfully violate 
explicit pledges made to the blacks and to practice fraud, 
since with the control of the election machinery they were 
in a position to do so, were clear moral issues, and Hampton 
approached them as such.
Personal Appeals
The general high esteem in which Hampton was held by
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audiences throughout the state has already been established, 
and will not be repeated here. What is noteworthy is how he
employed that esteem in his argument at Blackville.
The key strategy of the argument was to impress upon 
the audience that he and his policy toward the blacks were 
one. The participation of blacks in the political process 
was not a peripheral matter that could be discussed, 
bartered, or altered, but was an integral part of his own 
commitment to certain values. In other words, if they 
wanted him they also had to accept his racial policies.
After describing the approach of appealing to the blacks and 
then excluding them, he flatly declared, "I can carry out no 
such policy." He reviewed his canvass and the commitment he 
had made to black and white from the mountains to the coast
and then put himself among those who "would cut off their
right arms before they would violate their pledges." He 
warned them that "I can only assist you by standing upon 
that platform of '76." Finally, for the fourth time in the 
short speech he stated his unavailability if they changed 
the platform:
If you are to go back upon all pledges that I have made 
to the people-— if you are to say that the colored men 
that have sustained us are no longer to be citizens of 
South Carolina . . . then, my friends, much as I would 
do for you and for South Carolina, earnestly as I would 
desire to spend or be spent in her service, willing as I 
am to give even my life for my State, I should have to 
decline. I would give my life for South Carolina, but I 
cannot sacrifice my honor, not even for her.
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In the challenge to his policies he saw his own character at 
stake.
During the 1876 campaign the key element of ethos 
which he had stressed had been trustworthiness. Now it was 
this element that was threatened. Thus in one sense he was 
appealing to them not to damage his ethos by destroying his 
trustworthiness and was relying on their great respect for 
his character to achieve his objective.
Logical Appeals
The speech was typically Hampton. There was an 
absence of evidence, little detail, and no closely reasoned 
arguments. In addition to his proclivity for such develop­
ment, the moralistic tone encouraged the broad lines of 
analysis. Large portions of his arguments were already in 
the heads of his listeners. His basic premise was that it 
was wrong for the Democratic party to proscribe the partici­
pation of blacks. He developed the argument in a two fold 
manner: (1) it was wrong in principle? and (2) it was wrong
pragmatically.
The argument from principle was simple and straight­
forward. Some whites believed that any means that elimi­
nated the threat of black political domination was legiti­
mate. Here, Hampton flatly contradicted that idea. He 
tried to separate the action from its object and to force a 
moral judgment on the intrinsic merits of the behavior. To 
pledge one's word and then deliberately break it and to
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engage in fraud were morally wrong and should be avoided
regardless of the goal. The argument was conclusionary in
nature and assumed that the audience shared his values.
In addition to being wrong in principle, the behavior
would prove counter productive:
If you listen to those men, then I say you may as well 
at once relinquish the fight, for South Carolina will 
soon pass again under the rule and to the ruin from 
which she has just emerged, and in the great Presi­
dential contest of 1880 we shall not only lose our own 
election but we, the people of South Carolina, will be 
the cause of breaking down the national Democracy.
The argument was causal but the links were missing. In no
way did he attempt to show how excluding blacks from the
Democratic party would put them back under radical rule and
cause the loss of the national election in 1880. The link
in Hampton’s mind might have been the power of the blacks to
regroup and vote out the Democrats, much as he had advised
them to do if the Democrats did not treat them fairly.
He also applied the counter productive analysis to the
use of fraud. First, it would not produce the desired
result because the chosen sons of South Carolina form 
the returning board now. The men that you have placed 
there as representing the truth and honor of South 
Carolina would die before they would perjure themselves 
by placing men wrongfully in office.
Here at least he provided the causal link, but it was simply
an assertion that had to find its validity in the audience's
willingness to accept his generalization at face value, and
in their own knowledge of the character of the men to whom
he was referring. His statement did not prove to be very
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accurate since Jarrell argues that probably more fraud 
occurred in 1878 than in 1876, and Hampton, himself, 
conceded afterwards that there had no doubt been a good deal 
of fraud in the election.64 In addition to not producing 
the desired result, fraud would also degrade them and make 
them unworthy individuals.
His most extensive causal argument was the claim that
they could be successful in 1878 by appealing to the blacks
to join with them. He supported the link by looking at what
had happened in Barnwell County in 1876:
You carried your election by an overwhelming maj ority 
because you came before the people, white and black, 
recognizing the right of every citizen and saying, "you 
shall all be equal under the law." You went to the 
colored people and told them that their rights would be 
protected. . . . You appealed to them to come and help 
you work out the redemption of the State. They came by 
hundreds and did help you.
Through experience they had seen the one policy work in the
past and, therefore, should continue its use in the future.
But, what policy had actually been used in 1876 to secure a
majority for Hampton? Since Barnwell was one of the three
counties whose returns were contested in 1876,65 there is at
least a basis for solid suspicion that Hampton was overly
idealistic in describing the approach they had used. To the
extent the majority vote had been obtained by fraud and
intimidation his argument lost impact.
64Jarrell, 149; Charleston News and Courier, 20 January
1879.
65Simkins and Woody, 517.
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His final causal argument was direct and simple. If 
they altered the platform of 1876 to in any way proscribe 
the black, then he would not be a candidate in 1878. The 
link as developed above was that his personal integrity was 
involved, and it was more important than the state. The 
position was repeatedly stated, and there was no reason for 
the audience to believe he was anything less than sincere.
Hampton correctly perceived the issue of racial pro­
scription as having strong moral dimensions and correctly 
took the high ground. His appeals to his audience's moral 
integrity and to his own character were the strongest of the 
address, with those based upon his ethos having the greatest 
potential for impact. His pragmatic causal arguments were 
not particularly convincing, since the critical link between 
the act and its consequences was frequently unsupported or 
open to other interpretations.
Greenville Address
In the introduction to his report on Hampton's Green­
ville address, the correspondent for the Charleston News and 
Courier remarked that the speech "was the most impressive I 
have ever heard him deliver."66 His assessment was a good 
one. It was not the speech of a politician plying his 
skills to get himself and his party reelected, but rather
66Charleston News and Courier. 20 September 1878. All 
further references to the Greenville speech in this section 
are from this source.
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that of a statesman seeking an enduring solution to a 
profound and perplexing problem. The speech was not so much 
an attempt to persuade his audience as it was a setting 
forth of his position on the right policy to pursue toward 
the blacks.
Personal Appeals
There was little conscious attempt to build ethos, and
yet the entire speech revolved around the character of the
man. He assumed, correctly, that he had their respect and
set out to show them the path that should be taken by the
man of character.
In the introductory portion he reflected on the
campaign of 1876 and used it as an opportunity to remind
them of his good judgment. He described going to the
mountains after his nomination to ponder the plan for the
campaign, and then starting the canvass in the Piedmont and
moving to the coast:
It was no accident that arranged that part of my 
programme. Communing alone with nature in those grand 
solitudes I had considered what would be the plan of 
operation, and I determined to go first to the men of 
the mountain. . . .  I knew that the fires of patriotism 
kindled here would be reflected throughout the State, 
and I was right.
While he complimented the men of the up-country for their
patriotic zeal, he also demonstrated the correctness of his
judgment. While not vital to the speech's outcome, he was
going to be pronouncing a judgment on right and wrong
policies and it didn't hurt to plant at the beginning a
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reminder of his past good judgment.
In his conclusion he drew attention to the quality of
his judgment. It was not for personal or party gain or for
any monetary advantage:
I am not now— God forbid that I should be— advocating a 
policy simply for momentary triumph or personal 
qualification. No, I have been looking far beyond that 
present day— for it has seemed to me that I have been 
able sometimes to catch transient glimpses of the future 
through the veil that hides it from us— and I have 
thought that in that far future, in the day when you and 
I and all of us shall have been gathered to our God, I 
could see a great and happy State and people.
His policies thus represented the judgment of a man of
vision and altruism. He further strengthened his altruistic
motives when he said, "It would be the highest reward that
could come to me if in the hearts of those descendants of
ours yet unborn they could say that I worked for South
Carolina."
He developed his character attributes when he showed 
himself as a man who would not move on a matter of prin­
ciple. He and the Democratic party had given pledges in 
1876 and reaffirmed them at the 1878 convention, and he was 
unalterably opposed to any deviation from them. The state­
ment almost had the ring of a Martin Luther's "Here I stand, 
I can do no other." Hampton wanted there to be
no misunderstanding of the position of your standard- 
bearers in the fight. I intend that there shall be no 
mi sunderstanding of mine, for I propose to stand where 
the Democratic party placed me in 1876. . . .  I cannot 
deviate from that policy. I believed it was the true 
one then, and I know that it is now.
Finally, he defended his character from the personal
attack of Martin Gary. Gary had earlier referred to "the 
Hampton Democracy" and its attitude toward blacks. Hamp­
ton's response was twofold. He deprecated the linking of 
his name to a form of democracy: "I have never assumed to 
myself the honor of founding or attempting to found a school 
of Democracy." He was but a follower of Jefferson and other 
founding fathers and "content to follow where they have led, 
without indulging for a moment in the presumption of trying 
to engraft one article of faith on the creed promulgated by 
the fathers." He also denounced any insinuation "that the 
proud banner of our party has been lowered in my hands," and 
labeled as "unfounded" and "impertinent" any attempt "to 
reflect upon myself personally or officially." In essence 
Hampton put down the attack without ever answering the 
specifics. It was his character against the charges of 
Gary, and there was no contest. With the recent Claflin 
University incident fresh in his mind, it was wise to 
dismiss rather than dignify Gary's claims.
Motive Appeals
His motive appeals were similar to those at Black­
ville, but not as well developed. He undergirded his 
position with two basic values: (1) that which was morally
right and honorable; and (2) a deep patriotism that desired 
what was best for South Carolina and her citizens for 
generations to come.
His direct appeal to discard policies that were
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intrinsically wrong was short, succinct, and forceful:
In the name of our civilization and of all that has been 
honorable in South Carolina, in the name of our State 
and of our God, I protest against any resort to 
violence, or wrong, or any adoption of the "shot-gun 
policy!" We cannot do evil that good may come of it.
The last statement was very close to what he had said at 
Blackville, "Is it not better to fail in doing right than to 
succeed by doing wrong." In both instances he rejected the 
casuistry of the end justifying the means and appealed to 
higher values.
His patriotic appeal was not a trite, maudlin attempt 
to cover over bad policy by having the band play Dixie and 
recalling the glory of the Confederacy. In fact the remark­
able aspect of the appeal was that it asked his audience to 
look forward and not back, and to consider the long term 
consequences of policies on the quality of their society.
"We must be united and move together," he urged, "for on 
that depends now the very life of the State, not the mere 
supremacy of one or another party for an hour. Your 
children for generations to come will be influenced by your 
action." He then described his vision of the future:
I have thought that in that far future . . .  I could see 
a great and happy State and people. Our children's 
children . . . shall build up a new and great country. 
They will lift up South Carolina and place her where God 
intended her to stand— with a united, free and happy 
people, walking on the great road to national prosperity 
and peace. I have seen that future, and I have worked 
for it; I have prayed for it.
His vision was the broad vision that went beyond party
ascendancy and state domination to national prosperity. His
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view encompassed harmony and reconciliation both within the 
state and throughout the country. From the perspective of 
Richard Weaver's noble rhetorician, he was trying to lift 
his audience to a better and higher vision of themselves.
Logical Appeals
The primary emphasis of the speech was the development 
of four major arguments: (1) he established the commitment
of the party to the platform and principles of 1876; (2) he 
refuted Martin Gary's position; (3) he set forth a cons­
tructive approach for dealing with the racial problem; and 
(4) he warned his audience of dangers that threatened the 
party.
Hampton supported his generalization that the South 
Carolina Democratic party was committed to the principles of 
the 1876 election by offering five examples of actions by 
the 1878 convention. The convention had endorsed the same 
men for state office in 1878 as had run in 1876. The only 
exception was James Conner, who resigned in order to return 
to his private practice. To send forth the same ticket a 
second time constituted, in Hampton's view, a clear mandate 
for his policies. The convention had adopted the same 
platform from 1876, which he saw as broad, liberal, and 
capable of being supported by both races. Third, the 
convention had "reiterated unanimously the principles which 
gave life, and strength, and victory to that struggle." 
Fourth, the convention had appealed to all citizens of the
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state for their support, which would include the blacks. 
Finally, the convention "when it placed its candidates in 
the field, told them to go forth and declare to the people 
that the great party which had won success in the last 
canvass intended faithfully, honestly and truly to keep all 
those pledges of the past, and not forget in the future the 
promises made when defeat was overshadowing us."
He further strengthened his argument of commitment by 
looking at the national party. "The Democratic Party of the 
United States countenances no proscription on account of 
birth, race, or color." Furthermore, the national conven­
tion had "declared its acceptance in perfect good faith of 
the recent amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States." The state convention had not ignored or simply 
acquiesced in the decision, but had "accepted, ratified and 
endorsed in most emphatic terms the action of the national 
party." Because of the actions of both state and national 
organizations, Hampton concluded, "we are thus doubly 
pledged to carry out in good faith the policy to which the 
great Democratic party of the country is unalterably and 
solemnly committed."
Hampton offered no proof or documentation for the 
actions of the convention, but relied on his audience's 
knowledge for that support. He also carefully indicated 
that the commitment was not just to the principles of 1876 
but to his interpretation of those principles. It was a
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commitment to a broad, liberal policy of appealing to blacks 
and practicing no proscription. It was a strong argument 
with very clear support from the record.
His refutation of Gary consisted of two parts, an 
extensive response to Gary's "shot-gun policy" and a brief 
retort to his remarks about a "Hampton Democracy." In 
refuting Gary's policy, Hampton employed three lines of 
analysis: (1) Gary's views were not consistent with the
Democratic Party; (2) Gary's policy did not produce success 
in 1876; and (3) Gary's policy was not the Mississippi plan. 
After extensively developing the position to which the party 
was committed, he entered his "emphatic dissent to the views 
expressed by Gen. Gary at the recent meeting here and in his 
card in reply to Gen. Gray." Those views, he contended, 
were "inconsistent with the true policy of the Democratic 
party." He supported the charge of inconsistency by showing 
that Gary's views did "not represent the opinion of your 
standardbearer, nor of the Democratic party of South 
Carolina, and that he was not authorized to speak for your 
nominee." Thus Hampton succeeded in divorcing Gary's views 
from the Democratic party. There was clear inconsistency 
between the position of the party as developed by Hampton 
and the position of Gary. The only other link to the party 
would have been if Gary had been speaking in some official 
capacity, but Hampton denied this. In fact, the evidence is 
clear that the executive committee did not want Gary out
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speaking for the party.67 The argument could probably have
been strengthened by analyzing specific passages from Gary's
speech, but Hampton chose instead to refute the perceptions
from the address rather than the actual language itself.
Hampton next contended that it was not Gary's policy
which was successful in 1876, but his.
I believe that it was the conservative character of the 
last campaign, as contradistinguished from what he calls 
an "aggressive" one, that enabled us to carry the State. 
I believe that the appeals made to the colored citizens 
by men in whom they had confidence brought thousands to 
our support.
He offered no election statistics to back his claim but
relied on argument from authority. He claimed as evidence
for his contention
the fact that many more thousands will go with us in the 
coming election. They realize that they have been 
honestly dealt with. They recognize that all their 
rights have been unimpaired, and they appreciate the 
blessings of peace and increased prosperity which have 
followed the inauguration of Democratic rule.
While as it turned out he was correct in that he received 
widespread support from the blacks, one can't claim events 
yet future as evidence. Another fallacy was that satis­
faction with the Democratic administration did not prove 
which means got them into office. Even if elected by fraud 
they still could have carried out a policy that pleased the 
black constituency. To prove that he had been elected by 
the help of the blacks he needed, preferably, statistical 
data or at least authoritative testimony to bolster his
67See pp. 181-82 above.
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assertion. His statement of the positive attitude of the 
blacks that would cause them to vote Democratic in the next 
election not only didn't relate to how he had been elected 
in the past but was again an unsupported generalization. 
There was ample data available to indicate the satisfaction 
of many blacks with his policies, but he chose to ignore it, 
choosing rather to rely upon his ethos. While the logic was 
flawed and the support weak, it is highly probable that the 
only perturbation belongs to the critic and not his 
audience.
The longest part of his refutation focused on the 
Mississippi plan. In what was substantially an argument of 
definition, Hampton contended that it was slanderous to 
refer to the Mississippi plan as a "shot-gun policy." He 
compared the Mississippi canvass to the one in South 
Carolina:
In one sense their canvass was aggressive as ours was. 
They met the plunderers of their State at every point to 
denounce their corruption before the people. They 
devoted themselves, as did our people, heart and mind to 
the great work of saving their State, and they appealed 
to all honest voters to aid them in their patriotic 
undertaking.
He then provided the example of General Chalmers to support
this contention. Chalmers had won election to the United
States House of Representatives in a district with a large
black majority by appealing to them. Hampton had recently
seen an interview
in which the question was asked: What he [Chalmers]
would do if the Republicans sent speakers into his
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district to oppose his election? He did not threaten to 
Ku-Klux them or to intimidate them; he did not say that 
he would resort to the "shot-gun policy," but he said 
that he would give those visitors a cordial welcome; 
that he would offer them every facility to meet his 
constituents and that he would have them met everywhere 
by colored Democratic speakers.
Hampton then concluded, "This is the best commentary on the
Mississippi Plan, and that plan I am willing to adopt."
The purpose of the argument was to further isolate 
Gary and deprive his views of any legitimacy. Earlier he 
had isolated Gary from the Democratic party of South 
Carolina, now he prevented him from claiming the same policy 
as was used in a sister state. Hampton had also tacitly 
endorsed the Mississippi plan and it was important to 
distinguish what he had endorsed from what Gary advocated. 
The example of Chalmers was a good illustration of Hampton's 
interpretation of the Mississippi plan, but was far from 
proving that in fact it was the policy carried out in 
Mississippi. The letter from General Ferguson outlining the 
Mississippi plan would strongly suggest otherwise.68 While 
he could not prove that Gary's use of the term was illegiti­
mate, except again by his own authority, he did succeed in 
establishing the meaning he attached to the term.
He concluded this attack on Gary's misapplication of 
the Mississippi plan with the causal argument that had the 
policy of violence been followed, the election would have 
been lost; "Had we been so short-sighted as to have
68See p. 126 above.
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endeavored to carry the State at the last election by force 
or violence, martial law would have been proclaimed, and we 
should now be under the hateful rule of our oppressors." 
Again, Hampton offered no proof other than his word, but he 
could reasonably count on his audience's knowledge that 
federal troops had been brought into the state as a direct 
result of specific violence against blacks; thus, he 
extended the analysis to conclude that had the violence been 
widespread the entire state would have been placed under 
martial law. It was not an unreasonable extension of 
argument.
Hampton's second line of refutation was against what 
he considered personal attacks by Gary. In his response to 
Gray, Gary had said, "He [Gray] claims that the event [black 
and white militia marching together] is a natural result of 
'Hampton Democracy.' I suppose that we will next hear of 
'dining' or dancing with the colored brothers and sisters 
as . . . the natural result of 'Hampton Democracy.'"69 As 
discussed above, Hampton did not want to get into the 
substance of the attack because of the Claflin incident.
His reply, which focused on the phrase "Hampton Democracy," 
totally missed the issue. "Hampton Democracy" had not been 
coined by Gary but by Gray in his defense of Hampton's 
policies. So the phrase entered the dispute in a positive, 
not a derogatory, way and from a friend, not a foe. Yet
69Charleston News and Courier. 29 August 1878.
212
Hampton took umbrage at Gary's use of the term, and argued 
that he was not the founder of a school of democracy. Thus 
Hampton1s attack on Gary for use of the phrase was unfounded 
since Gary was merely repeating Gray; moreover, Hampton 
ignored the substance of the argument which dealt with the 
direction his policies were taking.
The constructive policy which Hampton developed for 
dealing with the blacks constituted one of the most complete 
statements on the subj ect in any of his speeches. Before 
making his proposals, he identified the problem and des­
cribed some of its characteristics.
The problem was the "adjustment of the relation of two 
distinct nations living on the same soil." It was one which 
was not temporary. "It is not a question of a day nor of a 
generation, but for all time to come, and we have to meet it 
now." His perspective was not a narrow one that looked 
exclusively at immediate political gain, but a broad one 
that considered the difficulties of two distinct groups of 
people living and working together over a long period of 
time. It was the correct perspective for viewing the 
problem.
The problem, he contended, was not created by the 
white southerners but the northerners who brought the slaves 
to the South, sold them, and then to mollify their con­
science set them free at no cost to themselves. But rather 
than spend time vilifying the Yankees, he accepted the
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present condition as a burden placed upon the southerner by 
an act of Providence: "We cannot tell what great object
Providence had in view in allowing these things to be done 
by which these people have been brought here and liberated 
in our midst." Providence, then, had also placed upon the 
whites the responsibility of caring for the blacks: "He has
brought them here, relieved them of their shackles and left 
them here untutored in mind, with all the prejudices a 
century of slavery has engrafted on them, and we are to be 
their guardians and protectors." The only flaw with this 
relationship was that others had come between the native 
white southerners and the blacks, and taught them that "we 
[whites] are natural enemies, politically at least, of the 
colored men," and "that if the Democratic party got into 
power he would be put back into slavery." In spite of that 
teaching, in all matters except voting, the blacks still 
felt a strong pull toward their old masters: "Personally
they have had kindly feelings for their old masters. Let 
one of them but get into difficulties, and in nine cases out 
of ten he will go to his old master for assistance, and not 
to one of his Republican leaders." There was, therefore, a 
role or an obligation for the whites to fulfill toward the 
blacks, and the natural ties from the past would enable him 
to carry out that role in all areas except the political, 
where the black had been deceived by northern adventurers. 
Now, he argued, under his policies the claims of the
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Republicans were exposed as lies, and there was no reason
for the blacks not to trust the white Democrats:
They have been at last dispossessed of the great error 
into which they were led by their designing leaders, and 
have found that they are protected in all their rights, 
and are as free now as they were in '76. . . . They see 
now that they were misled and are now willing in many 
instances to trust those whom they were taught to 
distrust.
His support for the changed attitude was "that while 
thousands voted the Democratic ticket at the last election, 
thousands more will support it at the next one."
The ideal relationship ordained by Providence was a 
benevolent paternalism of whites toward blacks. This 
proposition was strictly an assertion by Hampton, but one 
that he was safe in making. The tendency of blacks to seek 
aid from former masters was also unsupported, but Hampton in 
his 1876 campaign had frequently referred to his own experi­
ences with former slaves to support that contention, and the 
argument was not likely to be challenged by his audience.
The causal factor preventing the ideal relationship was the 
political distrust of the blacks. His administration had 
eliminated the mistrust, thus they were now in a position 
for the ideal relationship to be realized.
A new opportunity was before the Democrats, and 
Hampton moved into the means by which this new relationship 
could be permanently secured and maintained. The whites 
should: (1) recognize the political equality of the races;
(2) protect them in the exercise of all their rights; (3)
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manifest a kind disposition toward them; (4) provide 
facilities for their education; (5) encourage them to join 
the Democratic party and if they did, allow them to vote in 
the Democratic primaries; and (6) show them through justice, 
generosity, and magnanimity that the whites were their best 
friends. At the same time, blacks would not be given any 
preference because of race. Each man would have to stand 
upon his own merits, and positions would be filled by the 
most qualified men without regard to race. Most of these 
duties were not developed and had to be accepted on the 
authority of Hampton. The exception was education, which he 
developed extensively.
He first established the importance of education for a 
nation: "The greatest statesman and philosopher of England
has said that education is the chief defence of a nation, 
and no philosophical remark was ever made with greater 
truth." Realizing how sensitive this subject could prove 
for his up-country audience, he carefully qualified what he 
meant by education. "I am not one of those who believe 
[sic] that because a man can read and write he is neces­
sarily a better man than his fellow." As an example to 
prove his point, he recalled that during the war the 
northern men were better educated, but the southern men were 
better soldiers. Education, he concluded, was "not only 
intellectual education, but education of the heart and 
soul— to lift our people up and teach them that the only
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true knowledge is the knowledge of God." He then turned to 
ancient Greece to argue "that the best educated people the 
world has ever seen could neither read nor write." In 
addition to the educated Athenians who could neither read 
nor write were men of South Carolina in past generations. 
They were well versed in governmental and political theory, 
but they received it from "their great men who came fre­
quently through the country and discussed before them the 
great questions of the day." Once he had qualified his 
definition of education, he could then argue for both kinds:
I want not only that education, but the diffusion of a 
general education— that the rudiments at least should be 
placed in the reach of every man, and the colored people 
allowed the opportunity of bettering their condition. I 
want them to be made good citizens, and I believe it can 
best be done by giving to their children education.
Education would help them learn the "rights, duties and
responsibilities of citizenship." The results would be
beneficial to both white and black because "they will be
happier, and will make us happier."
His initial argument for education was a broad 
enthymeme that whatever was in the best interest of a 
nation was good; education was vital to the interest of a 
nation, therefore, education was good and by implication 
should be pursued. The minor premise was expressed as a 
quotation from a respected British source. The major 
premise and the conclusion were both unexpressed. His 
second argument was a more narrowly developed causal 
analysis. Education for the blacks would give them a better
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understanding of their role as a citizen which would in turn 
make for a better relationship between the races. The 
weakest link in the analysis was that a better informed 
black citizenry would work co the benefit of the whites. 
Idealistically he was probably correct, but one could also 
argue that as education for the blacks increased so would 
their desire for more influence in the government and that 
definitely would not have made a lot of whites happy.
In his fourth major area of argumentation, Hampton 
addressed the issue of dangers to the party. He identified 
two concerns: (1) independents who acted apart from the
spirit and letter of the platform, and (2) an overconfidence 
that tolerated political heresies. Though Gary's name was 
not mentioned in this section, both threats were indirect 
attacks upon him.
The greatest threat endangering the party was "that of 
an Independent movement." He carefully defined an indepen­
dent as one "who sets up his own individual judgment as a 
rule of action, and refuses to act in full and perfect 
accord with our platform, in spirit as well as in letter." 
The crisis of the times, presumably the threat of blacks and 
carpetbaggers regaining control of the government, demanded 
unity above all else:
Our party must be kept fully organized, perfectly 
compact, and thoroughly disciplined. Every member of it 
must yield implicit obedience to its dictates, sacri­
ficing, if need be, his private judgment to its 
expressed policy, and subordinating all personal 
ambition to the public welfare.
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Anyone who did not act in this manner should be considered 
an "enemy," and a "radical," for "an open enemy is far less 
dangerous than a pretended friend."
On the surface it was a general argument for Demo­
cratic unity, which was supported by Democrats across the 
state, including Gary. Below the surface, however, Gary was 
the intended target. In the early part of the speech, he 
had shown that Gary was acting in a manner that was totally 
inconsistent with the "spirit" and "letter" of the party 
platform. It was common knowledge Gary was pursuing his 
ambition for a seat in the United States Senate and apparent 
as well that Gary was putting his personal judgments on the 
race issue above the expression of the party. An editorial 
in the Charleston News and Courier attacked Gary for being 
out of step with the Democratic platform. "So long, 
however, as he approves of and stands by the Fourth Article 
of the Edgefield platform, he is not in accord with, and 
stands in opposition to, the assembled Democracy of the 
State."70 Finally, the "pretended friend" reference was 
almost directly from Hampton's letter to James Conner in 
which he disparaged Gary's "pretended support."71
The second danger was even more obviously aimed at 
Gary. The threat was an overconfidence that tolerated
70Ibid., 25 September 1878.
71Wade Hampton to James Conner, 5 September 1878, Wade 
Hampton Papers.
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deviation from the successful path of 1876:
The Democratic party thinks it is invincible, and it is 
so when thoroughly disciplined and properly led, but if 
we have divisions and dissensions, and if we allow 
ourselves or any men to set up false gods or indoc­
trinate us with political heresies and lead us from the 
straight road which led to victory in '76 . . . that 
party will be scattered as these leaves now shimmering 
above us will soon be scattered by the blasts of 
October.
The political heresies that would lead them astray were no 
doubt the ones he had been attacking throughout the speech. 
The audience had two choices: they could either follow the
policies of Hampton which would lead to victory, or "politi­
cal heresies" that created division and ultimately produced 
disaster. The choice was not a difficult one. The argument 
was nothing more than a restatement in general terms of the 
more specific argument employed earlier that the "shot-gun 
policy" would have led to martial law and carpetbag rule 
whereas his policy of moderation had been successful.
Hampton's position and his analysis were clear and 
reasonably well developed. More so than in most of his 
speeches, he provided support for his claims. He provided 
multiple documentation to support the commitment of the 
Democratic party, which was foundational to everything else 
he would argue. With regard to Gary, he provided a three­
fold analysis to prove Gary's inconsistency. With his 
constructive policy for blacks and analysis of dangers to 
the party, his line of argument was clear but resting
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primarily upon his authority and the knowledge in the heads 
of his audience.
Fitness of Response
Hampton's response to Martin Gary's challenge of his 
moderate racial policies was direct, aggressive, bold, and 
most appropriate. He perceived the exigence correctly as a 
rhetorical one in which the blacks had to be convinced that 
the Democrats would keep their pledges and allow black 
participation in party affairs, and whites persuaded that 
the promises were commitments that needed to be met. From 
the spring of 1878 until the election in November he spoke 
to both black and white audiences in all parts of the state. 
Whether the occasion was a political meeting or a festive 
one such as the Aiken Schutzenfest he consistently incor­
porated into his speeches a call for kind, fair treatment of 
the blacks as demonstrated by his administration. The 
blacks were not going to rule the state again, but they 
should be fairly represented.
Many of the themes were old ones such as the destinies 
of the two races being linked, and that which was in the 
best interest of the whites, but there was some remarkable 
new ground as well. Though he had been speaking on the 
subject since 1865 the utterances of this period marked his 
highest level of appeal. Repeatedly he framed the issue to 
his white audience in moral terms. The Gary policy of 
violence was wrong. Denying blacks who had voted with the
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Democrats a voice in the primaries was wrong. Abandoning 
promises made in good faith was wrong, and the moral 
principle was more important than the pragmatic gain, for it 
was better to fail doing right than to succeed doing wrong. 
Along with this new moral appeal was also a new dimension of 
statesmanship. He had consistently argued from a perspec­
tive of long term race relations, but during this period he 
placed more stress upon establishing policies that would 
solve the problems for generations to come. There were 
fewer negative statements regarding the blacks and more 
emphasis upon education, political participation, and 
economic improvement.
The appropriateness of Hampton's response, partic­
ularly the policies enumerated in the Greenville speech, is 
the subject of considerable difference of opinion among 
historians. Joel Williamson argues generally that Hampton 
was not "more willing than any of his followers to give the 
Negro political justice." To the contrary, "Hampton 
actually offered Negroes only the privilege of voting for 
himself and his followers, and he was in perfect harmony 
with those native whites who steadfastly refused to recog­
nize the Negro's political equality by joining with him in 
any political partnership.1,72 Thomas Holt, looking specifi­
cally at the Greenville speech concludes:
Wade Hampton seemed more interested in creating the
72Williamson, 406.
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image [emphasis in original] of liberality than its 
substance. . . .  In essence, he described a policy based 
on the illusion of color-blindness. He promised blacks 
a fair procedure [emphasis in original] in the selection 
of offices, not actual representation [emphasis in 
original] of their constituents in government opera­
tions.73
Holt then illustrates his point with the example of the 
special election of the Charleston state delegation in 1877. 
He cites the view of the Charleston News and Courier that 
blacks should be given proportional representation on the 
ticket, but when they received fewer than their proper 
proportion
the editor dismissed this discrepancy as being of little 
practical effect after all. "Upon the fair number of 
colored candidates we do not lay so much stress because 
every one of the seventeen members from Charleston will 
represent the colored people." Thus while great care 
should be taken to represent lawyers, doctors, and 
Germans, anyone could be counted on to represent 
blacks.74
In contrast to Holt and Williamson, George Tindall concludes 
that "under a regime of white supremacy Wade Hampton saw 
room for the talented and trained Negro and left open the 
door of advancement for the whole race." According to 
Tindall, Hampton "gave not only lip service to the pledges 
of 1876, but also active effort in carrying them out." 
Tindall further points out that "during his administration 
Hampton carried out the announced policy of naming the 'best 




of negroes to minor offices." Tindall then proceeds to 
document those appointments and the Hampton policy in 
general.75 The question then is whether Hampton's response 
was one of substance or appearance.
Williamson's statement seems so far off the mark that 
it is difficult to understand how he reached his conclusion. 
The whole Gary-Hampton controversy that has been documented 
above clearly shows that Hampton was most certainly not "in 
perfect harmony" with those who refused to recognize the 
political equality of the blacks. In Sumter he commended 
the county Democrats for putting up Westberry, a black man, 
for a seat in the state legislature.76 Throughout the 
state, Hampton encouraged counties with large black popula­
tions to divide the offices between them.77 Orangeburg 
County Democrats asked the black members of the party to 
select a proportionate number of their race to be on the 
ticket.78 While the offices and the number of blacks 
selected may not have been as great as Williamson desired, 
it was Hampton's leadership that was preventing the pro­
scription of blacks and providing in large measure support 
for the offices they received.
Holt's criticism is unrealistic and slightly
75Tindall, 21-26.
76Columbia Daily Register. 24 September 1878.
77Tindall, 23-24.
78Charleston News and Courier. 12 August 1878.
inaccurate. In his illustration of the Charleston special 
election as representative of the Hampton policy, he misses 
the point entirely. He quotes the opinion of the editor of 
the Charleston News and Courier. In a list of grievances 
against Hampton, Martin Gary revealed that the governor 
opposed the unseating of the original Charleston dele­
gation.79 Not only did he oppose the original action, but 
also he sent a message by James Conner encouraging the 
Charleston white Democrats to select a proportionate number 
of blacks.80 Thus, by his opposition to the unseating and 
his direct plea for proportional representation, he 
certainly seems to be consistent with the principles 
enunciated at Greenville. It is also difficult to under­
stand how Holt can fault Hampton for offering "a fair 
procedure" rather than guaranteeing "actual representation." 
It is not at all clear how Hampton could have guaranteed 
actual representation to any group. What does seem clear is 
that within his socio-political milieu he exercised to the 
degree possible both his authority to appoint blacks and the 
force of his persuasion to encourage an expanded role for 
the blacks.
Both Holt and Williamson appear to be judging Hampton 
with a twentieth century standard rather than measuring his
79Message "To His Excellency Wade Hampton, Governor of 
South Carolina," Martin Gary Papers.
80Charleston News and Courier. 20 June 1877.
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responses by the attitudes of his day. They are obviously 
bothered by the concepts of white supremacy and paternalism 
which were unquestionably part of Hampton's vision of good 
race relations. It is Tindall who is able to look at 
Hampton's actions and beliefs and evaluate them within their 
context:
The liberal nature of the Hampton program, however, 
should not be exaggerated, nor on the other hand, should 
it be condemned in the light of contemporary programs 
for Negro advancement. It was . . . basically a program 
of white supremacy. But there was in the Hampton view 
no necessary correlation between white supremacy and 
black proscription. His program did not carry the 
connotation that latterday white supremacists included 
of the complete elimination of Negroes from public 
life.
Tindall then concludes: "Given the situation in which he
found himself and the dominant spirit of the times, with 
both northern and southern white opinion accepting as 
axiomatic the innate inferiority of the Negro race, the 
Hampton program marks him as a generous and constructive 
statesman with regard to race relations."81 Considered thus 
within its context, his response was not image creation, but 
a substantive, appropriate response to a challenging exigence.
81Tindall, 20-22.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary
This investigation of Wade Hampton's racial rhetoric 
in South Carolina 1865-1878 was prompted by studies showing 
him as a prominent reconciliation speaker in the North, a 
major spokesman for the South, and a moderate on the race 
issue. Since no investigation of his speaking in South 
Carolina existed, this study attempted to assess his 
speaking in the state on the race issue. The dates repre­
sent the period of his active involvement in the contro­
versy. The major newspapers of the state were examined to 
locate his speeches, which were then categorized by period 
and subject. Those that contained racial passages were 
grouped for further study. These speeches were then 
critiqued employing the methodology of the rhetorical 
situation. This approach seemed most appropriate since it 
allowed the critic to view Hampton's speeches as a response 
to an urgent problem, which in fact they were, and to 
analyze the appropriateness of his response.
The plotting of his speeches revealed four periods of 
active speaking on the racial theme, with a different 
emphasis in each period. In 1865-66 he focused on the lost
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supply of laborers and the need through fairness and kind 
treatment to induce the former slaves to return to the 
fields, lest both white and black go down to economic ruin. 
In 1867-68 he directed his attention to the suffrage issue 
and sought to gain control of the black vote by offering a 
qualified suffrage. Personal matters took him out of active 
involvement in the affairs of the state until the campaign 
of 1876. In his campaign for governor, he went to the 
blacks seeking their assistance in redeeming the state from 
thieves and carpetbaggers. In the last period, 1877-78, he 
fought attempts from within the Democratic party to break 
his promises of 1876 and proscribe blacks from party 
participation.
Conclusions
At the beginning of the study a number of questions 
were posed. It is now possible to look back over the 
preceding chapters and posit answers to those questions.
(1) To what extent were Hampton's speeches in South 
Carolina from 1865 until 1879 concerned with the race issue?
Three general themes emerge in Wade Hampton's 
speaking: the Lost Cause, North-South reconciliation, and
race. The race question overwhelmingly dominates the other 
two. The Lost Cause theme was frequently employed in 
ceremonial addresses to various veterans' groups, both in 
and out of the state. Even on these occasions, however, 
Hampton would at times inject the racial theme as he did in
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his 1866 Walhalla address and the 1878 speech at the 
reception for the Washington Light Infantry. The recon­
ciliation theme was used more at engagements outside of the 
state than within it.
Of his thirteen known speaking occasions within the 
state during 1865-68, all but two were concerned to some 
extent with the racial issue. In all probability the actual 
number is higher since the number of speeches reported for 
the 1867-68 suffrage campaign does not seem to match the 
level of his involvement.
From 1869 until 1876 there is no evidence of a single 
speech delivered by him within the state on the racial 
issue. The only evidence of his addressing the issue at all 
during this period is his 1869 speech at the Macon, Georgia 
fair. He was out of the state for most of the period 
attending to personal and business matters. His speeches 
were ceremonial and centered around the Lost Cause theme.
Both the amount of his speaking and the proportion 
devoted to the racial issue increased enormously beginning 
with his 1876 gubernatorial campaign and lasting through his
election to the United States Senate at the end of 1878. In
the 1876 campaign there were at least fifty-seven major 
addresses plus his acceptance of the nomination and his 
inaugural. Thus,, during the five month period from August 
through December there were at least fifty-nine major
addresses that focused on the racial issue. His pace
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changed dramatically in 1877 with only three speeches 
delivered in the state, but all three dealt with the racial 
theme. He returned to a more active schedule in the state 
in 1878, delivering twenty-seven major addresses of which 
twenty-five incorporated the racial element. Not included 
in this number are short impromptu speeches delivered en 
route to campaign engagements. The number is smaller than 
it would have been had he not become ill and cancelled 
several of his campaign addresses.
Over the span of thirteen and one-half years from 
after the Civil War until his election to the United States 
Senate in 1878, it is possible to document 102 speeches 
delivered by Wade Hampton in South Carolina. Of those 
speeches ninety-eight dealt at least in part with the racial 
issue. Overwhelmingly, the dominant theme of his speaking 
in South Carolina from 1865 through 1878 was race.
(2) What arguments and strategies did he employ to 
deal with the racial situation?
There is no evidence of a clearly developed strategy 
by Hampton for dealing with the racial problem prior to the 
spring of 1867, yet his speeches during 1865 and 1866 were 
all consistent with the later plan of action. In letters to 
John Mullaly and James Conner in the spring of 1867 he 
clearly outlined his plan for dealing with the racial issue. 
His obj ectives were the obvious one of preventing the blacks 
from "overwhelming" the white minority and the less expected
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one of making a record for history. The only expression of
the latter goal was in his letter to John Mullaly:
We are appealing to the enlightened sense and the 
justice of mankind. We come forward and say we accept 
the decision rendered against us. We acknowledge the 
freedom of the negro and we are willing to have one law 
for him and for us. We are making up our record for 
posterity and we wish no blot or stain to be found 
there.1
Though this letter provides the only reference to the motive 
of a record for posterity in the approach to the blacks, his 
later affiliation with the Southern Historical Society 
suggests that he was concerned with how subsequent gener­
ations would view his actions. To James Conner he wrote in 
1869:
There is another matter on foot in New Orleans which 
promises immense good— the formation of a grand 
Historical Society with branches all over the south. I 
have promised to assist in this scheme. . . . We wish to 
put on record in an enduring form, the truths regarding 
our struggle for freedom, and thus preserve untarnished 
our glorious position and our heroic deeds. If we let 
the Yankees manufacture a history, as they do wooden 
nut-megs, we shall have of the former about as good an 
article as they gave us of the latter, and as much like 
the genuine.2
A key ingredient in achieving his objectives was to 
realistically assess the situation and adjust his plans 
accordingly. Prior to the war he had been a Union man 
opposed to secession, but when South Carolina withdrew from 
the Union he adjusted his stance and wholeheartedly
■̂Wade Hampton to John Mullaly, 31 March 1867, Wade 
Hampton Papers.
2Wade Hampton to James Conner, 11 April 1869, Wade 
Hampton Papers.
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supported the southern cause. After the war he repeatedly
counseled frank recognition of what had happened and the
need to accept new realities. On the need to face the
realities of the racial issue he wrote to John Mullaly,
I advocate a warm protest from the South against all 
this legislation of Congress, but protests can do us no 
good. We must meet it as a fact, one we have to deal 
with, and on the solution of which depends the very 
existence of our country.3
To Conner, he wrote in 1869,
It is criminal to say that because we do not recognize 
the present State Offices as constitutional, we refuse 
to take any part in the administration. We cannot be 
extricated from our deplorable condition by any help 
from abroad, we must work out our own political sal­
vation and work it out with such instruments as we find 
at hand.4
A realistic approach to the new conditions called for 
a strategy of controlling the black vote by saying "to the 
negroes, we are your friends . . . we are willing to let the 
educated and tax paying among them vote."5 To Mullaly, he 
indicated it meant "making the negro a Southern man and if 
you will a democrat, anything but a radical.1,6 The critical 
element in the strategy was a kind, benevolent attitude
3Wade Hampton to John Mullaly, 31 March 1867, Wade 
Hampton Papers.
4Wade Hampton to James Conner, 11 April 1869, Wade 
Hampton Papers.
5Ibid., 24 March 1867.
6Wade Hampton to John Mullaly, 31 March 1867, Wade 
Hampton Papers.
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toward the blacks by the whites:
As it is of the last consequence to maintain the same 
amicable relations which have heretofore existed between 
the whites and the blacks, I cannot too strongly 
reiterate my counsel, that all classes should cultivate 
harmony and exercise forbearance. Let our people 
remember that the negroes have as a general rule, 
behaved admirably, and that they are in no manner 
responsible for the present conditions of affairs.
Should they, in the future, be mislead by wicked or 
designing men, let us consider how ignorant they 
necessarily are, and let us only the more, try to 
convince them that we are their best friends. Deal with 
them with perfect justice, and thus show that you wish 
to promote their advancement and enlightenment.7
This realistic, pragmatic strategy even meant con­
cessions to and compromises with the blacks. The qualified
suffrage was an effort to divide the blacks along class
lines and draw to themselves the educated, propertied class 
of blacks whose interest in sound government and economic 
responsibility would most likely be parallel to their own.
It even meant giving some offices to the blacks:
Like you, I am only solicitous about our state govern­
ment, and if we can protect that from destruction, I am 
willing to send negroes to Congress. They will be 
better than any one who can take the oath and I should 
rather trust them than renegades or Yankees.8
A few weeks later he was even more direct, "We had better
endeavor to compromise with the negroes, allowing them to go
to Congress if they will let us have the State."9
7Wade Hampton to D. W. Ray, Wm. H. Talley, et al., 27 
August 1867, Wade Hampton Papers.
8Wade Hampton to James Conner, 24 March 1867, Wade
Hampton Papers.
9Ibid., 9 April 1867.
His strategy, then, came from a realistic, pragmatic 
assessment of conditions. It was an attempt to direct the 
black vote. An exercise of kindness and good will would 
reaffirm former ties of loyalty and friendship between 
masters and slaves and thus draw to them many of their 
previous slaves. The qualified suffrage and compromise on 
offices would split the blacks along class lines disfran­
chising the majority of blacks while drawing to them the 
upper strata of blacks. Of course, after 1868 the qualified 
suffrage aspect of the strategy had to be abandoned, but the 
rest remained intact. Finally, they were to appeal to the 
blacks in terms of mutual self interests and southern heri­
tage. In essence the strategy was almost exactly what 
Horace Greeley had suggested would have been the appropriate 
policy for the South to have pursued immediately after the 
war.
Aristotle said that the appeal from a man's character 
is probably stronger than either emotional or logical 
appeals. An analysis of Hampton's speeches revealed the 
prominent role of ethos in his arguments. Aristotle placed 
the emphasis upon ethos developed within the speech rather 
than that which preceded the speaker to the occasion. In 
Hampton's case, however, he drew heavily upon antecedent 
ethos as well as that developed in the speech. With his 
white audiences his reputation as successful planter and 
military hero was well established. Primarily because of
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the war, the admiration for the man was not divided by class 
or sectional lines. He was as popular in the up-country as 
in the low and with the merchants and small dirt farmers as 
with the aristocracy. Thus, there was little need to 
develop ethos among the whites. The only time he developed 
the ethos argument in speaking to whites was in 1878 when he 
linked his policies and his character and argued that to 
talk of going back on the pledges of 1876 was a direct 
threat to his integrity.
To his black audiences he developed at length the 
elements of trustworthiness, sincerity, and good will. In 
Richland Fork he was a man of truth and good will, who had 
the best interests of the blacks at heart. In the freed- 
men's address over one-third of the speech was spent 
establishing his trustworthiness, and a similar portion was 
used to build sincerity by showing the consistency of his 
approach since the war. The same was true in the 1876 
campaign when in almost every speech he argued the good 
relationship that had existed in the past between himself 
and his former slaves. Repeatedly he gave illustrations and 
examples of the respect and trust exhibited toward him by 
blacks. In 1878 he pointed to the fulfilling of his pledges 
as past evidence of his trustworthiness.
Hampton accurately recognized the pivotal role his 
character played in any appeal to blacks and correctly 
stressed those appeals. In order to achieve any degree of
235
success he had to convince them that he and the other whites 
could be trusted with their political future. In 1867 
Hampton could point to past examples of his good relations 
with blacks as justification for trusting him; however, the 
record of the white power structure since the war indicated 
they were not a safe repository for black rights. While the 
blacks might trust Hampton, he was in no position to make 
guarantees or speak in any official capacity. In 1876 the 
same appeals had greater impact since as candidate for
governor, he spoke for the party and with the power to carry
»
out his pledges.
Hampton's motive appeals were both positive and nega­
tive, and demonstrated some progression in his approach 
during the period. Self interest, particularly in terms of 
economic survival, was one of his most consistent appeals.
In 1865 he told the whites it was in their self interest to 
treat the blacks kindly and fairly because it was the best 
way to keep laborers for their farms. To the blacks he 
contended in 1865, 1867, and 1876 that their economic 
interest was intrinsically bound up with that of the whites. 
Instead of showing, however, the economic benefits that were 
possible if the whites thrived, the application was 
primarily negative, stressing how far down in the rubble 
heap the blacks would be if they let the whites go under.
In 1865 and 1867 he strengthened the fear dimension by 
adding reminders of what had happened to the Indians. He
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was correct in his assessment that the self interest of both 
blacks and whites required a working together but the 
emphasis was misdirected. When one has been on the lowest 
possible rung of the economic ladder, the threat of collapse 
is not terribly intimidating; a more compelling appeal would 
have been to hold out possible gains for them through mutual 
cooperation.
A second major appeal involved two dimensions: 
patriotism and identification. To the whites the appeal was 
to work and sacrifice for the good of South Carolina. For 
the blacks, however, before he could appeal to them for the 
good of the state, he had to get them to see themselves as 
Carolinians and southerners, thus the two pronged approach. 
In 1867 and 1876 he tried to transcend the racial and class 
differences and have the blacks view themselves as one with 
the whites in their heritage; he could then appeal to them 
as patriots. While the appeal was ideally suited to his 
white audience, it was painfully obvious to the blacks that 
they were not and had not been one with the native sons.
The South Carolina of the blacks was a totally different 
state from the one celebrated by the whites.
The progression in his thinking is seen in his 
speaking in 1878, and particularly in the Greenville 
address. The appeal was not to immediate self interest or 
economic survival but to a true patriotism that looked 
toward the long term solution of a profound sociological
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problem. The emphasis was positive in providing education 
and opportunity for the blacks. Finally, he placed his 
appeal on a new level, that of morality. Certain actions 
and approaches to the racial problem were wrong and his 
appeal was to do what was right.
In his argumentation Hampton utilized both construc­
tive and refutative approaches, and employed enthymemes, 
causal analysis, and generalizations. His arguments tended 
to be broad and sweeping in nature and frequently lacked 
adequate support. Rarely in any of the speeches did he 
engage in counter argumentation; it was almost as if his 
were the only conclusions possible. One conceivable 
explanation for his reliance upon his authority rather than 
evidence and his failure to engage in counter argumentation 
may rest with his background. As a wealthy planter, who 
managed several plantations, and a high ranking confederate 
officer, he was more accustomed to having his statements 
accepted at face value than having to support them with 
detailed analysis and evidence.
In 1865 he argued that the best way to keep crops in 
production and achieve a happy, contented, and laborious 
peasantry was through kind treatment. The only proof was 
his authority. In 1867 he contended that the interests of 
the blacks were bound up with those of the native whites and 
that the native whites were the best ones to have political 
control of the state. While he used valid lines of
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argument, his evidence did not adequately support his 
premises or his conclusions. In 1876 his emphasis shifted 
from constructive to refutative arguments. He had to refute 
the belief that the whites, once they got in power, would 
take away the rights of the blacks. The case here was one 
of the best constructed in all of his speeches. The 
analysis showing the threefold guarantee of rights by the 
whites, himself, and the blacks was brilliant, but at the 
same time the argument was flawed because the truth of two 
of his propositions was certainly susceptible to doubt, even 
though he supported them with evidence. His two construc­
tive arguments consisted of an enthymeme indicting the 
integrity of the radical office seekers and a causal 
argument dissuading the whites from violent tactics.
The Greenville speech in 1878 was probably his best 
use of argumentation; it was certainly his most extensive 
and well developed attempt at analysis. Two of his best 
constructive arguments dealt with the commitment of the 
party to the platform of 1876 and the need to provide 
education for the blacks. The former was a generalization 
which was well supported with examples, and the latter was 
an enthymeme with premises supported by historical example 
and authority. He advanced a detailed refutation of Gary's 
position but it did not match his other arguments. The 
analysis was valid, but his support was not adequate to 
prove his contentions.
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Overall, Hampton's analysis was generally valid, and 
his arguments pertinent to the question. His great weakness 
was a tendency to rely too heavily upon his audience to 
provide proof for his propositions or to trust his 
authority. Here one must realize that in some cases he was 
trying to establish a point for which all of the existing 
evidence was contrary to his thesis. In trying to prove in 
1867 and 1876 that the whites would preserve and protect 
black rights, the only direct evidence was the refusal of 
the whites to grant a qualified suffrage in 1865 and the 
passage of the harsh, restrictive Black Codes. Thus,
Hampton was faced with the challenge of advancing an 
argument with all of the evidence against him. It must also 
be remembered that while many of his arguments were not 
sufficient to meet the rigorous demands of the critic, 
Hampton's authority and the premises drawn from his 
audience's own experience were sufficient to secure the 
point.
(3) Did his position and strategies remain consistent 
throughout the period?
One of the rather surprising findings of this study is 
the consistency of Hampton's position. Only a little more 
than six months after the war, Hampton addressed an audience 
of blacks and whites at Richland Fork and made his initial 
statement on the approach to be adopted in the new racial 
climate. From that day until his departure for the Senate
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in 1879 his position did not change. His private corres­
pondence with political confidants elaborated upon and 
clarified his position but was internally consistent 
throughout the period and consonant with his public utter­
ances . The same policies were advocated before white 
audiences that were argued before black ones. His position 
in the up-country was no different in the low. In short, 
Hampton may be faulted for many things, but not for being 
inconsistent in his racial views. Apparently early on, he 
had a view of the new social, economic, and political 
relations in the post-war society and the means to achieve 
that goal. While the society about him underwent revolu­
tionary change, his vision and the means for achieving it 
remained essentially unaltered.
(4) To what extent did Hampton practice and encourage 
rhetorical means for solving the race problem as opposed to 
more coercive ones?
There is no direct evidence that Hampton ever prac­
ticed or encouraged anything but rhetorical means for 
solving the racial problem, and considerable evidence to 
establish his active opposition to violence, intimidation, 
coercion, and fraud as means of dealing with the blacks. The 
only reason to raise the question is because of some of the 
tactics employed in the 1876 campaign. Outside of this 
campaign there isn't even a shadow of tolerance for anything 
but persuasive means. There is no question but that
coercive methods were practiced in the campaign. Impor­
tantly, however, no one actually accused Hampton of being 
present where any violence or intimidation occurred. The 
Senate investigating committee concluded that Hampton was 
totally removed from all of the violent aspects of the 
campaign.10 Apparently there were two roads for the 
campaign, the high road of persuasion taken by Hampton, and 
the low road of violence and intimidation traveled by Martin 
Gary. The question is whether Hampton knew of the violence 
and gave tacit approval by ignoring it. There is no direct 
evidence on the question, so the answer is based strictly on 
inference. Considering the contacts he had and his promi­
nence in the campaign it seems almost impossible that he 
would not have known about the violence and intimidation 
that were taking place. Secondly, those who pursued the 
policy of violence perceived Hampton's approach as inimical 
to their own, and in 1878 he directly challenged Gary and 
his policies. The best conclusion seems to be that Hampton 
knew, at least in part, of some of the acts of violence and 
intimidation, and that he did not approve of the activities, 
but lacked the political clout to stop it. Not until his 
position was secure in 1878 could he move directly against 
the intemperate forces of Gary, and even then he was still 
unable to totally control the actions of his party. Hampton 
repeatedly avowed a commitment to persuasion as the means
10South Carolina in 1876. 138.
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for gaining black support, and his actions appear to affirm 
the sincerity of his commitment.
(5) To what extent did Hampton’s speeches offer a 
constructive solution to the problem of race relations in 
South Carolina?
In the conclusion of his Greenville address, Wade
Hampton spoke eloquently of his vision for the state.
I have been looking far beyond the present day— for it 
has seemed to me that I have been able sometimes to 
catch transient glimpses of the future through the veil 
that hides it from us— and I have thought that in that 
far future, in the day when you and I and all of us 
shall have been gathered to our God, I could see a great 
and happy State and people. Our children's children—  
wise by the errors we have committed, chastened by 
sorrows we vicariously have borne for them, instructed 
by the experiences we have gained— shall build up a new 
and great country. They will lift up South Carolina and 
place her where God intended her to stand— with a 
united, free and happy people, walking on the great road 
to National prosperity and peace. I have seen that 
future, and I have worked for it; I have prayed for 
it.11
Hampton had a vision of an ideal social order for a 
prosperous South Carolina, and toward this vision he worked 
and prayed. Before evaluating the vision one must first 
determine the character of his society.
The first tenet upon which Hampton's society was
constructed was white supremacy. In an 1888 article he
clearly and forthrightly stated and defended his position:
The question has been asked in some quarters, "What 
would be the effect upon the South, morally, socially, 
and commercially of the political supremacy of the 
negro?" Every one in the South who had the misfortune
^ Charleston News and Courier. 20 September 1878.
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to experience that baleful supremacy while it existed 
would answer, without hesitation, that it would involve 
total and absolute ruin to the South, and infinite and 
irreparable loss to the whole country. But a large 
class at the North, mainly honest and conscientious men, 
but knowing nothing of the condition of affairs at the 
South, and profoundly ignorant of the characteristics of 
the negro, think that he should, of right, rule, 
wherever his race is in the majority. To this class I 
shall address myself, and I shall endeavor to prove, by 
facts cited from the recent history of South Carolina, 
while under negro rule, how erroneous are their 
opinions, and how sound are those of the southern people 
who have had direful experiences of negro supremacy.12
At the conclusion of the article he quoted Abraham Lincoln
to show that the Great Emancipator held similar views on the
equality of the races, yet Lincoln "was equally emphatic in
expressing the utmost kindness for the negro. No one can
doubt that he was a sincere friend of the colored race.1,13
Repeatedly in his speeches in 1878 he reminded blacks that
while their rights would be protected and they could
participate in government, never again would they control
the state.
The second tenet was that the primary role for the 
black was as a laborer on large farms and plantations. At 
Richland Fork he had argued that kind treatment of the 
blacks would bring about "a happy contented and laborious 
peasantry." The blacks, however, were to be given the 
opportunity to acquire education and better prepare them­
selves for the responsibilities of citizenship. Those that
12Hampton, "Negro Supremacy," 2.
13Ibid., 14.
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were qualified by education and experience would have an 
equal opportunity to compete with whites for positions in 
government. Ideally he would have had only the educated and 
property holders voting, but that was taken out of his 
hands. Blacks should be encouraged to join the Democratic 
party and all black members should have full voting rights 
in party matters and primaries.
His vision has received a variety of labels from 
historians. Holt and Cooper see it, at least partially, as 
an expression of noblesse oblige.14 Williamson describes it 
as "paternal politics as they had given him paternal 
slavery."15 Tindall characterizes it as noblesse oblige, 
paternalism and white supremacy.16 They are all correct; it 
was all of those, but because those terms carry a strong 
negative connotation in late twentieth century society one 
cannot deprecate out of hand the application of those 
concepts in the latter portion of the nineteenth century.
One must consider the context and the alternatives.
Hampton's program was a significant improvement over the 
Black Codes of 1865 and the later violence and proscription 
of Gary and Tillman. It also represented a realistic 
assessment of what could be done. The program had to be 
within the latitude of acceptance of the whites or it would




have gone nowhere. As it: was, Hampton was operating on the 
very fringe of acceptability as he sought to expand the area 
of acceptance. As discussed earlier he was significantly 
ahead of other whites in 1867 when he called for a qualified 
suffrage, and though his program was being implemented from 
1876 to 1878 it was not without a struggle. His program was 
positive and constructive in that it offered the best 
attainable balance between a totally unacceptable black 
supremacy-on the one hand and proscription on the other and 
sought to establish persuasion, accommodation, respect, and 
equality of rights as means for solving for generations to 
come the complex problem of "two distinct nations living on 
the same soil."
(6) What was the apparent impact of Hampton's racial 
rhetoric?
From 1865 through 1868 Hampton's rhetorical efforts 
were apparent failures with no favorable results. In 1865 
the farmers preferred the Black Codes as a means of keeping 
their labor over Hampton's proposal for kind treatment and 
just compensation. In 1867-68 blacks rejected his plea to 
trust the native whites and qualify their suffrage. It was 
not all failure, however, since he established a wide 
reputation as a racial moderate. The New York Times. New 
York Herald. Harper1s Weekly, and the New York Daily Tribune 
all commended his moderate views and his persuasive efforts 
toward the blacks. The Richmond Times indicated pleasant
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surprise at Hampton's speech to the freedmen:
Light upon the intricate problems of "how to deal with 
the freedman" [emphasis in original] has broken in upon 
us from a most unexpected quarter. Wade Hampton of 
South Carolina . . .  is destined to become as 
distinguished as a sagacious, practical statesman, as he 
was a hero.17
By the time of the 1876 gubernatorial campaign he was 
clearly identified as a moderate on the racial issue, and 
one of the strengths in his appeal to the blacks was that he 
could point to a consistent position that went back ten 
years.
While Hampton's figure of seventeen thousand blacks 
voting with him in 1876 may be somewhat exaggerated, and 
while the precise number cannot be documented, blacks across 
the state in substantial numbers did listen to him, and 
several thousands of them voted for him. Hampton, uniquely, 
possessed the personal appeal that allowed him to bridge the 
gulf between the races. He was able to both rally and 
restrain the whites and persuade the blacks. Without his 
judicious application of rhetoric to the situation, it is 
highly doubtful that the whites would have carried the 1876 
election.
In 1878 his rhetorical efforts were directed at 
reaffirming and redeeming the pledges made two years 
earlier. In many counties with large black populations the 
problem was how to deal with the new influx of blacks and
17Richmond Times in Columbia Daily Phoenix. 26 March
1867.
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particularly their role in the candidate selection process. 
One cannot establish a direct causal link between Hampton's 
persuasive efforts and actual policies adopted in the 
counties, but significantly, the counties, with few excep­
tions, and the state convention adopted Hampton's position.
One certainly cannot discount the multiple factors 
that were at work during the period influencing racial 
attitudes and decisions, but clearly the rhetoric of Wade 
Hampton played a major part in helping define and shape the 
new black-white relationships in the post-war period.
In 1865 the world turned over for southerners. Not 
only had they lost the war, but with emancipation of the 
slaves their whole social order had been thrown into chaos. 
The attempt to restore order and define the proper relation­
ship between the races presented a problem of such com­
plexity and controversy that over a hundred years later it 
is still one of society's most pressing issues. The study 
of Wade Hampton provides insight into the efforts of one 
man, in one state, during one brief period to cope with the 
problem. He perceived the issues in terms of economic and 
political exigencies which could be modified through the 
application of rhetoric. His efforts demonstrate for the 
rhetorical critic the power and significance of a rhetor's 
personal character and the comparative roles of rhetoric and 
coercion as they were applied to the same objective. The 
substance of his solution to the exigence was not such as
would be appropriate in our day, but was in his, and at 
least provided a direction which if followed in succeeding 
generations might have removed the exigence from ours.
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